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Averting Mistaken Executions by Adopting
the Model Penal Code's Exclusion of Death in
the Presence of Lingering Doubt
MARGERY MALKIN KOOSED*

ABSTRACT

We are bound to execute an innocent person unless we make some
changes. This article urges adopting the Model Penal Code's exclusion of the
death penalty when the evidence does not foreclose all doubt respecting the
defendant's guilt. Adopting a modified version of the Code's section
210.6(1)(f) would both save innocent lives and lessen burdens on our justice
system. While the trial jury may convict on proof beyond a reasonable doubt
of capital murder, the case would not proceed to a penalty phase unless jurors
found the elements proven by a stronger standard.
Illinois is now reevaluating its system of capital punishment, desperately
seeking means of averting the execution of innocents. That real threat brought
Governor George Ryan to announce a moratorium on January 31, 2000, two
weeks after the thirteenth innocent person was freed from Illinois death row.'
* Professor of Law, University of Akron School of Law. Thanks to Lisa J.McGuire
for her extensive research and assistance in this project, and to Alissa Amsden-Michel, Amy
Corrigal, Angela Walls and Melinda Smith for their research assistance while students at the
University of Akron School of Law. I appreciate the support of the University of Akron School
of Law in providing a summer research grant for this project. In addition, I appreciate the
assistance of Kevin McNally for providing materials of help in this study, Phyllis Crocker for
her thoughtful suggestions, and Maria Sandys and Tim Ford for their bits of input as this article
neared completion. I also extend my gratitude to the capital defense counsel who responded
to a survey questionnaire, and to so many others who provided insights in innumerable seminars
and conversations and who work tirelessly to avert mistaken executions.
This article grows out of a presentation entitled "Averting the Mistaken Execution
of Innocent People," made at the Northern Illinois University Law Review's Ninth Annual
Symposium "Defense Strategies in Death Penalty Litigation" on March 23, 2000. That
presentation included a brief sketch of the reform measures then the subject of consideration
by Illinois legislative, court and executive committees in the wake of a moratorium on
executions announced by Governor George Ryan. It also contained a number of suggestions
for reform at the trial and appellate levels that are not developed in this article.
1. Announcing the moratorium, Governor Ryan decried the Illinois system as one that
was "so fraught with error and has come so close to the ultimate nightmare" of executing an
innocent that executions must be suspended. Ken Armstrong& Steve Mills, Ryan: "Untillcan
be sure": Illinois Is FirstState to Suspend Death Penalty, Cm. TRIB., Feb. 1, 2000, § 1, at I
[hereinafter Illinois Is First]. The State had a "shameful record of convicting innocent people
and putting them on Death Row." Id. Illinois had executed twelve persons in the period from
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The risk of wrongful execution has drawn national concern. Legislative
proposals in Congress and elsewhere enlist science and technology in hopes
of averting the nightmare of a wrongful execution.' This article looks to juries
and judges to help avert that nightmare. It looks to human understanding,
human limitations and human responses to avert tragedy.
This article considers community views on the risk of mistaken
executions and how sentencing juries respond to such risks. It explores the
present state of the law surrounding risk-taking, and finds the law in a state of
denial. Though the risk may be there, and jurors may see it, this is not
something they are directed, or even invited, to consider. Some jurors may
deny effect to the risk they see, believing it is not a proper subject of their
attention. Others will consider it, yet wonder whether they should. This
inconsistent treatment, and dissonance from what the public wants and
justifiably expects from its legal system, is largely a product of the United
States Supreme Court's 1988 decision in Franklin v. Lynaugh., Arguably
misread, and at least misguided, the Court's decision on considering lingering
or residual doubts about guilt as a mitigating factor at the penalty phase has
retarded development of meaningful ways to avert mistaken executions.
Courts and legislatures continually look to the Model Penal Code for
solutions to capital punishment litigation questions. But they have overlooked
the Code's provision excluding death in the presence of lingering doubt, and
it is time for its adoption, in modified form.
The Code mandates the trial judge exclude death if the evidence does not
foreclose all doubt about guilt. It establishes a modified bifurcated (almost a
trifurcated) process: a trial phase to the jury and/or judge; an exclusion
determination by the judge; and, if exclusion does not occur, a penalty phase
before the trial jury and/or judge.
Leaving the exclusion issue to the judge alone excludes the jury from a
decision they are fully and (arguably) best able to make, they are sometimes
already making, and in the wake of the recent Apprendi v. New Jersey/
decision, they may be constitutionally required to make. The information the
1976 to 2000, when the moratorium took effect. Execution Update, DEATH Row U.S.A.
(Capital Punishment Project, NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., New York, N.Y.), July

1, 2000, at 7. Illinois therefore had freed more innocents from death row than it had executed.
There were over 160 inmates on Illinois death row when the moratorium went into effect; the

NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund listed 167 inmates on death row as of April 1,
2000. Execution Update,DEATH Row U.S.A. (Capital Punishment Project, NAACP Legal Def.
& Educ. Fund, Inc., New York, N.Y.), April 1, 2000.
2. See, e.g., Innocence Protection Act, S. 2073, 106th Cong. (2000) (proposed by
Senator Patrick Leahy).
3. 487 U.S. 164(1988).
4. 120 S.Ct. 2348 (2000).
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jurors need to make this decision is before them. Studies show jurors are
discussing both penalty and exclusion in the trial phase, though prematurely
under present law and without the guidance of judicial instructions. Studies
also show jurors may slip into convicting for an offense for which they
believed they should acquit in order to avoid a hung jury and the risk of a
death sentence by a later jury, in return for assurances of a life sentence at the
penalty phase. These studies suggest that bifurcation of the trial and penalty
phase is not working in this setting, that jurors want to reach the penalty issue
and may return less reliable trial phase verdicts to assure against death in
lingering doubt cases.
Having the jury make the foreclose-all-doubt finding during the guiltinnocence phase deliberations is the solution to these bifurcation and risk of
error woes. The jury has the information they need, and jury instructions and
verdict forms are readily propounded for this purpose. Obliging jurors to
make the finding should reduce the risk of unwarranted convictions, and
making this a requirement in all cases should eliminate arbitrary and
inconsistent premature decision-making. Making the finding before the
penalty phase will enhance the assurance of averting mistake and decrease the
burden on the system. The penalty phase of a capital case is costly, in
financial and human terms. Life sentences would be returned due to lingering
doubt in all or nearly all these cases anyway. The exclusion of death should
occur at a point when the costs of an unnecessary penalty phase can be
avoided.
Trial jurors or, if there is no jury, the trial judge, should be obliged to
make this finding in the trial phase. If exclusion does not occur at the trial
phase, the issue of lingering doubt would not be revisited in the penalty phase
unless there was relevant evidence going to that question which could not be
submitted in the trial phase.' In the event a death verdict is returned by a jury,
the trial judge should be obliged to make its own finding on whether the
evidence forecloses all doubt, and to impose death only if it does.
If we are to have capital punishment, reasonable assurances against
mistake must be adopted. A modified Model Penal Code approach is a
reasonable, workable and cost-effective measure to enhance our chances of
averting a nightmare.

5. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that evidence which is
inadmissible in the trial phase may still be admitted in the penalty phase to assure the greater
reliability needed in capital cases. Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979) (per curiam).
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I. RISKING MISTAKEN EXECUTIONS
A. REALIZED AND RESPONDED TO IN ILLINOIS

Illinois is the right place to address how to avert mistaken executions.
Hard-working lawyers, journalists, investigators and students have averted
thirteen mistaken executions here. Thirteen innocent lives were nearly lost,
but reclaimed. Fallibility has been demonstrated and remedied. Each branch
of the state's government has now committed to review the capital litigation
process and take steps to ensure greater reliability. Recognizing the risk of
error had been realized, Republican Governor George Ryan declared: "Until
I can be sure with moral certainty that no innocent man or woman is facing a
lethal injection, no one will meet that fate."'6 With that, Governor Ryan
became the first Governor to impose a moratorium on executions since they
resumed in 1976.
In Illinois, where the risk has been realized, everyone appears willing to
listen and think creatively about ways to ratchet up our legal system and make
it less likely we will execute the innocent. There are many measures that can
be adopted. Some will be described in this article. But before looking to
reasonably workable, but still complex, solutions, the courts, legislators and
citizens may wish to consider the simplest and surest measure. That is simply
to stop executing people. Our system is fallible; there will always be a margin
of error. Though ratcheting it up is an improvement with some promise,
Illinois should consider the certain solution. For the sake of certainty, of
respect for fairness, of closure for victims' families, of better-funded efforts
such as community policing that can actually make a difference in reducing
crime and finally, for the sake of respect for human life, Illinois may conclude
it is best to stop.
But not all have come to Justice Harry Blackmun's view that this noble
experiment to find a reliable, non-arbitrary and non-discriminatory death
6. Illinois Is First,supra note 1, at 1.
7. The American Bar Association called for a moratorium three years earlier. ABA
EndorsesMoratoriumon Imposition ofDeath Penalty, 60 CRIM.L.REP. (BNA) 1434 (Feb. 12,
1997). The ABA House of Delegates voted for a moratorium until all jurisdictions conformed

to previously adopted ABA policies aimed at ensuring fairness and impartiality in the
administration of capital punishment. i Moratorium measures have now been passed in many
cities, and such measures are being considered in many states. For up-to-date information on

the moratorium movement, see the Quixote Center's Moratorium Now website at
http://www.quixote.org/ej (last visited April 13, 2001). The Secretary General of the United
Nations called for a worldwide moratorium on December 18, 2000. after receiving a petition
signed by 3.2 million people. DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., THE DEATH PENALTY IN2000: YEAR
END REPORT(2000), at http:llwww.deathpenaltyinfo.orglyrendrptOO.html. AsofDecember 19,
2000, there were 3,703 persons awaiting execution in the United States. Id. tbl.
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sentencing system has indeed failed.' Six years ago, Justice Blackmun wrote,
"The inevitability of factual, legal, and moral error gives us a system that we
know must wrongly kill some defendants." 9
That risk of mistake drove Justice Blackmun to declare he would no
longer "tinker with the machinery of death," no longer try to make the system
work at a level where the risk of such error could be reduced to tolerable
limits.'0 But many are still willing to tinker in the face of these risks.
Thankfully, those willing to and committed to tinkering are at least not
"coddl[ing] the court's delusion that the desired levels of fairness [have] been
achieved and the need for regulation eviscerated."" It is good to be in a state
where the delusion has been banished and where, at least, significant tinkering
is underway.
B. A CONCERN FOR PROPONENTS AND ABOLITIONISTS ALIKE

We are in the midst of a national debate over the risk of mistake and what
to do about it.' 2 Everyone has a stake in this concern, whether they are die-hard
proponents or avid abolitionists. As former prosecutor and now law professor
Craig M. Bradley has written, reducing the risk of error may be essential to
maintaining the death penalty in Illinois and elsewhere. 3 "[S]upporters might

8. Callins v.Collins, 114S. Ct. 1127, 1128 (1994) (mem.) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

9. Callins, 114 S. Ct. at 1130 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Governor Ryan may be
inching toward that conclusion. Recent news reports suggest he is "convinced that 'moral
certainty' in capital cases isn't possible." Bruce Shapiro, A Talk with Governor GeorgeRyan,
THE NATION, Jan. 8, 2001, at 17.

10. Callins, 510 U.S. at 1131 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
11. Id. This view is echoed by the Illinois Supreme Court justice who chaired the
Court's committee that recently proposed "new rules that set minimum standards for lawyers,
require training for judges and remind prosecutors oftheir duty to seekjustice": "Idon't suggest
for a moment that, by what we've done, we have finished the job." Steve Mills, BarRaisedfor
CapitalCase Trials: State High CourtSets Standards,CIn. TRIB., Jan. 23, 2001, § 1, at I.
12. Ninety persons have been released from the nation's death row on grounds of
innocence since 1973. The Death Penalty in 2000: Year End Report, supra note 7, at 1.

Professor Michael Radelet, who has conducted much of the research on wrongful executions,
estimates that one in seven persons are wrongly executed in the United States. See Hugo Adam
Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriagesof Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN.

L. REV. 21 (1987); Videotape: Wrongly Convicted - How the Innocent Are Sent to Death Row:
A Definitive Symposium (Michigan State University School of Criminal Justice & Michigan
Coalition Against the Death Penalty 1999); see also C. RONALD HUFFET AL, CONVICTED BUr
INNOCENT: WRONGFULCONVICTION AND PUBLIC POUCY (1996). But see Stephen J. Markman
& Paul G. Cassell, Protectingthe Innocent: A Response to the Bedau-RadeletStudy, 41 STAN.

L. REV. 121, 152 (1988) (arguing that the risk of error is outweighed by interest in deterrence,
retribution and incapacitation).
13.

See Craig M. Bradley, A (Genuinely) Modest Proposal Concerning the Death

Penalty, 72 IND. L.J. 25 (1996).

20011

AVERTING MISTAKEN EXECUTIONS

well be even more concerned about this problem than opponents since, if even
a few demonstrably innocent people are executed, public opinion is likely to
turn against the death penalty as an acceptable criminal sanction."' 4 Professor
Bradley is probably greatly underestimating what is at stake for proponents.
One mistaken execution may be enough to bring abolition." And thirteen
averted mistakes seem enough to bring about a moratorium with support from
proponents of the death penalty."6 Opinion polls show a drop in support in
Illinois, though only the great risk of executing the innocent has been
confirmed.'7 Concerns about executing the innocent are also being voiced
elsewhere and are affecting views on the death penalty." The growing
consensus surrounding Senator Leahy's proposed Innocence Protection Act

14.

Id. at 25; see also id. at25 n.l (referencing that England abolished the death penalty

in 1957 in part as a response to the execution of one or more persons deemed innocent).

15. See Thorsten Sellin, The Death Penalty, in MODEL PENAL CODE 64 (Tentative
Drafts Nos. 8-10, 1959) ("It is claimed that both Maine and Rhode Island abolished the death

penalty because of the execution, in each of these states, of an innocent person.") (citation

omitted).
16. Governor Ryan himself favored the death penalty, and the moratorium was
supported by other proponents, including the State Attorney General, the Cook County
prosecutor and state legislators. IllinoisIs First,supra note 1, at 1. As one legislator put it:
"My guess is virtually every member of the State Republican caucus supports the death penalty,
and I don't know how any of us could oppose the governor wanting to make sure that the deathpenalty system, the most important cornerstone of Illinois criminal law, is working properly.
How can you not want to make sure?" Id. at 4.
17. Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, Death Penalty Support Erodes: Many Back Life
Term As an Alternative, Clmi. TRB., Mar. 7, 2000, § 1, at I [hereinafter Death Penalty Support
Erodes]. Support for the death penalty among registered voters fell from 76% in 1994 (a poll
taken after two innocents had been freed) to 63% in March 1999 (after several more inmates
were exonerated), to 58% in March 2000 (after thirteen had been freed). Id. Opposition to the
death penalty rose from 15% in 1994 to 22% in 2000. Id. When Illinois citizens were polled
on their views on the death sentence as opposed to life imprisonment with absolutely no chance
of parole, they were nearly evenly split: 43% favored death, 41% favored life and 16% had no
opinion. Id.
18. An increasing number of persons in other states believe that innocent people will
be convicted and executed. In Ohio, nearly 68% of those polled believed this was very or
somewhat likely, up from 46% in 1997. Alan Johnson, Death-PenaltySurvey Results Provide
Mixed Message,COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov. 20, 1999, at 18. In Connecticut, 30%believed it
likely that Connecticut will execute an innocent person. Associated Press, Poll: Most People
Support Capital Punishment (Jan. 7, 2000), WL 117/00 APWIRES 08:03:00 (relating a poll
conducted by the Hartford Courant (Conn.)). Further, over 80% of Missourians polled this fall
said that discovering "[t]hat some executed are later found to be innocent" affected their opinion
about the death penalty, and 56% supported a three-year moratorium on executions to
investigate. CTR. FOR SOC. Scis. & PuB. PoucY RESEARcH, SOUTHWEST Mo. STATE UNIV.,
TELEPHONE SURVEY OF MissOuRi RESIDENTS' OPINIONS ON THE DEATH PENALTY i (1999), at
http://www.umsl.edu/divisions/artscience/forlanglit/mbppoll.html. Nationally, support for the
death penalty has dropped from 80% in 1994 to 66%in March 2000, according to a Gallup poll.
Death Penalty Support Erodes, supra note 17, at 1.
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demonstrates this shared concern. 9 The concern that we may have executed
an innocent person lingers long after the inmate is killed. Eight years after
Roger Keith Coleman's execution, a lawsuit has been filed to gain access to
the forensic evidence and conduct DNA testing.' The reticence on the part of
a state attorney to turn over the evidence, and her suggestion that public
interest was limited to important matters, and that this was not one of those
matters, 2 is belied by this shared and abiding moral concern.
While there are those who believe the death penalty is unnecessary,
unwise, arbitrary, and far too costly, and so oppose it for other reasons beyond
its potential for mistake, it is important for its supporters that the death penalty
at least be used on the right people. Without that, it is rather difficult to
convince the public that they should nonetheless tolerate the arbitrariness and
cost." Reliable judgments must underlie executions, or the public will turn
away.
C. THE MODEL PENAL CODE'S RECOGNITION OF RISK AND ITS RESPONSE

The American Law Institute considered the risk of mistaken executions
when crafting the Model Penal Code in the late 1950s and early 1960s.
Thorsten Sellin, who had prepared reports for the Royal Commission on
Capital Punishment that later recommended abolition of the death penalty in
England, prepared a report for the Institute containing data on the death
penalty.' He hoped "the facts presented would afford a basis for a judgment
as to whether the death penalty should be excluded or retained in a modem
penal code."2 4 In a section of the report entitled "Errors of Justice," he wrote:

19.

Senate Bill 2073, "[a] bill to reduce the risk that innocent persons may be executed,

and for other purposes," was introduced in the 106th Congress, 2nd Session, by Senator Leahy.
The proposed "Innocence Protection Act" speaks principally to exonerating the innocent
through DNA testing, ensuring competent legal services in capital cases and compensating the

unjustly condemned. There is bipartisan support for some DNA testing legislation; "a
Republican counterproposal would limit tests to those convicted before DNA technology
existed and who could show that a test alone would prove their innocence." Brooke A.Masters,
DNA Testing in Old Cases Is Disputed, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2000, at Al.
20.

Frank Green, State Objects to More Testing: DNA Work Sought on Executed Man,

RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (Va.), Oct. 7, 2000, at Al.

21. Id.
22. See generally Ronald J. Tabak & J. Mark Lane, The Execution oflnjustice: A Cost
and Lack-of-Benefit Analysis of the Death Penalty, 23 LOy. L.A. L. REV. 59 (1989); RICHARD
C. DIETER, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., MILLIONS MISSPENT: WHAT POLITICIANS DON'T SAY
ABOUT THE HIGH COST OF THE DEATH PENALTY
(1994), at

http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.orgdpic.r08.html.
23. Sellin, supra note 15, at iii.
24. Id.
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Human justice can never be infallible. No matter how
conscientiously courts operate, there still exists a possibility
that an innocent person may, due to a combination of
circumstances that defeat justice, be sentenced to death and
even be executed. That possibility is made abundantly clear
when one considers the many instances in which innocent
persons have been saved from the extreme penalty either by
the last minute discovery of new evidence or by a
commutation followed, perhaps after many years in prison,
by the discovery of the real criminal....
The argument has been heard that such occasional
errors, while deplorable, are nevertheless excusable and are
outweighed by the great service to society, which the death
penalty is believed to render by its deterrent power. This
would seem to be the only logical defense but it has no basis
in fact. Those who advocate the use of the death penalty
only because they regard it as a just or well-deserved
retribution for crime, or atonement for taking a human life,
would probably be unwilling to defend the execution of an
innocent person. 25
The American Law Institute (ALI) was "faced with the preparation of a
penal code which is to reflect the best thinking of the day and therefore be
worthy of adoption by legislative bodies."2' 6 Ultimately, it took no position on
"the issue of whether or not the death penalty should be employed. 27
However, the ALI did craft a provision to govern such prosecutions in
jurisdictions choosing to pursue death as a punishment. That is reflected in the
Official Draft of the Model Penal Code, dated May 4, 1962, as section 210.6.
Section 210.6, entitled "Sentence of Death for Murder; Further
Proceedings to Determine Sentence," did indeed become a model for
legislatures.2' Many jurisdictions looked to the Model Penal Code when
death-sentencing statutes around the country were struck down in the wake of
the United States Supreme Court decision in Furman v. Georgia29 ten years
later. Subsection two of Model Penal Code section 210.6 provided for a non25.

Id.at 63, 65.

27.

Id.; see also MODELPENALCODEANDCOMMENTARIES § 210.6, at 107,111(1980).
MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, supra note 27, § 210.6, at 167.

26.

28.

29.

Id. at iii.

408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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mandatory death-sentencing scheme. The judge and the jury (or the judge if
the defendant had waived a jury) would conduct a separate proceeding to
determine whether the defendant found guilty of murder should be sentenced
for a felony of the first degree or sentenced to death.3 This bifurcated capital
trial would consist of a trial phase (or a guilt-innocence phase) and a penalty
phase (a sentencing phase) when death was an eligible punishment.
Subsection three of section 210.6 delineated aggravating circumstances, and
subsection four listed mitigating circumstances. 3 The jury and judge were to

"take into account" these factors and "any other facts that it deem[ed]
relevant" in determining the sentence. 2 The jury or judge's discretion was
limited under section 201.6(2): "[lIt [the jury or the judge] shall not impose or
recommend sentence of death unless it finds one of the aggravating
circumstances enumerated in Subsection (3)and further finds that there are no
mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency."33
True to its name, the Model Penal Code serves as the model for our
present procedures of capital sentencing. The Code bifurcates the trial and
sentencing phases, requires the finding of an aggravating circumstance and
mandates the consideration of the listed mitigating circumstances and any
other facts deemed relevant. These are the foundational precepts of American
capital litigation. When the United States Supreme Court addressed whether
death could be constitutionally imposed, the Court responded with a
conditional "yes." The constitutional conditions were those precepts found in
the Model Penal Code. Gregg v. Georgia,3 Woodson v. North Carolina,3' and
Lockett v. Ohio' made the Model Penal Code provisions the constitutionally
permissible death-sentencing framework. The Court explicitly adopted the
Model Penal Code's bifurcated structural approach and showed respect for the
factors included in the Code's aggravating and mitigating circumstances." In

30.
31.
32.

MODEL PENAL CODE

34.
35.
36.

428 U.S. 153 (1976).
428 U.S. 280 (1976).
438 U.S. 586(1978).

33.

Id. § 210.6(3)-(4).
Id. § 210.6(2).

§ 210.6(2) (1980).

Id.

37. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 190-94; see also California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1009 n.23
(1983); Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633,636-37 (1977); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 290 (1976);
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 270-72 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 247-50 (1976).
It may be noted that the Court regularly looks to the Model Penal Code when interpreting
federal criminal statutes. See, e.g., Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1999) ("That
holding has been repeatedly cited with approval by other courts and by scholars. Moreover, it
reflects the views endorsed by the authors of the Model Criminal Code [sic].") (citations
omitted).
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1980, the Model Penal Code Commentaries summarized these developments

since the Code's drafting in 1962: "Section 210.6 of the Model Code is a

model for constitutional adjudication as well as for state legislation."38
But while some portions of the Code have risen to constitutional status,
other portions of the Code seem to have been left behind. Section 210.6's

subsections two through four set the path to pursue death. But nearly forgotten
is the critical first subsection that barred the path to death in certain
circumstances. That subsection reflects the American Law Institute's costbenefit analysis of the death penalty. That subsection "reflects the best

thinking of the day," respecting when death is to be possible and when it is to
be foreclosed.

Drawing on the reports it had received, and recognizing the need to avert
"Errors of Justice," the Institute barred death where "although the evidence

suffices to sustain the verdict, it does notforeclose all doubt respecting the
defendant's guilt."39 The Commentaries relate:

This provision is an accommodation to the irrevocability of
the capital sanction. Where doubt of guilt remains, the

opportunity to reverse a conviction on the basis of new
evidence must be preserved, and a sentence of death is
obviously inconsistent with that goal.'

reads:

38.
39.

MODEL PENALCODE ADCOMMENARES,*supra note 27, § 210.6, at 167.

MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(1)(f) (emphasis added). The entire subsection one

Death Sentence Excluded. When a defendant is found guilty of murder,
the Court shall impose sentence for a felony of the first degree if it is
satisfied that:
(a) none of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in Subsection (3)
of this Section was established by the evidence at the trial or will be
established if further proceedings are initiated under Subsection (2)
of this Section; or
(b) substantial mitigating circumstances, established by the evidence at
the trial, call for leniency; or
(c) the defendant, with the consent of the prosecuting attorney and the
approval of the Court, pleaded guilty to murder as a felony of the
first degree; or
(d) the defendant was under 18 years of age at the time of the
. commission of the crime; or
(e) the defendant's physical or mental condition calls for leniency; or
(f) although the evidence suffices to sustain the verdict, it does not
foreclose all doubt respecting the defendant's guilt.
Id. § 210.6(1).

40.

MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES,

supra note 27, § 210.6, at 134.
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The Model Penal Code's capital sentencing provision directly addresses
and effectively responds to the most critical issue presently occupying the
body politic in jurisdictions that are executing their own: Are we executing an
innocent person?
If we are going to continue on the path of execution rather than abolition,
then it is incumbent on state legislators and courts to acknowledge the risk of
executing the innocent or those undeserving of death, and respond to the
concerns of citizens that this risk must be reduced. The Model Penal Code
offers a solution worthy of adoption.
By interjecting an exclusion of death inquiry, the Model Penal Code
essentially established a trifurcatedor modified bifurcated procedure: a trial
phase to determine guilt or innocence, an exclusion phase to determine if death
is precluded, and a penalty phase to determine if death or life should be
imposed.
The benefits of modifying the bifurcation practice now used in capital
cases will be discussed below. But first, it is important to test whether the
Model Penal Code's exclusion of death fits contemporary thinking, and to
ascertain the present state of the law surrounding doubt and death-sentencing.
II. JUROR RESPONSE TO THE RISK OF MISTAKE
A. WHY LOOK TO JUROR RESPONSE?

The Model Penal Code exclusion provision reflected the "best thinking
of the day" forty years ago."' To discern whether legislators or courts should

pursue this provision now requires some assessment of whether it is consistent
with present opinion. Courts traditionally look to the practice of juries in
making such assessments. When assessing whether death-sentencing violated
the Eighth Amendment, which "must draw its meaning from the evolving
42
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,' the Court
looked to jury-sentencing behavior as one source of information on what
43
contemporary American society saw as acceptable punishment. ' The Court
found the "jury is a significant and reliable objective index of contemporary
values because it is so directly involved" in decision-making." In choosing

41. Seilin, supra note 15, at iii.
42. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion), quoted in Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).
43. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 181 (1976). The Court also looked to legislation
among the states. Id. at 174 n.19; see also Woodson v. North Carolina. 428 U.S. 280, 294-95
(1976).
44. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 181.
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the punishment," 'one of the most important functions any jury can perform
... is to maintain a link between contemporary community values and the
penal system.' "' So jury behavior can help assess whether the Model Penal
Code exclusion reflects present-day thinking on the appropriateness of
punishment in the presence of doubt.
Before proceeding to examine jury behavior, it should be acknowledged
there is concern whether jury decision-making is wholly reliable as an
objective indicator of society's values for purposes of this evolving standards
inquiry. Professor Barbara Raeker-Jordan has urged that
lj]ury sentencing behavior should not be employed at all as
an index of society's views because the capital jury's
composition does not mirror society and because its
decisionmaking has been influenced toward death from the
outset. If jury sentencing behavior is used as an index, it
must be used with caution and an awareness that the process
may not yield an objective result. . . . Because public
opinion could clamor for just those punishments that should
be considered cruel under ordinary definitions, which
clamoring would find its way into jury decisions and
legislative enactments, these forms of public opinion cannot
be bootstrapped into usurping and, by that usurping,
eliminating the restricting function of the constitutional
provision.'
Professor Raeker-Jordan questions the Court's displacement of traditional
measurements of deterrent or retributive interests served by the punishment,
international practices and recognition of the dignity of man.4 7 These concerns
are appropriate. Focusing on jury behavior can improperly limit the Court's
willingness to scrutinize. But that problem is not presented here. Executing
an actual innocent should offend the Eighth Amendment under any analytical
approach. Should the Court ultimately reach the question of a free-standing
convincing claim of innocence and turn that argument aside,"8 we will then
know the Eighth Amendment has indeed been rendered "meaningless."' 9

45. Id. (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968)).
46. Susan Raeker-Jordan, A Pro-Death, Self-Fulfilling Constitutional Construct: The
Supreme Court's Evolving Standard of Decency for the Death Penalty, 23 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 455, 552 (1996).
47. Id. at 553-54.
48. Cf Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
49. See Raeker-Jordan, supra note 46, at 554.
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More to the point, the focus here is not to pinpoint the evolving standard
of human decency for purposes of constitutional analysis, though that
evolution should be expected. The focus here is whether the Model Penal
Code approach "is worthy of adoption by legislative bodies" - not whether a
legislatively-adopted position should be struck down. Legislatures do find the
actions of jurors a helpful gauge of community sentiment when exercising
police powers. Further, the public clamoring for greater certainty in the
process is not clamor for a punishment that should be considered cruel and
unusual. If the public clamor were for executing innocents, this would present
the concern Professor Raeker-Jordan suggests. Thankfully, we seem to have
fairly successfully evolved beyond that point years ago.
So jury practices are relevant and helpful for the inquiry here. But
because juries do not mirror society, and jurors have been influenced toward
death from the outset, due to the factors discussed in Professor Raeker-

Jordan's article ° and others that will be noted below, legislators cannot

discount the significance of juror concerns about executing in the presence of

doubt. That jurors were so skewed toward death, and yet still withstood these

pressures to express a community value toward life, is a testament to the
strength of this community sentiment against executing the possibly innocent.
B. HOW CAPITAL SENTENCING JURORS RESPOND WHEN THE EVIDENCE DOES
NOT FORECLOSE ALL DOUBT

The failure of evidence to foreclose all doubt, though it achieves proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, leaves jurors with what has been called many
things: residual doubt, lingering doubt, nagging doubt. This could be

described as the absence of absolute certainty, though it could be argued that

reaching "a subjective state of certitude" or of "utmost certainty" is expected
s
under the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard itself." The doubt
50. Professor Raeker-Jordan appropriately identifies the Court's rulings in the areas of
anti-sympathy instructions, victim impact evidence, circumscription of mitigating
circumstances, sanctioning of vague definitions of aggravators and death qualification ofjurors
as means by which the Court has systematically channeled jury decision-making toward death,
and thereby rigged the evolving standards test. Id. at 513-32.
51. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,363-64 (1970). The Supreme Court has rejected jury
instructions that defined reasonable doubt as "grave" or "substantial uncertainty" in Cage v.
Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990). But the Court allowed the use of terms "substantial doubt" and

"strong possibilities" when taken in the context of an entire charge that spoke in part to "abiding
conviction" to a "moral certainty" in Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 (1994). In Ohio, proof
beyond a reasonable doubt is described in the now common manner of "proof of such character
that an ordinary person would be willing to rely upon and act upon it in the most important of
his own affairs." OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2901.05(D) (West 1996). As noted Cleveland
attorney Gerald Gold pointed out to the Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers years ago, the ordinary
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remaining can center on any element of the crime (the identity of the culprit,
the required mental state,, the voluntariness of the act, the degree of
participation in the act or causation) or on any aggravating factor that must be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is a doubt that is experienced, discussed
and ultimately remains, though it does not yield an acquittal of the crime or a

negative finding as to the aggravating factor.5 2 It may not be a "reasonable

doubt" but it is a real doubt nonetheless, in the sense that those who possess
it "can be expected to resist those who would impose the irremedial penalty of
death."53
Over a decade ago, William Geimer and Jonathan Amsterdam reported
that post-sentencing juror interviews in Florida revealed that lingering doubt
in general "[is] the most often recurring explanatory factor in the life
recommendation .... ."' Sixty-nine percent of the jurors in this study gave the
existence of some degree of doubt about the guilt of the accused as their reason
for recommending life."5 Reliance on doubt occurred even though Florida
courts refused to acknowledge its legitimacy as a mitigating factor that could
call for a sentence less than death, and thus no penalty phase instruction on it

person's most important affairs are probably deciding who to many or for whom to work.
Divorce and job change rates in this country demonstrate that the ordinary person makes a lot
of mistakes inthis decision-making. Ordinary juror persons are likely to do the same in capital
cases, if that isthe standard they are instructed to apply. Because Governor Ryan has stated that
"until [he] can be sure with moral certainty that no innocent man or woman is facing a lethal
injection, no one will meet that fate," itis appropriate to re-address whether adequate certainty
is currently expected in convicting juries in capital cases. This article focuses, however, on
certainty to execute, not certainty to convict.
52. "While feelings such as residual doubt... can resist identification, and often
operate on something akin to a deliberative subliminal plane, [they are] nevertheless present.
Although sometimes amorphous.... doubt influence[s] death penalty decisionmaking." Amy
D.Ronner, When Judges Impose the Death PenaltyAfter the JuryRecommends Life: Harris v.
Alabama as the Excision of the Tympanic Membrane in an Augmentedly Death-Biased
Procedure, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 217,230 (1995).
53. Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573, 581 (5th Cir. 1981).
54. William Geimer& Jonathan Amsterdam, Why JurorsVote Life orDeath: Operative
Factorsin Ten FloridaDeath Penalty Cases, 15 AM. J.CRIM. L. 1, 28 (1988).
55. Id.at 28. The authors included actual reasonable doubts as well as lingering doubts
in this figure. "The term [lingering doubt] as used in this context of juror responses includes:
(a)reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of any crime, doubt that normally should have
resulted in a vote for averdict of not guilty; (b)reasonable doubt only that defendant was guilty
of first degree murder, a doubt that normally should have resulted in a vote for a verdict of
guilty ofa lesser included offense; and (c)a lingering doubt about either of the first two matters,
sufficient in the mind of the juror to counsel against voting for the irrevocable penalty of death."
Id.
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was given.56 Several of the interviews revealed residual doubts about the
identity of the culprit as a reason for a life sentence.57
Amsterdam and Geimer referenced a larger, more sophisticated study
conducted by Professor Arnold Barnett that found "[hiolding the other factors
constant, and increasing or decreasing the 'certainty [that the defendant was
a deliberate killer]' factor raised or lowered the likelihood of a death sentence
in a range between four and fifty-six percent."5 8 "This was true even though
did not
Professor Barnett's lingering doubt factor (the converse of 'certainty')
' 59
include the reasonable doubt that should result in a vote to acquit.
More recent studies repeatedly confirm that jurors focus on lingering
doubt during their deliberations, and that this is by far the most significant
factor in their deliberations. Post-capital trial juror interviews have been
conducted in over a dozen states by the Capital Jury Project, funded by the
National Science Foundation.' The project's findings on the issue of lingering
doubt are remarkably consistent.
One study found that two of the three topics most focused on in South
Carolina penalty phase deliberations are residual doubt issues: "the
defendant's role or responsibility in the crime" and "how weak or strong the
evidence of guilt was."'" This was true among jurors that sentenced to life and
jurors that sentenced to death, and the extent of discussion was nearly the same

56. This is commonplace in other jurisdictions as well, for reasons that will be
discussed below in infra Part III.
57. Geimer & Amsterdam, supra note 54, at 28-29. See generally Arnold Barnett,
Some Distribution Patternsfor the Georgia Death Sentence, 18 U.C. DAVIS L.REv. 1327,133845 (1985); Michael Mello &Ruthann Robson, Judge Over Jury: Florida's Practice ofimposing
Death Over Life in Capital Cases, 13 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 31, 59-60 (1985); Lawrence T. White,
Juror Decision-Making in the Capital Trial, 11 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 113, 123-26 (1987).
58. Geimer & Amsterdam, supra note 54, at 30 (citing Barnett, supra note 57, at 133845).
59. Id. (citing Barnett, supra note 57, at 1339).
60. Each interview took an average three to four hours. William J. Bowers et al.,

Foreclosed Impartialityin Capital Sentencing: Jurors' Predispositions, Guilt-Trial Experience,

and Premature Decisionmaking, 83 CoRNiELLL. REV. 1476, 1486-87 (1998). A fifty-plus page
questionnaire was used in the interview. Scott E. Sundby, The Capital Jury and Absolution:
The Intersection of Trial Strategy, Remorse, and the Death Penalty, 83 CORNELLL. REV. 1557,
1559 n.8 (1998). There may be some drawbacks in post-juror interviewing. Some jurors may
not be good at self-evaluation, or as capable of recall, or may be inclined to say what they think
an evaluator may want to hear, or give their own rationalizations after the fact. Stephen P.
Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do Jurors Think?, 98 CoLUM. L.

REV. 1538, 1541 (1998). But the Project's design is to elicit information in a consistent manner
around the country, and its findings in this area are so consistent in themselves that there can
be no discounting the value of the information received.
61.

Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror Instructions in

Capital Cases, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 5 & tbl.1 (1993).
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in each.62 As would be expected, juries that sentenced to death spent a bit less
time focused on "how weak or strong the evidence of guilt was."63
Another study in South Carolina gave jurors a list of seventeen categories
of "Aggravating and Mitigating Factors Relating to the Defendant."" 4 With
regard to the statement "Juror held lingering doubt over the defendant's guilt,"
60.4% responded "yes" to the question "Did or would this make you much less
likely to vote for death?"65 This was almost a third higher than the 44.3% for
the category of "mental retardation," more than double the 26.7% response for
a "history of mental illness," and triple the response of 20.1% for "the
defendant had been in institutions but was never given any real help." 66 The
study justly concluded, "residual doubt over the defendant's guilt is the most
powerful 'mitigating' fact." 7
A 1998 article compiled the Capital Jury Project's findings for the eleven
states in which interviews had been completed. It demonstrated South
Carolina jurors were the same as jurors across the country. This composite
study concluded: "By far, the strongest mitigating factor was lingering
doubt.""8
To the factor that read "Although the evidence was sufficient for a capital
murder conviction, you had some lingering doubt that (the defendant) was the

62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Garvey, supra note 60, at 1559 tbl.4.
65. Id. An additional 16.8% said they would be slightly less likely to impose death,
bringing the total of those who would be swayed toward a life sentence to over three-fourths
(77.4%) ofjurors. It was surprising to see that 1.3% said they would be much more likely to
impose death, another 1.3% said they would be slightly more likely, and 20.1% said would be
just as likely to impose death where lingering doubt was present. Id. This may be a product of
some jurors being confused about the concept of lingering doubt. One researcher studying
California jury practices related that "[s]ome jurors have trouble conceptualizing the notion of
lingering doubt about actual innocence," and made note that a particular juror was "one of the
few who was able to distinguish between a reasonable doubt and a lingering doubt." Sundby,
supranote 60, at 1578-79. On the other hand, the South Carolina study found it disturbing that
"among those twenty-eight jurors who said they actually held lingering doubt over the
defendant's guilt [and who would seem to understand the concept by having held it], only
46.4% said it made them much less likely to vote for death, and only 57.1% said it made them
at least slightly less likely. Fully 35.7% said it made no difference to them" Garvey, supra
note 60, at 1563. Professor Garvey wrote with concern: "Learned Hand once wrote that the
thought of an innocent man condemned was little more than a 'ghost' that haunted the law.
Capital jurors appear to take the matter more seriously, but perhaps not seriously enough." Id.
at 1563. Still, this was the most powerful of mitigating factors, and given the powerful forces
compelling death, and the predisposition some jurors may have towards it, the fact that it could
not sway every juror should not be controlling.
.66. Garvey, supranote 60, at 1563.
67. Id.
68. Bowers et al., supra note 60, at 1535.
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actual killer," 161 jurors, or 13.4% of the jurors interviewed, responded that
this was a factor present in their case. 9 Of these persons who possessed
lingering doubt, "62% said it was very important in their punishment decision,
69.2% said it made them 'less' likely, and 48.7% said 'much less likely,' to
vote for death."" That this influenced the sentencing decision was borne out
by the disparity in life votes cast. Nearly 70% of those who identified this as
a factor in their case voted for life, while just over 40% of the jurors who did
not have it in their case voted for life.7 '
The researchers also confirmed South Carolina's experience regarding the
primacy of lingering doubt compared to other mitigating factors. The elevenstate study found lingering doubt "outstrips its nearest rival, [mental illness,]
as a 'very important' sentencing consideration... by 18.6 percentage points
[and] outstrips its nearest rival[, mental retardation,] that made jurors much
'
less likely to vote for death,... by 12.3 percentage points."
The three researchers repeatedly emphasized the significance of lingering
doubt to sentencers:
These data reveal that doubt about the defendant' s guilt
is both a fundamental and abiding moral concern of jurors
in deciding the appropriate punishment. The haunting
possibility of an erroneous capital murder conviction, and
even more so, the prospect of condemning and even
executing an innocent person, is more formidable in jurors'
decision making than any of the other mitigating
considerations. . . . Jurors who have such doubts are
manifestly unwilling to ignore them in making their
punishment decisions.
... [L]ingering doubt is the strongest influence in
support of a final life punishment vote.... These data make
it clear that lingering doubt, when it is present, is an integral
element in forming a reasoned moral judgment about
punishment. Indisputably, lingering doubt plays a central
role in jurors' thinking about what punishment the defendant
deserves. 73

69.
70.

Id.
lId

72.
73.

Id.
Id. at 1534, 1536 (footnotes omitted).

71.

Id.
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Post-trial interviews of capital jurors provided through the Capital Jury Project
uniformly and resoundingly confirm that doubt still holds sway on the
sentencing decision.'
Another study directed at interviewing those involved in the defense of
capital cases to a life verdict likewise confirms the primacy of lingering doubt
in sentencing decisions. The Life Vote Project was originated by Kevin
McNally, a Kentucky lawyer who also serves as Federal Death Penalty
Resource Counsel with the Death Penalty Resource Counsel of the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers ("NACDL").75 The Life Vote
Project seeks to collect information on capital cases where the defendant was
convicted of capital murder but received a sentence less than death, as a means
of assisting attorneys preparing for capital trials and furthering understanding
of why death qualified jurors reject capital punishment.7 6 The project uses a
six-page questionnaire as a means of gathering information from persons who
have prevailed in a penalty phase.'

74. A California study compared the relative impact on sentencing of types of lingering
doubt in cases where the defense carried out a denial defense, i.e. where the defendant denies
that he committed the crimes charged and/or defends on the State's failure to prove he did it.
Sundby, supra note 60, at 1574 fn. 41 (citing, for the nature of denial defenses, Gary
Goodpaster, The Trial For Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58
N.Y.U.L. REv. 299, 330 (1983)). "While lingering doubt concerning the defendant's actual
innocence played a very infrequent role in influencing the jury's penalty decision, lingering
doubt seemed to play a far. more significant role when the doubt involved the defendant's level
of participation in the murder.... [I]n each (denial] case [where life was imposed], more than
one individual carried out the homicide and . . . the prosecution presented a largely
circumstantial case.... [In these denial cases, jurors rejected actual innocence but] remained
uncertain about the level of the defendant's participation or intent." Id. at 1580-81. In these
cases, though only 5% of jurors contemplated the thought of actual innocence in the penalty
phase, "49% had contemplated the 'thought' during sentencing deliberations that the defendant
'definitely killed the victim, but might not have planned, intended, or wanted to do so."' Id. at
1585 n.65.
75. Letter from Tanya Greene, NACDL Death Penalty Resource Counsel, to NACDL
Law Professor Members (Feb. 9,2000) (on file with author).
76. Id.
77. Id. The Life Vote Project's questionnaire asked defense counsel (or another person
with a role in the case) to: (1) summarize "mitigation themes" (Question 13); (2) identify "what
mitigation seemed to matter most to jurors" (Question 14); (3) identify "what mitigation seemed
to matter least to jurors" (Question 15); (4) check and rank mitigating circumstances by weight
(Question 16A: "Number all applicable mitigating circumstances in sequence of strength";
included "lingering doubt" in the list); (5) score mitigating circumstances as to weight (Question
16B: Score "3 as high mitigation, 2 as moderate mitigation, Ias low mitigation, and N/A as not
applicable"; included "lingering doubt" in the list); (6) respond "whether there were lingering
doubts about the defendant's guilt" (Question 34); and (7) identify "what was the single most
important factor in the penalty decision" (Question 37).
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A review of the fifty-three Life Vote Interview Forms completed as of
August 1, 2000,78 reveals that thirty-four (64.2%) made reference to lingering
doubt at some point in their questionnaire as a possible factor in mitigation at
the penalty phase.79 Of these thirty-four cases, lingering doubt was ranked as
"high" in mitigation weight in twelve cases (35.3%), "moderate" in mitigation
weight in four cases (11.8%), and "low" in mitigation weight in eight cases
(33.3%). Others did not assign a score. Of these thirty-four cases, lingering
doubt was identified as the strongest mitigating factor in nine cases (26.5%),
as among the two strongest or as the second strongest mitigating circumstance
in two cases (5.9%), as among the three strongest or as the third strongest
mitigating circumstance in four cases (11.8%), as the fourth strongest
mitigating circumstance in five cases (14.7%), and as the seventh strongest
mitigating circumstance in one case (2.9%). Lingering doubt was described
as the factor that was the single most important or that mattered the most in
eight cases (33.3%), and as the factor that was the least important or that
mattered the least in three cases (8.9%). Lingering doubts arose over whether
the defendant was actually innocent as well as over whether he had committed
a less-than-capital crime.'
The primacy of lingering doubt in life-sentencing decisions is universal.
The Model Penal Code practice to foreclose all doubt before death-sentencing
clearly fits and reflects contemporary societal values.
C. WHEN JURORS MAKE DECISIONS ABOUT PUNISHMENT

1. The Expectation:Jurors Will Decide on Punishment in the Penalty
Phase
A prime construct in the Supreme Court's post-Furman capital litigation
framework is devoted to the question of when jurors should make decisions
about punishment. In Gregg v. Georgia, the Court found the Eighth
78. The author appreciates the contribution of Kevin McNally, who provided copies
of the Life Vote Interview Forms for use in this research. A copy of the completed forms is on
file with the author. NACDL members may access the forms at the NACDL website at
http://www.nacdl.org.
79. The thirty-four cases arose from prosecutions in sixteen different states (Alabama,
Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, New Mexico, Nevada,
New York, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and Washington) and one federal prosecution.
80. There were fifteen cases in which the responses suggested the nature of the
lingering doubt presented. In four cases, lingering doubt appeared to arise from concerns over

who was the "trigger-person." In seven cases, lingering doubt appeared to arise from concerns
over whether the defendant had only committed a crime of lesser degree that was not deatheligible. In four other cases, lingering doubt appeared to arise from concerns over whether the
defendant had committed the offense when a single offender had committed the crime.
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Amendment mandated the bifurcation of capital trials to ensure that jury
decision-making would be more reliable and less susceptible to prejudicial
influences."s
The Gregg Court affirmed the Model Penal Code's position respecting
the desirability ofjury sentencing. Jury involvement serves "to maintain a link
between contemporary community values and the penal system - a link
without which the determination of punishment could hardly reflect 'the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.""'2
But the Court agreed that jury sentencing "creates special problems," as
"[m]uch of the information that is relevant to the sentencing decision may have
no relevance to the question of guilt, or may even be extremely prejudicial to
a fair determination of that question. ' 3 The Court found "[t]his problem,
however, .. . scarcely insurmountable."" The Court looked to "the drafters of
the Model Penal Code"8" to solve the problem: "Those who have studied the
question suggest that a bifurcated procedure--one in which the question of
sentence is not considered until the determination of guilt has been made-is
the best answer." 6
When a human life is at stake and when the jury must have
information prejudicial to the questions of guilt but relevant
to the question of penalty in order to impose a rational
sentence, a bifurcated system is more likely to ensure
elimination of the constitutional deficiencies identified in
Furman.s7
The Court determined that the "problem" of juror inexperience in sentencing
"will be alleviated if the jury is given guidance regarding the factors about the
crime and the defendant that the State, representing organized society, deems
particularly relevant to the sentencing decision."88 Bifurcation, coupled with
81.
82.
83.
84.

85.
86.

428 U.S. 153, 191-92(1976).
Id. at 190 (citing Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968)).
Id.
Id.

Id. at 191.
Id. at 190-91. The Court quoted the comments to the Model Penal Code:
The obvious solution... is to bifurcate the proceeding, abiding strictly
by the rules of evidence until and unless there is a conviction, but once
guilt has been determined opening the record to the further information
that is relevant to sentence. This is the analogue of the procedure in the
ordinary case when capital punishment isnot inissue; the court conducts
a separate inquiry before imposing sentence.

Id. at 191 (quoting Model Penal Code § 201.6 cmt. 5 (Tentative Draft No. 9, 1959)).
87. Id. at 191-92.
88. Id. at 192.
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guidance to the inexperienced sentencer, would also solve problems of
arbitrariness in the imposition of penalty.
[T]he concerns expressed in Furman that the penalty of
death not be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner
can be . . . best met by a system that provides for a
bifurcated proceeding at which the sentencing authority is
apprised of the information relevant to the imposition of
sentence and provided with standards to guide its use of the
information.89
Bifurcation thus arose to avoid irrelevant and prejudicial information flowing
to the jurors at the trial phase, and to ensure adequate access to relevant
information and guidance on how to use it at the sentencing phase. Jurors
were to determine guilt and punishment in separate proceedings. This was a
simple solution to the Court's concerns.
2. The Reality: JurorsOften Decide On Punishment in the Trial Phase
Contrary to the Court's expectations, empirical data demonstrates that the
sentencing decision is often being made in the trial phase. The Bowers,
Sandys and Steiner compilation of Capital Jury Project data found:
Virtually half of the capital jurors (48.3%) in the eleven
[Capital Jury Project] states indicated that they thought they
knew what the punishment should be during the guilt phase
of the trial.... At least four of ten jurors took such a stand
in ten of the eleven [Capital Jury Project] states.9°
To say these jurors "thought they knew what the punishment should be"
during the trial phase seems too soft a description of the stances most took.
The researchers found that most were quite certain of their position on penalty
before or as they were convicting:
Seven out of ten who took a pro-death stand and six of ten
who said the punishment should be life were "absolutely
convinced" [during the guilt stage of the trial]. Moreover,
nearly all of the remaining jurors who took a stand said they
were "pretty sure." Only a meager two to five percent of

89.
90.

Id. at 195.
Bowers et al., supra note 60, at 1488.
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those who said they knew what the punishment should be at
the guilt phase characterized themselves as "not too sure." '"
Nor did those jurors who formed their opinion in the trial phase tend to alter
it when they reached penalty deliberations. Those who decided early were
even more convinced or firm in their premature decisions
than those who reach such a decision only after the penalty
phase of the trial.
... [S]ix of ten jurors who thought at the guilt stage of
the trial that either death or life was the right punishment
held steadfastly to that conviction for the rest of the

proceedings.'2

The researchers found this premature decision-making by individual jurors
altogether contrary to the constitutionally-mandated practice of bifurcating
criminal trials. "In effect, many jurors seem to reach a decision about the
defendant's punishment on the basis of what they learn during the guilt stage
of the trial, rendering the evidence, the arguments, and the instructions of the
penalty phase irrelevant." 3
D. HOW PREMATURE DECISION-MAKING JURORS OFTEN MAKE THEIR
DECISION - DOUBT, OR LACK THEREOF?

The Capital Jury Project data shows jurors making their decisions about
punishment in the trial phase are often (if not generally) reaching their decision
by centering on the amount and quality of the evidence of guilt.
91. Id.at 1489.
92. Id. at 1490, 1491.
93. Id.at 1493. A study that focused on why Kentucky jurors changed their minds
about the sentence pointed up the effect of juror's premature decision-making on bifurcation
principles in that jurisdiction. See Maria Sandys, Cross-Overs- CapitalJurors Who Change
TheirMindsAboutthe Punishment:A Litmus Testfor Sentencing Guidelines, 70 IND. L.J. 1183
(1995). "[A]pproximately one-half of the jurors (33 of 68)... acknowledged that some
discussion of the death penalty took place during thejury's guilt deliberations." Id. at 1191; see
also id. at 1192 tbl. 1. "The most striking finding is that 70%, or 30 of the 43 jurors who were
interviewed, were 'absolutely convinced' of their penalty preference before they heard any
evidence as to the appropriate sentence." Id at 1194. Concerns arose as the "purpose of
bifurcated proceedings isto separate the guilt and sentencing decisions.... [and alny discussion
of the appropriate sentence during the guilt deliberations is (theoretically) irrelevant and
inappropriate." Id. at 1191. The author concluded that "bifurcated proceedings do little to
separate the guilt and penalty decisions in the minds of capital jurors." Id. at 1194. There was
thus grave concern: "[H]ow can they also evaluate the aggravating and mitigating factors
presented during the penalty phase, factors which are intended to guide their sentencing
decisions?" Id. at 1194.
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1. Pro-DeathJurors Who Believe the State's Case
Bowers, Sandys and Steiner found that "[b]eyond convincing jurors of the
defendant's guilt, the presentation of guilt evidence appears to have a
substantial additional effect of persuading them of what the punishment should
be - more often that it should be a death rather than a life sentence."" Of
those who said they knew what the punishment should be during the guilt
phase of the trial, "[t]hree of ten jurors said the punishment should be death,
two of ten said it should be life, and the other five of ten were undecided at this
early stage of the trial.""5
The researchers found some "early pro-death jurors appear to have
operated under a presumption that unequivocal proof of guilt justified the
death penalty."96 "A number of early pro-death jurors declared either the law
or their own personal views required them to impose death when they
' Further, "many came to the case with the
determined unquestionable guilt."97
notion that death is the only acceptable punishment for various kinds of
murder.""8
The unequivocal proof and unquestionable guilt standard for death
applied here is consistent with, and essentially the converse of, practices where
lingering doubt has led to life sentences. But there is a crucial difference
between the two. The view that unquestionable guilt mandates death is
unconstitutional, as it forecloses the required consideration of mitigating
evidence at the penalty phase." Jurors holding such views should be excluded
from jury service, but it appears the processes of voir dire and death
qualification have not purged jurors who are predisposed to death as
punishment and who will not give effect to mitigating evidence. Case law
provides some means of inquiry to find those jurors with such views,' °° but
this appears to be insufficient.
94.

95.

Bowers et al., supra note 60, at 1493-94.

Id.at 1488. InKentucky, the number of jurors in favor of death was higher. Only

34% of the jurors interviewed claimed that they were undecided before the sentencing phase
as to the sentence they should impose. Sandys, supra note 93, at 1193. But of those willing to
express a penalty preference, 43% believed that death was the appropriate sentence, 22%
believed life. id.
supra note 60, at 1497.
96. Bowers et al.,
97.
98.

Id.
Id. at 1521.

99. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978) (holding that a sentencing jury is to
consider all relevant mitigating circumstances that may call for a sentence less than death).
100. See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992) (finding that defense counsel is allowed
to voir dire jurors on whether they have views that would cause them to automatically impose
the death penalty, or would substantially impair their ability to follow the law).
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These early pro-death jurors make their decisions about penalty as the
evidence is presented in the trial phase, and then advocate for death during trial
phase deliberations. 10 Their individual view that death is mandated if guilt is
unquestionable not only lessens the reliability of the penalty decision of its
own weight but, once shared, may well improperly influence those who are as
yet undecided on penalty and lead them to less attentive consideration of
mitigating evidence.
2. Pro-Life Jurors Who Doubt the State's Case
Early pro-life jurors often leaned toward or chose life during the trial
phase to deal with perceived inadequacies in the State's proof.
Early pro-life jurors often found that some defect in the
evidence against the defendant or some doubt about the role
of the defendant in the crime led them to decide that death
was not the appropriate punishment ....
Jurors frequently expressed reservations about death
during guilt deliberations either when they were uncertain
about who specifically had committed the killing or when an
accomplice had not received a death sentence ....
Some jurors who voiced opposition to the death penalty
during guilt deliberations expressed reservations about the
evidence of guilt, including its circumstantial character, the
absence of eyewitnesses, and indeed, the possibility of
mistake.... 102
Jurors had doubts about whether the defendant committed the higher degree
of murder, and concerns that the defendant was not the "trigger-person," was
not an active participant in the crime, was not the one primarily responsible or
had shot the victim accidentally. 3 These early pro-life jurors were often of
the belief, after hearing the trial phase evidence, that the defendant was
innocent of a capital crime:
[F]ewer than half . . of the early pro-life jurors had
decided, before deliberating on guilt with their fellow jurors,
that the defendant was guilty of capital murder. In
101.
102.
103.

Bowers et al., supra note 60, at 1531.
Id. at 1501, 1526-27.
Id. at 1502.
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comparison to the other jurors, early pro-life jurors were
more likely to believe that although the defendant was guilty
of murder, he was not guilty of capital murder, the chief
implication of which is that the defendant would not be
eligible for the death penalty.104
At the first vote in the trial phase deliberations, "almost four of ten early prolife jurors ...were not convinced" of the defendant's guilt of capital murder
beyond a reasonable doubt."0 As deliberations proceeded, these jurors' views
on the appropriate punishment crystallized:
Pro-life jurors were two to three times more likely than prodeath jurors to cite jury deliberations as the critical point'in
their decision making; 28.1% of the pro-life [did so] ....
Evidently, the discussion of guilt prompted a number of prolife jurors to realize or finalize their stands on the
defendant's punishment. Some of these jurors may have
had misgivings about the defendant's guilt during the
presentation of guilt evidence, but failed to consider the
implications of these misgivings for punishment until guilt
deliberations."'
As deliberations progressed still further, some of these jurors were still
reluctant to enter that final verdict:
[Elarly pro-life jurors were twice as likely as the undecided
jurors (25.9% versus 12.9%) and nearly four times as likely
as the early pro-death jurors (25.9% versus 6.9%) to say that
they personally were reluctant to go along with the final
verdict that the defendant was guilty of capital murder.
Evidently, reservations about the capital murder verdict,
especially the view that the defendant may have been guilty
of murder but not of capital murder, were an important
contributing factor in taking an early pro-life stand on the
defendant's punishment.107
Disturbingly, juror doubts about guilt eventually lead some jurors to negotiate
and trade what may be reasonable doubts about guilt for assurance of a life
sentence. According to the Capital Jury Project data, "some who may be
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.at 1517 (footnote omitted).

Id.
Id.at 1495-96.

Id.at 1517-18.
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reluctant to agree to a capital verdict may agree to enter a guilty verdict in
exchange for the agreement of other jurors not to impose the death penalty."' 0 8
The motivation to "get to yes" on the part of both sides appears to be, at least
in part, a desire to avoid a hung jury on guilt or at punishment.
For some jurors, guilt deliberations became the place for
negotiating or forcing a trade off between guilt and
punishment. One or more jurors with some doubts, possibly
reasonable doubts, about a capital murder verdict
nevertheless may have agreed to vote guilty of capital
murder in exchange for an agreement with pro-death jurors
to abandon the death penalty. However reluctantly, in this
way, both sides would have avoided the stigma of being a
hung jury on either guilt or punishment."
There may be more to this than stigma, however. Juror comments suggest that
the desire to avoid a hung jury may also be a product of fear of what a
subsequent jury would do. Pro-death jurors may fear that a subsequent jury
may not convict, and pro-life jurors may fear that a subsequent jury will acquit
on all charges or sentence the possibly innocent defendant to death. "0
More troubling, "not all jurors who have misgivings about the
defendant's guilt of capital murder will weather the anticipated response of
other jurors or negotiate a guilt for punishment tradeoff.'. A Missouri juror
who did not want to find the defendant guilty of capital murder gave up the
fight, as "who knows, maybe [at] another trial, the guy might get totally off
and so I gave up in that way..' .
The risk of an unwarranted conviction of a capital offense appears to be
realized in some cases where a compromise is reached. The three researchers
conclude the "compromise forfeits the punishment decision to guilt
considerations; [and] perhaps less obviously, it also contaminates the guilt
decision with punishment concerns and thereby nullifies a lesser guilt
verdict."' 3" This, in turn, "raises the possibility that neither death nor life is the

108. Id. at 1496; see also Sandys, supra note 93, at 1196, 1198-1200, 1203-06.
109. Bowers et al., supra note 60, at 1527; see also Sandys, supra note 93, at 1196.
110. Bowers et al., supra note 60, at 1527. A Texas juror related that another juror was
fearful if the jury was hung, the next jury would give him death, and that was his reason for
voting for capital murder. Id
11. 1d at 1528.
112. d
113. Id. at 1527.
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right punishment, and indeed, that death is not appropriate as a punishment
option."" 4 Bowers, Sandys and Steiner found:
[Early pro-life jurors] are concerned that the defendant may
not have committed capital murder. It is only after much
soul searching and deliberation that some are able to convict
the defendant of capital murder. Lingeringdoubts aboutthe
defendant'sguilt convince them that the sentence should be
life, not death. Ultimately, and not always successfully,
they may try to negotiate or to force a trade off of guilt for
punishment, in which they accede to a capital murder
conviction in exchange for no death sentence."'
The three summarized their findings on this matter as follows:
[Early pro-life jurors] make [their] decision later.... often
during jury deliberations on guilt.... Many of these jurors
make it clear that they had reservations about the
defendant's guilt of capital rather than noncapital murder.
Misgivings about the level of guilt frequently keep them
from agreeing to a capital murder verdict before guilt
deliberations and cause them to have reservations about
joining the ultimately unanimous capital-murder conviction.
They frequently report that, during jury deliberations, the
jury talked about whether the defendant was guilty of

murder but not of capital murder, about what the

punishment would be for less than capital murder, and about
whether the defendant should or would get the death
penalty. Some cast their guilty vote for capital murder only

after indicating that their penalty vote would be for a life
sentence. 16
Some juries will talk about punishment, others will not, and there seems to be
little means of discerning why some do and others do not. "Jurors experience
a strong temptation to talk about punishment at guilt, even when they know it

is inappropriate. In some instances jurors manage to overcome the temptation,

in others, the temptation prevails."'" 7 After expressing concern over the

114.
115.
116.
117.

Id.at 1534-36.
Id.at1529 (emphasis added).
Id.at 1531-32.
Id. at 1528.
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predisposition toward death of others that should not have been on the jury, the
researchers conclude:
The heaviest counterweight to this early pro-death tilt is a
nagging concern of lingering doubt among a good many
jurors about the defendant's guilt of capital murder. This
doubt is apparent in discussion of guilt of murder but not of
capital murder, in indecision and preference for a noncapital
murder verdict at the jury's first vote on guilt, and in
reluctance to join the final capital murder verdict. This
lingering doubt crystallizes into a pro-life standfor many
during the guilt phase of the trial.The reasons they give for
their early pro-life stands reveal that for many this is a moral
response to remaining doubts they have about the evidence
of guilt, sufficient, they often reluctantly agree, for a capital
murder verdict, but not for a death sentence."3
E. IMPLICATIONS OF THE CAPITAL JURY PROJECT DATA, AND THOUGHTS ON
SOLUTIONS FROM THE RESEARCHERS

The Capital Jury Project "data... demonstrate the danger of corrupting
the guilt decision with punishment considerations.""'9
Jurors with
"reservations about proof beyond a reasonable doubt [may] accede to a capital
murder verdict and then vote for a life sentence,""' leading to an unwarranted
conviction of capital murder.
The data also confirms the need to better "detect and reject jurors whose
feelings about the death penalty prompt them to take and to remain committed
to an early pro-death stand."''
The researchers suggest improved jury
selection, but they acknowledge that this "leave[s] the further problems of
structural aggravation and guilt contamination unattended."' 22 "Structural
aggravation" is a term coined by Craig Haney, describing "psychological
factors that the law has built into the very process of death sentencing, serving
to make death verdicts more likely, even though they do not explicitly appear
in any capital statute."'" This structural aggravation may include the voir dire

118. Id. (emphasis added).
119. Id. at 1540.
120. Id. at 1539.
121. Id. at 1540-41.
122. Id. at 1542.
123. Craig Haney, Violence and the CapitalJury: MechanismsofMoralDisengagement
and the Impulse to Condemn to Death, 49 STAN. L. REv. 1447, 1451 (1997).
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process and other points, "[t]o the extent. .. that the... process... conveys
the message that the court has summoned the juror to impose death if the jury
finds the defendant guilty of capital murder, or that the death penalty is the
The researchers suggest that
correct punishment for such a crime ... ."'
may also be relevant,"
decision
"[tihe forbidding character of the life or death
and theorize:
Perhaps a major source of premature decision making
inheres in the character of the decision to be made and in the
human frailties of the decision makers themselves. It may
be that people simply cannot reliably be counted on to
forego discussing punishment during guilt deliberations or
to postpone taking a stand on punishment prior to the
penalty stage of the trial.'
To cope with contamination and structural aggravation, Bowers, Sandys
and Steiner suggest that there be a second round of voir dire before the penalty
phase to discover those with bias." But this is seen as just as likely to fail as
the first round ofjury qualification, and does nothing to fend off contamination
of the guilt phase.' 27
A second proposal is to impanel a separate penalty phase jury to relieve
the structural aggravation problem, but this is properly dismissed as well.
Whatever else it might accomplish, impaneling a separate
penalty-phase jury runs headlong into a fundamental issue
this research has raised about moral judgment in capital
sentencing-the role of lingering doubt as a sentencing
consideration. Jurors who decided reluctantly and only after
much urging by others that a defendant was guilty of capital
murder would no longer be present to render a reasoned
moral response that incorporates considerations of lingering
doubt in the decision of punishment.'
The researchers beg the United States Supreme Court to accord constitutional
protection to lingering doubt as a mitigating factor, as it is "the strongest prolife consideration in punishment decision making" and truly represents what

supra note 60, at 1538 (footnote omitted).
124. Bowers et al.,
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

1538-39.
1542.
1542-43.
1544.
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the Court tohas
prescribed,
that
give their "'reasoned moral
response'
both
sentencingnamely
evidence
andjurors
arguments."29
Failing to sanction lingering doubt as a constitutionally
protected consideration in sentencing asks jurors to ignore
an essential consideration in making a moral decision on the
ultimate punishment. For those who have lingering doubt
about the defendant's guilt, barring its consideration
transforms the sentencing process into a demoralizing
exercise, if not a desperate scramble to transmute lingering
doubt into a legally sanctioned consideration. In other
words, to not sanction residual or lingering doubt about the
defendant's guilt as a punishment consideration undermines
the moral character of the jury's task. To ask them to make
a reasoned moral judgment about the defendant's
punishment and, at the same time, to deny them the
relevance of a concern they deem extremely important, is to
trivialize their task.130
The researchers urge that lingering doubt be given the constitutional status the
Supreme Court "so far has failed to grant or to recognize," and give the
defense the right to argument and to jury instruction on this in the penalty
13 1
phase.
In the end, the researchers "see no easy or obvious remedy," and suggest
the "research merely identifies the faults and demonstrates the dire need for
correctives that will relieve the presently foreclosed impartiality in capital
sentencing" brought about by premature pro-death decisions and pre-existing
feelings that death is the only acceptable punishment for certain murders.13 1

IllI. THE LAW'S RESPONSE TO THE RISK OF MISTAKE
The Capital Jury Project researchers properly plead for a reality-based
legal response to the risk of error. Their studies find lingering doubt is
"fundamental to [jurors'] responsibility as moral agents" and is consistently
"the strongest of the mitigating considerations that figure in the final
punishment decisions of capital jurors.'43 Yet, they conclude that the present
129. Id. at 1545 (referencing Californiav. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987), and Franklin
v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164 (1988), as articulating the "reasoned moral response" doctrine).
130. Id. at 1545-46.
131. Id. at 1546.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1544.
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law "fail[s] to grant or to recognize the place of lingering doubt as an essential
ingredient of a reasoned moral judgment."'' This utterly intolerable disparity
between the reality and the law is creating grave risks of mistaken executions,
yielding arbitrary punishment decisions as some juries consider these while
others do not, and is even risking unwarranted convictions on capital crimes.
How did the law become so blind?
A. EARLIER ACCEPTANCE OF THE ROLE OF LINGERING DOUBT

Before the mid-1700's, jurors may have been allowed to acquit on the
135 Proof beyond a reasonable
basis of any doubt, reasonable or otherwise.
3
36
doubt to convict was likely a concession to prosecutors.' In Re Winship' 7set
the constitutional mandate at proof beyond a reasonable doubt to convict. The
case was non-capital: a juvenile faced the possibility of six years of
imprisonment. To reach the correct standard, the Court weighed the
individual's and the state's interests as presented in the case. The Court
recognized the "accused... has at stake interests of immense importance, both
because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon conviction and
conviction.' 138
because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the
Obviously, the possibility of a loss of liberty and the certainty of
stigmatization the juvenile risked cannot compare with the interests at stake in
a capital case. Further, as to the public interest, the Winship Court believed it
necessary the community "not be left in doubt whether innocent men are being
condemned" to prison. 39 Again, in capital cases, the public interest is
obviously greater, as the possibility exists innocent men (and women) will be
condemned irretrievably.
When the United States Supreme Court established the present
constitutional framework for death sentencing, it acknowledged that this
distinction between life and liberty deprivations must make a difference:
Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment
that a 100-prison term differs from one of only a year or
two. Because of that qualitative difference, there is a
corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the

134. Id. at 1546.
135. See Anthony A. Morano, A Re-Examination ofthe Development ofthe Reasonable
Doubt Rule, 55 B.U. L. REV. 507, 508-12 (1975).

136.
137.
138.
139.

Id.
397 U.S. 358 (1970).
Id. at 363.
Id. at 364.
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determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a
specific case. 40
Since that time, the Court has applied greater reliability standards to the trial
phase by requiring an instruction on lesser-included offenses if the evidence
warrants it."4' In essence, the Court has concluded more process is due the
capital defendant.
The federal courts recognized early-on the force of residual or lingering
doubt, in the sense that they appreciated those who possess it "can be expected
to resist those who would impose the irremedial penalty of death.' 42 Federal
courts embraced the notion of doubt as a constitutional concern, sometimes to
the defendant's advantage, 43 sometimes not. In Lockhart v. McCree,"4 the
defense challenged the practice of death-qualifying jurors at the outset of the
case, urging separate juries be impaneled for the trial and penalty phases, as
death-qualification yielded conviction-prone juries with an underrepresentation of minorities. The Court rejected the challenge, in part because
this would endanger consideration of lingering doubts in determining
penalty. 4 ' The benefit of lingering doubt flowed to the defense only when a
single jury tried both guilt and penalty under the bifurcation system in place.
The argument that two separate juries should be impaneled (one deathqualified, the other not) "would effectively destroy the whimsical doubt.' 146
The failure to permit two separate juries, or to alternatively death-qualify
only after the trial phase was completed, was seen as a disappointing
development for capital defendants. But a counterweight consoled them: at
least the Court recognized the significance of lingering doubts about guilt as
a relevant concern in the penalty phase. In effect, a tradeoff occurred in
140. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
141. See Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980). In that case, an Alabama statute
precluded lesser offense instructions. The Court found this "would seem inevitably to enhance
the risk of an unwarranted conviction," that "[s]uch a risk cannot be tolerated ina case in which
the defendant's life is at stake," and struck down this "procedural rule that tended to diminish
the reliability" of the guilt determination. It at 637-38. Later cases have narrowed the
doctrine, suggesting that instruction on one lesser offense is enough, (See Schad v. Arizona, 501
U.S. 624 (1991)), and that no instruction is needed unless state law recognizes those lesser
offenses as lesser included offenses of the capital charge. Hopkins v. Reeves, 524 U.S. 88
(1998).
142. Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573, 581 (5th Cir. 1981).
143. Because juries could sentence to life based on incidents that occurred in the trial

phase, ineffectiveness and other errors at the trial phase impacting on the level of proof of guilt
could have a spillover-effect and require re-sentencing, even if the conviction was upheld. See,
e.g., Smith v. Wainwright, 741 F.2d 1248 (11th Cir. 1984).
144. 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
145. Id. at 180-82.
146. Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573, 581 (5th Cir. 1981).
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Lockhart, rendering capital defendants more convictable, but at least, less
executable.
But then, a mere two years later in 1988, the United States Supreme Court
appeared to reverse course, and seemed to reject its previous embrace of
lingering doubt. Franklin v. Lynaugh 47 appears to reverse the trade-off, and
unfairly render innocent capital defendants both more convictable, and more
executable.
B. FRANKLIN V. LYNAUGH- MISREAD? MISGUIDED? APPARENTLY BOTH

At the outset, it must be understood Franklin carries no weight in the
question of whether a legislature or court should adopt a requirement that
death be precluded unless the evidence forecloses all doubt as to guilt. In
Franklin, the federal constitutional floor that is poorly laid (or planned) is a
minimum standard the state can always surmount.
1. The Case
Franklin found no error in the trial court's instructions to the jury
regarding mitigating circumstances to be considered. The case discusses the
constitutional necessity and relevance of an instruction about residual doubt
as a mitigating circumstance.
Franklin argued the jury could not give effect to residual doubts raised by
Franklin's defense in the trial phase. His defense was mistaken identity, or
alternatively, a claim of superseding cause in the death of the victim due to
incompetent medical treatment. His sole "evidence" in mitigation was a
stipulation that he had a good prison disciplinary record while previously
incarcerated. Defense counsel referred to the stipulation in the penalty phase
argument, contending that Franklin would not be a danger in prison, and that
he was of good character. In the Supreme Court, Franklin argued that the
cumulative impact of the refusal to give the instructions he requested,
combined with the narrowness of the statutory special questions addressed to
the Texas jury,'" prevented the jury from considering his character, and any
49
"residual doubts" it may have had about his guilt.
147. 487 U.S. 164 (1988).
148. Texas' special issues then inquired whether the jury was convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt that the offense was committed deliberately and with the reasonable
expectation that death of the deceased or another would result and that there is a probability that
the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat
to society. See Franklin, 487 U.S. at 168, n. 3. By then-Texas-law, the jury must sentence to
death if it answered "yes" to both questions. Id.
149. The instructions requested would have told the jury it may consider any aspect of
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The Eighth Amendment question was whether merely instructing on the
fairly narrow special questions, and telling the jury to consider all the evidence
in answering them; limited the ability of the sentencing authority to give effect
to mitigating evidence. If there was evidence that was constitutionally relevant
to a capital sentencing decision, yet irrelevant to the special questions, then
Franklin's jury would be denied the opportunity to express its views on the
appropriateness of punishment based on such evidence. Thus, an Eighth
Amendment violation would occur.
While Franklin's death sentence was affirmed, a majority of the Court
agreed "a State may not constitutionally prevent the sentencing body from
giving effect to evidence relevant to the defendant's background or character
or the circumstances of the offense that mitigates against the death penalty."'"5
If some such evidence were introduced in Texas, there may well be an Eighth
Amendment violation as "the jury instructions [here] would have provided the
jury with no vehicle for expressing its 'reasoned moral response' to that
evidence."''
A majority of the Court first rejected the argument that the jury could not
52
give effect to his "character evidence" under the instructions.
Analysis of the Court's response on residual doubt requires partitioning
Franklin's argument, and then counting votes. Franklin's argument had three
necessary ingredients: (1) that there may have been doubts remaining as to the
identity of the culprit, deliberateness, and/or causation elements of the crime;
(2) that doubt as to each such element was a relevant mitigating factor; and (3)
that the jury could not give effect to one or another of these residual doubts
under the instructions given. No member of the Court accepted all three parts,
although it is likely that every member accepted the first ingredient that there
were residual doubts for purposes of argument. Justices expressly disagreed

regarding the third ingredient: seven against and two in favor on the issue of

the adequacy of the jury instructions. The disagreement regarding the second
is rather murky: three probably in favor, four split for and against, and two
probably against.
The dissent of Justices Stevens, Marshall, and Brennan would likely agree
that all residual doubts are always relevant in mitigation.'53 But the dissent
defendant's character or record or circumstances of the offense in answering the special
questions, and that they may answer "no" to the special questions "if you find any [such aspect]
mitigates against the imposition of the death penalty." Franklin,487 U.S. at 169, n. 4.
150. Franklin, 487 U.S. at 184-85 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
151. ld. at 185 (Justices O'Connor and Blackmun, concurring in the judgment), and
adding the votes of Justices Stevens, Marshall, and Brennan, dissenting.
152. See id. at 174; id. at 184-86 (O'Connor, J. concurring).
153. Although silent on the point in Franklin, Justices Marshall and Brennan explicitly
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concludes, without analysis, that Franklin' s third ingredient was not met; there
54

evidence.
was no interference with any right to have the jury consider this

This is the dissent's perception of the plurality's opinion, and the dissent
accepts it.
The four-justice plurality opinion is somewhat less clear, however, as the
plurality proceeds to distinguish among the forms of residual doubt (perhaps
in dicta) and discusses whether interference occurred in each. The lack of state
interference is clearly relied on by the plurality as to the residual doubts about
deliberateness and causation. These issues could "have been considered by the

jury in answering""'5 the special questions, and "there was nothing in [the]

proposed jury instructions which would have provided the jury with any
further guidance beyond that already found in the first Special Issue, to direct
Therefore, denial of the
its consideration of this mitigating factor."'
requested instructions "inno way limited [Franklin's] efforts to gain full
a reconsideration of any.
consideration by the sentencing jury-including
'residual doubts' from the guilt phase.'15 7
It appears then that at least seven members of the Court would agree
residual doubts about deliberateness and causation are constitutionally
relevant mitigating factors. Therefore, if one of these residual doubts is
adequately raised by defense counsel in a request for specific instructions, and
consideration by the sentencer is not otherwise assured by the instructions
actually given, an Eighth Amendment violation will occur.'

approved of residual doubt as a constitutionally relevant mitigating factor in Burr v. Florida,
474 U.S. 879 (1985) (dissenting from the denial ofcertiorari), andJustice Stevens implicitly did
so in Spaziano v. Florida,468 U.S. 447,488, n. 34 (1984).

154. Franklin,487 U.S. at 189 (Stevens, J.dissenting). The dissent did believe there was
interference with the ability to consider aspects of Frandin's character, however. Id. at 193-94.
155.

Franklin,487 U.S. at 176.

157.

Id.

156.

Id.

158. The United States Supreme Court's more recent decisions in the area of jury
instructions undercut the proposition that clear instructions are required in non-weighing states
(ie. states that do not require the sentencer to weigh aggravating against mitigating
circumstances to reach a sentencing decision). See discussion arising out of the non-weighing
state of Virginia, in Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269 (1998), and Weeks v. Angelone, 120

S.Ct. 727, 731-32 (2000). See also Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 61, at 14 (1993), Stephen

P. Garvey, Sheri Lynn Johnson & Paul Marcus, CorrectingDeadly Confusion:Responding to
Jury Inquiriesin CapitalCases, 85 CORNELL L.REV. 627, 645-46 (2000). Other cases suggest

that there may be a need to instruct on specific mitigating circumstances in weighing states
when the defendant or prosecution offers evidence constitutionally relevant to sentencing. See
Delo v. Lashley, 507 U.S. 272, 275 (1993) (per curiam) (constitution does not require
instruction that lack of criminal history could be considered in mitigation, where neither
defendant nor prosecution offered evidence on the matter).
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The plurality's response to residual doubts about the identity element of
the crime is more ambiguous. Arguably in dicta, the plurality refused to
recognize at that time "a constitutional right to an instruction telling the jury
to revisit the question of his identity as the murderer as a basis for mitigation"
although states may still allow defendants such assistance.'5 9 One could urge
this to be dicta because, after the plurality recited reasons for declining to
presently recognize doubts about identity as mitigating, the plurality stated:
"[m]ost importantly, even if we were inclined to discern such a right in the
Eighth Amendment, we would not find any violation of it in this case."'" The
plurality then emphasized defense counsel's failure to draw attention to this
issue in argument, the lack of limitation whatsoever on counsel's opportunity
to press it, and the proffered jury instructions not addressing it.""' The
proposed instructions "offered no specific direction to the jury concerning the
potential consideration of [this] residual doubt."' 62 The plurality concluded
that "even if petitioner had some constitutional right to seek jury consideration
of 'residual doubts' about his guilt during his sentencing hearing-a
questionable proposition-the rejection of petitioner's proffered jury
instructions did not impair this 'right."" '
In its holding, the plurality did not reject the proposition that the
constitution required consideration of residual doubts about identity, it merely
called this questionable. The Court plurality's holding was that it found no
violation in this case because the right had not been interfered with. But the
plurality's earlier discussion of residual doubts about identity did relate three
reasons why these may not be constitutionally relevant in mitigation. First, the
plurality suggested these "are not over any aspect of petitioner's 'character,'
'record,' or a 'circumstance of the offense.""" The concurring opinion of
Justices O'Connor and Blackmun made an identical blanket assertion, without
distinguishing among types of residual doubts, but instead simply categorizing
Franklin's argument as one concerning "residual doubts about guilt."'6 5 The
two-Justice concurrence relied entirely on Franklin's failure to meet the second
ingredient of his argument, the relevance of residual doubts, for their decision.
The concurrence concluded, "While the capital sentencing procedure may have
prevented the jury from giving effect to any 'residual doubts' it might have
had about petitioner's guilt, this aspect of Texas procedure violated no Eighth
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Franklin,487 U.S. at 172-73.
Id. at 174 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 174-75.
Id. at 174 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 175.
Id. at 174.
Id. at 187 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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Amendment guarantee."' 66 The concurrence apparently believed interference
could occur due to the failure to give a specific instruction to consider this
evidence, along with the instruction to return a verdict of death if convinced
[only] beyond a reasonable doubt as to the affirmative response to the special
questions. "The jury might not have thought that in sentencing petitioner, it
was free to demand proof of his guilt beyond all doubt."' 67 But, the
concurrence concluded, the states are not required to allow such doubts as
mitigating factors as these are "not a fact about the defendant or the
circumstances of the crime. It is instead a lingering uncertainty about facts, a
state of mind that exists somewhere between 'beyond a reasonable doubt' and
'absolute certainty." ' 68 Second, the plurality relied on their perception that
"prior decisions, as we understand them, fail to recognize a constitutional right
to have such doubts considered as a mitigating factor."'" Third, the plurality
said recognizing residual doubts about identity as a constitutionally relevant
factor would likely undercut the logic of the Court's earlier suggestions of
proceeding with penalty-only retrials on remand.'
2. Misread
Careful reading of the Franklinopinions reveals that a majority approves,
or at the very least, does not disapprove, of residual doubt about the culpable
mental state (deliberateness) or causation elements of the crime. But courts,
relying on Franklin,appear to reject perfunctorily residual doubts that may be
of differing sorts. Further, courts routinely read the discussion of residual
doubt about identity as a holding in the case, when it may not be. In many
courts, there is little discussion or analysis of what the plurality termed a
"questionable proposition."' 7' Most often, cases perfunctorily recite that an

166. Id.at 188 (O'Connor, J.concurring).
167. Id.at 187 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
168. Id. at 188 (O'Connor, J.concurring).
169.

Franklin,487 U.S. at 174.

170. Id.at 173, n.6.
171. One of the few state courts to ponder the proposition at any length is the Ohio
Supreme Court, which recently reversed course on the issue. That court had held that residual
doubt was a mitigating factor that could be considered by the jury and the appellate court in its
independent review to determine the appropriate sentence. Ohio v.Watson, 572 N.E.2d 97, 111
(Ohio 1991); Ohio v. Richey, 595 N.E.2d 915, 929 (Ohio 1992); Ohio v. Gillard, 533 N.E.2d
272, 281 (Ohio 1988). Ina later case, the Court stated that though residual doubt was relevant,
there was no need to give an instruction on it. Ohio v. Garner, 656 N.E.2d 623, 632 (Ohio
1995). The dissenting opinion of Justice Resnick in Watson in 1991 urged the position that

residual doubt was not "relevant to the issue of whether the defendant should be sentenced to
death," under Ohio's catch-all mitigating circumstance found in Ohio Revised Code §
2929.04(B)(7). Ohio v. Watson, 572 N.E.2d 97, 112 (Ohio 1991). With a change in
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composition of the Court, her view held the day in Ohio v.McGuire, 686 N.E.2d 1112, 1122-23
(Ohio 1997). Justice Sweeney wrote "it is illogical to find that the defendant is guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt, yet then doubt the certainty of the guilty verdict by recommending mercy
in case a mistake has occurred." Id. at 1123 "Residual doubt casts a shadow over the reliability
and credibility of our legal system in that it allows the jury to second-guess its verdict of guilt
in the separate penalty phase of a murder trial. 'Thus, if residual doubt is reasonable and not
simply possible or imaginary, then an accused should be acquitted, and not simply have his
death sentence reversed."' d. (citation omitted). The Court found residual doubt is not an
acceptable mitigating factor, because it is irrelevant to the issue of whether the defendant should
be sentenced to death. Id. The Court refused to consider whether residual doubt was present
and did not address it on its merits in weighing aggravating or mitigating factors, simply
concluding that the case was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Indeed, the majority found
McGuire had "inappropriately relied on residual doubt" in his presentation to the trial jury and
before the Court. Id.
Concurring in judgment only, Justice Pfeifer, in an opinion joined by Chief Justice Moyer, made
an eloquent plea for retaining residual doubt:
The death penalty is special. Ohio's death penalty statutory scheme, with
its numerous and high hoops, is less a protection for defendants than it is
a protection for our status as a civilized society. No one could deny that
the execution of an innocent person would be the ultimate failure of our
justice system. The mitigating factor of residual doubt reaches that
deepest, most basic of concerns.
The majority's contention that R.C. 2929.04(B) does not allow for the
consideration of residual doubt is simply wrong. R.C. 2929.04(B)
instructs the jury to consider "the nature and circumstances of the offense,
the history, character, and background of the offender," and the seven
statutory factors, the seventh of which calls for a consideration of "[any
other factors that are relevant to the issue of whether the offender should
be sentenced to death." (Emphasis added.) The use of the words "any
other" in R.C. 2929.04(B)(7) specifically calls for a consideration of
factors not considered in any other portion of R.C. 2929.04(B). What
factor could be more relevant than identity?
Randall Dale Adams would certainly argue for its relevance. Adams was
sent to Texas' death row for the murder of a Dallas policeman in 1976.
See RADELEr, BEDAU & PUTNAM, IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE: ERRoNEous

CoNvIcrIoNs IN CAPiTAL CASES (1992), Chapter. 3. Adams, who had

recently moved to Dallas from Grove City, Ohio, had met sixteen-yearold David Harris on the morning of the day before the murder. They
spent the day together, driving around Dallas. They disputed what
occurred in the evening. Adams claimed that Harris dropped him off near
his motel at around 9:30 that evening. Harris testified that he and Adams
went to a late show at a drive-in theater, and that after that, when the pair
were pulled over shortly after midnight by police for driving without
headlights, Harris slumped unseen in the front seat while Adams shot one
of the officers in cold blood. The jury believed Harris, and the judge
sentenced Adams to death.
By chance, Adams' case caught the attention of filmmaker Errol Morris.
Morris' film about the case, "The Thin Blue Line" (1988), generated
publicity in the case and featured self-incriminating footage of Harris,
filmed while he was serving time on death row for another murder. On
March 21, 1989, Adams was finally released.
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Certainly, residual doubt is an appropriate consideration in only a few
cases. Still, its use should not be considered "illogical." It is entirely
logical to be certain beyond a reasonable doubt as to a man's guilt, yet
not be certain enough to send him to his death. Residual doubt
acknowledges our humanity--our ability not just to spit out data, but to
recognize the subtle shadings that are a part of life. The factoring in of
humanity when dealing with its ultimate decision is both relevant and logical.
Residual doubt, when present, only spares a man from death--it does not
leave him walking the streets. A life sentence leaves him still with the
prospect of no prospects, alive and dead at the same time. If, as a
civilized society, we are to be certain of anything, it must be that we are
sending the correct person to his death. Residual doubt is not for every
case, and not for the present one. But I will not be apart of removing the
concept from the case for which it is right.
Id. at 1124 (Pfeifer, J., concurring).
The question of residual doubt has haunted the Ohio Supreme Court. The Court (4-3) affirmed
the death sentence imposed on Anthony Apanovitch over a dissenting opinion reminding the
Court that under Revised Code § 2929.05, it was to affirm the death sentence only if it was
appropriate, and urging that here "there was a substantial possibility the defendant may not be
guilty." Ohio v. Apanovitch, 514 N.E.2d 394,405 (Ohio 1987) (Herbert Brown, J., dissenting)
("In essence, we are constituted as a super jury to review the record and to decide whether the
death sentence is appropriate [under Revised Code 2929.05]. We are not bound, as in other
cases, by the findings of fact made by the trier of fact. We must be "persuaded." Can anyone
quibble with the idea that lack of certainty as to a defendant's guilt (even if the evidence is
sufficient as a matter of law) should be a consideration in deciding whether the death penalty
is appropriate?"). The four-person majority held that though the prosecution's case was based
solely on circumstantial evidence and Ohio law then required the evidence exclude every
reasonable hypothesis of innocence (cf. Jenks v. Ohio, 574 N.E.2d 492, 502-03 (Ohio 1991)),
there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude the elements proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. Apanovitch, 514 N.E.2d at 403. That bare four-person majority
included Justice Craig Wright.
In December 1999, newspapers reported that shortly before resigning from the Court in
1996, Justice Wright wrote a letter asking the state parole board to commute Apanovitch's death
sentence. He told news reporters: "This is the only case that I can recall where there was some
doubt. It's just something I thought I had to do....This case, it was different." Sandy Theis, '84
Rape-Murder Case Haunts Justice Wright, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Dec. 14, 1999, at 1-B.
The letter related that Justice Wright had discussed the case with the trial judge, Justice Francis
Sweeney, who now sits on the Ohio Supreme Court, and who, ironically, authored the McGuire
opinion. In the letter, Justice Wright related that Justice Sweeney informed him that "he came
close to granting a Rule 29 motion [for acquittal] following the state's case." Sandy Theis,
Letter on Murder Case Reveals Justice's Doubts, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Dec. 10, 1999,
at IA. Justice Sweeney denied the conversation, and the assertion that he nearly acquitted
Apanovitch. Id. Apanovitch remains on death row as of this writing.
The case provides a setting to consider ways in which appellate court mechanisms could
be strengthened to avert mistaken executions. This might include: use of a sufficiency test that
requires the exclusion of all reasonable hypotheses of innocence when looking at the sentence;
requiring appellate courts to weigh the evidence as would the jury, rather than relying on a
sufficiency of the evidence analysis alone, and modifying the death sentence when the weight
of the evidence standard is not met; and requiring that death be foreclosed if the reviewing court
is not unanimous as to the sufficiency of the evidence to convict, under the sufficiency review
standard. Consider Ohio v. Miller, 361 N.E.2d 419, 423-24 (Ohio 1977) (death sentence
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argument wasmade by the defense that the court should have instructed or
should have allowed the jury to consider evidence or argument, and it is
rejected, with a citation to Franklin and/or earlier caselaw in the state.
3. Misguided
a. Franklin Rejects and/or DistinguishesAmong Doubts in an
Unworkable and Unjust Manner, Denying a ReasonedMoral Response to
the Evidence
The Supreme Court plurality's dicta suggesting residual doubts about
identity need not be considered is contrary to human understanding and
common sense and is simply unworkable. The best and safest course is to
accept all forms of residual doubt as appropriate considerations in mitigation
in the state courts and give instructions on it.
The plurality's dicta suggested that residual doubts about identity might
not need to be considered because they lack constitutional relevance in
mitigation. Doubts about identity, the plurality ruminated, "are not over any
aspect of petitioner's character, record, or a circumstance of the crime."' 72 But
this is hyper-technical legalese and unsupportable. Why isn't the identity
element just as much a "circumstance of the crime" as the other elements of
deliberateness and cause the plurality recognizes?
Moreover, the plurality's attempted distinction among forms of residual
doubt is quite unworkable. The plurality and concurrence suggest that "prior
decisions ... fail to recognize a constitutional right to have such doubts
considered as a mitigating factor."'" This is technically true, as Franklin
would have been the first to consider the issue directly. But the argument was
certainly hinted at in many cases. By chance those cases raising the question
of level of proof as mitigation have been accomplice liability cases, where one
could argue the Court's concern about considering the circumstances of the
crime went mainly to the lack of intent, or questions about the act element, i.e.
inadequate participation in the crime." Although the Court does not allude

affirmed where two in dissent believed evidence was insufficient to convict).
172. Franklin, 487 U.S. at 174. The concurring opinion of Justices O'Connor and
Blackmun makes an identical blanket assertion, without distinguishing among types of residual

doubts. Id. at 188 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
173. Id.at 174. See also id. at 187-88.

174. The overlapping nature of these arguments is exemplified in several of the Court's
key mitigation cases. In almost all of these cases, arguments of insufficiency of the evidence
for conviction of murder. had been made concurrently with arguments of inadequate
consideration of mitigation in the courts below.
One of the significant concerns in Locket v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) was "the
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to the act element formally in Franklin, it would appear these accomplice
liability cases do acknowledge that residual doubts about the act element
would be relevant in mitigation. This places the Court's premise about the
identity element in a different light, for residual doubt about whether one acted
necessarily creates a residual doubt as to one's identity as a defendant aider

absence of direct proof that the defendant intended to cause the death of the victim" and the
failure to consider this in mitigation. Id. at 608. The Court recognized that "the nonavailablity
of corrective or modifying mechanisms with respect to an executed capital sentence underscores
the need for individualized consideration as a constitutional requirement in imposing the death
sentence." Id. at 605. The relative degree of proof of guilt was thus identified, as it clearly
should be, as a factor in the individualization of sentencing.
Similarly, in the companion case of Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637 (1978), the Court
recited Bell's argument for mitigation as a "lack of proof that he had participated in the actual
killing," and noted he had argued insufficiency of the evidence regarding intent and regarding
his guilt as an aider and abettor in the Ohio courts. Id. at 641. The Brief of Petitioner Bell was
even clearer. See Brief for Appellant at 29, Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637 (No. 76-6513). It argued
that defendant's death sentence was excessive because it was inflicted upon him for a homicide
committed by another person, that the evidence of defendant's involvement was meager and
circumstantial, and that even the state conceded that it didn't know who pulled the trigger. Id.
On this record, the Court agreed the statute had prevented "consideration of the particular
circumstances of his crime." Bell, 438 U.S. at 642.
In Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979), the evidence at trial "tended to show" the
two co-defendants abducted the victim "and, acting either in concert or separately, raped and
murdered her," and the State argued "in the absence of direct evidence as to the circumstances
of the crime, [the jury] could infer that petitioner participated directly in [the murder]." Id. at
96. The Court concluded, within this context of circumstantial evidence of guilt, that the
excluded testimony of a co-defendant - that he alone killed the victim, and his testimony
questioning whether the defendant was present and had participated in her death at all -"was
highly relevant to a critical issue in the punishment phase." Id at 97.
In Enmund v. Florida,458 U.S. 782 (1982), the Court majority emphasized that the
punishment "must be tailored to [Enmund's] personal responsibility and moral guilt." Id. at
801. This had not occurred when, among other factors, there was "no direct evidence" that
Enmund was present when the plan to rob led to the murder, and the jury had merely inferred
his guilt from his participation in the robbery. Id. at 786. Although Florida could affirm his
conviction as an accomplice to murder over an objection of insufficient evidence, the death
sentence could not be imposed. The dissenting justices also voted to reverse his sentence, due
to the sentencer's fundamental misunderstanding ofthe defendant's level ofparticipation, which
prevented consideration of the circumstances of defendant's role in the crime. Id. at 829-30
(O'Connor, dissenting).
From these cases and others, the Court should be quite familiar with the frequency
with which arguments of weight of the evidence have been presented to sentencers as grounds
for mitigation. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, at 160-6; Id. at 216 (White, J.,
concurring) (noting that argument made in mitigation was "weight of the evidence of guilt" and
the "possibility a mistake had been made," when self-defense had been raised at trial). Indeed,
in the first case to require the consideration of mitigating evidence and the "circumstances of
the particular offense" before imposition of the death sentence, the only apparent argument for
mitigation that appears in the Supreme Court opinion is an argument of coercion by a codefendant and an assertion of innocence. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,284 (1975)
(Stewart, J.,
concurring).
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and abettor. In actuality, then, it is extraordinarily difficult to distinguish those
arguments respecting inadequate intent or involvement as an accomplice,
which have been accepted, from arguments of lack of proof on the element of
identity "as the murderer," which are summarily discarded in Franklin. The
unworkable nature of the Court's rule risks reversal in the event of a failure to
allow the jury to consider a required form of residual doubt."
More compelling, the lingering doubt whether the defendant was even
there is clearly a more relevant fact about the crime, at least as the public and
jurors would perceive it. Morally, we are naturally more concerned that we
may have convicted an altogether innocent person than that the person we have
convicted may not have acted with the required deliberate intent or with full
participation in the acts that led to the death. The plurality's approach to
consider the one but not the other is counter-intuitive to common sense and
common morality.
Morality plays a critical role in the Court's discussion of mitigation. In
Californiav. Brown'76 and Penry v. Lynaugh,'" the Court concluded that the
sentencing jurors needed to give a "reasoned moral response" to the
evidence."r In 1982, the Court stated that the Constitution mandated both
"measured, consistent application and fairness to the accused," and that
"capital punishment (must) be imposed fairly, and with reasonable
consistency, or not at all. ' " Fairness included reducing the risk of mistake
"as much as humanly possible.""

175. This risk of reversal due to a sentencer's confusion and inability to distinguish
recognized mitigating factors from residual doubt is exemplified in Ohio v.Green, 738 N.E.2d
1208 (Ohio 2000). The Ohio Supreme Court's death-sentence reversal was based in part on the

three-judge sentencing panel's having "misinterpreted" the Court's earlier decision inMcGuire,
discussed supra note 172, which had held residual doubt is not an acceptable mitigating factor
under R.C. 2929.04(B). Green, 738 N.E.2d, at 1222. The death-sentencing panel had declared
that, but for the McGuire decision, they would have imposed life without parole due to "residual
doubt as to identity, and to a lesser extent as to the role played by [Green] in the demise of [the
victim]." Id.The Ohio Supreme Court did not respond directly to the residual doubt expressed
about identity, but criticized -the panel for failing to consider what role Green played.
"However, the McGuire decision does not and was never intended to preclude the appropriate
weighing of the evidence and the independent weighing of aggravating circumstances against
mitigating factors. Accordingly, the trial panel was able to give whatever weight it thought
appropriate to the fact that it did not find that Green was the principal offender in the aggravated
murder. Indeed, the fact that a defendant was not the principal offender is a specific statutory
mitigating factor. See R.C. 2929.04(B)(6)." Id.
176. 479 U.S. 538 (1987).
177. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
178. Brown, 479 U.S. at 545 (O'Connor, J.
concurring); Lynaugh, 492 U.S. at 322.
179. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 111-12 (1982).
180. Id. at 118 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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A 1992 essay suggested that Franklin represented the Court's "sole
[instance of] rejection of evidence proffered as mitigating," and that the
Court's rejection "rested on its view that individualized sentencing does not
require a jury to reexamine its 'residual doubt' concerning the defendant's
The authors suggested "It]he inevitable possibility of factual
guilt."''
error... is a policy argument against the imposition of an irrevocable penalty
in every case, and does not call attention to any particular attribute of the
defendant."' 82 The authors further suggested that the court has never held to
a "substantive theory of relevance," but "instead focused solely on whether the
proffered evidence concerned the individual."'8 Much of what the Court has
done does appear to fit an individualization theme, looking at the history,
character, and background of the defendant. But in suggesting that all that
need be considered are "particular attribute[s] of the defendant," the authors
appear to neglect that Lockett also requires consideration of "any aspect" of
the crime, and "any circumstances of the particular offense."'' It is true that
the circumstances of the crime may often be aggravating, but they may also be
mitigating. The fact that lingering doubt may exist in one case as to one or
another element of the crime is an individualized and relevant sentencing
concern. This suggests a particular defendant's possibly "reduced culpability,"
and that should be mitigating under the authors' more circumscribed approach
to individualization. 8 5
The greater possibility of innocence of one defendant as opposed to
another is a "particular attribute" "concern[ing] the individual" that must be
embraced. To do otherwise impermissibly "treats all persons convicted of a
designated offense not as uniquely individual human beings, but as members
of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the
penalty of death."' 86 Justice cannot be so blind as to ignore the critical
differences in level of proof of guilt among capital defendants.
What could be more appropriate than to consider the relative level of
proof of guilt, and then distinguish the somewhat shaky case against one
defendant from the airtight case against another?

181. Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Let God Sort Them Out? Refining the
IndividualizationRequirement in CapitalSentencing, 102 YALE L.J. 835, 843, n. 43 (1992).

182. Id
183. Id.
184. 438 U.S. at 604, n.12.

185. Carol S.Steiker and Jordan M. Steiker, SoberSecond Thoughts: Reflections on Two
Decades of ConstitutionalRegulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARv. L. REV. 355, 391

(1995) (citations omitted).
186. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304.
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There may exist some tension at times between the "twin objectives" of

consistency and individualized sentencing." 7 But it does not arise in this
setting. If these principles "interact to structure decision-making .. to.. .reduce
the risk of condemning a defendant who does not deserve death,""' it is selfevident from public and juror behavior that reducing the risk of executing an
innocent undeserving of that penalty is proper.'"" Lingering doubt clearly fits
as well under an open-ended and less defined description of mitigation as
"those factors that are central to the fundamental justice of execution."' " It
also fits an "empathy obligation" on the part of jurors to factor into their
retributive assessment the relative level of anger they experience."' It 'is
irrational to suggest that sentencers should not distinguish among defendants
on the basis of whether there is absolute certainty of guilt.
Professor Lou Bilionis urges that the "reasoned moral response"
contemplated by the Lockett definition is "not tied to any particular moral
theory," and commends this "moral neutrality."" This approach "extends
constitutional protection to the kind of evidence that must be taken into
account at sentencing to produce a morally appropriate sentence, ... so that
any evidence about the offender or the offense that might support a
conceivable moral argument against the death sentence in a particular case is
187. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639,664 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring); Tuilaepa
v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 973 (1994). For references to scholarship on this question, see
Garvey, supra note 60, at 1544, n. 21.
188. Stephen P. Garvey, 'As the Gentle Rain from Heaven': Mercy in Capital
Sentencing, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 989, 1004 (1996).
189. See also Scott W. Howe, Resolving the Conflict in the Capital Sentencing Cases:
A Desert-Oriented Theory of Regulation, 26 GA. L. REV. 323,1361 (1992). Howe posits that the
Court's principles are designed "to ensure that those who receive death sentences deserve them
not to promote equality in the distribution of death sentences," and finds the present formulation
in Lockett unsatisfactory. "Whether the inquiry focuses on the offender's culpability or on his
moral merit, the current test of admissibility articulated in Lockett - evidence bearing on the
offender's character, record or crime - does not encompass all the evidence necessary to an
appropriate assessment. A determination of what punishment the offender deserves requires
an understanding of the alternative sanctions." Id. at 357, n. 130 (emphasis in original). Howe
concludes, "we should ask how the Eighth Amendment substantively defines when an
individual death sentence is acceptable," and that the "Amendment limits the penalty to those
who deserve it, and the need to assess deserts individually explains the need for a capital
sentencing inquiry." Id. at 418-19. A death sentence is not the just dessert for an innocent; it
is not deserved, and a concept of mitigation that does not include an individualized evaluation
regarding the certainty of guilt is itself unjust.
190. Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 13 (1986) (Powell, J.,concurring in
judgment).
191. Samuel H. Pillsbury, Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal
Punishment, 74 CORNEa L.REv. 655, 701 (1989).
192. Louis D. Bilionis, Moral Appropriateness, Capital Punishment, and the Lockett
Doctrine, 82 J.
CRIM. L. & CRPaNOLOGY 283, 301-302 (1991).
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protected." Under any moral theory, lingering doubt is relevant. The
legitimate penological goals to be served by punishing are not served by
executing an innocent, and it is immoral to inflict this punishment on an
innocent.' 93 Possible innocence is relevant to this sentencing decision and
cannot be ignored. As Professor Bilionis has stated, "Residual doubt about the
defendant's guilt [is] something that human beings instinctively find germane
to the morality of capital punishment."'" It should, therefore, be protected.
The line the Franklinplurality's dicta sought to draw is not justifiable as
a moral response to the evidence. In failing to affirmatively protect residual
doubt, "the Court has failed to pursue the goal of ensuring that death sentences
are imposed only on those who deserve them."'"
To the extent the plurality sought to draw a line among forms of residual
doubt, accepting the mental state, causation, or level of participation among
the actors elements, but rejecting the identity element, its line is also irrational.
It removes the protection of consideration of residual doubt where it is morally
needed the most: with the wholly innocent who may not even have been
present.
b. Lower Court Interpretationsof Franklin Worsen Its Impact
In the wake of frequent apparent misinterpretations of Franklinas holding
that residual doubts never matter, residual doubt seems to have become a
largely unavailable protection in the lower courts. Courts rarely reverse for
failure to give the instruction, perhaps leading some trial judges to be less
forthcoming in giving them. The Illinois Supreme Court and many other state
courts sometimes approve of defense argument about residual doubt but

193. One is struck by how incongruous the relevancy response is in the Franklin dicta
and in California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983). In Ramos, the Court strained to find that
constitutionally relevant information was being conveyed to the jury by a law mandating
instruction as to a governor's power to commute a life sentence without parole. The Court
eventually reconstructed the State's argument into one where the fact was viewed relevant to
the possibility of future dangerousness, over objections that it was far too speculative and did
not attend to the particular case. The Court could similarly have reconstructed the grounds to
consider residual doubt as one of lack of future dangerousness, however slight, and for that
matter, lack of retributive justification. But this was not forthcoming.
Another incongruity is presented by the Court's apparent acceptance in Parker v.
Dugger,498 U.S. 308, 321-22 (1991), that the Florida Supreme Court impermissibly failed to
consider the non-statutory mitigating factor of a co-defendant's fife sentence when overriding
a jury's life recommendation. If fairness and consistency require consideration of a lesser
sentence imposed on another actor, how can it not require consideration of the possibility of
non-culpability of this actor?
194. Louis D. Bilionis, Legitimating Death, 91 MIcH.L. REV. 1643, 1695 (1993).
195. Howe, supra note 190, at 419.
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generally refuse to require jury instructions.'" Still, some lower courts, likely
appreciating the importance of the issue in the minds of jurors, have given an
instruction when none was required by caselaw or statute.'"
Some lower courts are extending Franklin's no-instruction-required
approach to the admission of evidence in mitigation. In attempting to draw
what are largely unworkable distinctions, these cases present a greater risk of
Lockett error. In Franklin, the defendant made no "complain[t] that he was
denied the opportunity to present any mitigating evidence to the jury, or that
the jury was instructed to ignore any mitigating evidence he did present; ...
[he] was permitted to present to the jury any and all mitigating evidence that

196. See, e.g., Ruiz v. Arkansas, 772 S.W.2d 297, 308 (Ark. 1989); California v. Cox,
809 P.2d 351,384 (Cal. 1991); Illinois v. Howard, 588 N.E.2d 1044, 1072 (Ill.
1991); Illinois
v. Sutherland, 610 N.E.2d 1, 14 (Ill.
1992) (catch-all instruction on mitigation suffices); Tamme
v. Kentucky, 973 S.W.2d 13,40 (Ky. 1998); Louisiana v. Davis, 637 So.2d 1012, 1029-31 (La.
1994); Hunt v. Maryland, 583 A.2d 218,246-48 (Md. 1990); Minnick v. Mississippi, 531 So.2d
77, 94 (Miss. 1988); North Carolina v. Hill, 417 S.E.2d 765, 778 (N.C. 1992); Homick v.
Nevada, 825 P.2d 600,609 (Nev. 1992); Ohio v. McGuire, 686 N.E.2d 1112, 1122 (Ohio 1997);
Oklahoma v. Bernay, 989 P.2d 998, 1012 (Okla. 1999); Oregon v. Rogers, 836 P.2d 1308,
1327-28 (Ore. 1992); South Carolina v. Southerland, 447 S.E.2d 862, 868 (S.C. 1994) (no right
to argue, but had opportunity and did); Bigbee v. Tennessee, 885 S.W.2d 797, 813 (Tenn.
1994); Lilly v. Virginia, 499 S.E.2d 522, 537 (Va. 1998).
197. See e.g. Slaton v. Alabama, 680 So. 2d 879, 900 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995); California
v. Cain, 892 P.2d 1224, 1265, n.23 (Cal. 1995); New Jersey v. Harris, 662 A.2d. 333, 361 (N.J.
1995). There are surely many other instances when the jury instruction has been given but was
not noted in an appellate decision.
In an attempt to ascertain trial-level practices among the varying jurisdictions, the
author distributed a survey to experienced capital defense counsel attending an annual national
death penalty conference. A handful of attorneys responded, providing information on residual
doubt practices in California, Connecticut, Florida, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi,
Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, Ohio, and Washington. (Copies of these surveys are available
from the author). None of these states have incorporated the concept into standard jury
instructions or special verdict questions. Some states allow consideration of residual doubt, and
require ajury instruction thereon if the defense requests it. Missouri allows same as to residual
doubt regarding the client's role in the murder; Connecticut judges are obliged to read the
defense list of mitigating factors, and so the judge will read residual doubt if the defense lists
it. Until the recent about-face in the Ohio Supreme Court in McGuire, Ohio jurors were
commonly instructed on residual doubt if the defense requested it.
Other states allow consideration ofresidual doubt, and some trial judges may permit
the jury to be so instructed. California and Washington judges do so occasionally, less often
in California than previously. Kansas judges may permit instructions on residual doubt about
the client's role in the murders, and Mississippi and Louisiana judges will allow consideration
and instruction in some circumstances. However, the practice appears spotty in the latter two
states; it appears some judges will not instruct and have barred the defense from arguing
residual doubt. Florida judges have also refused to instruct and barred defense argument. In
Nevada, while judges do not instruct, some still allow defense argument. Where courts have
turned aside from use of the terms residual or lingering doubt, attorneys have sometimes been
able to work the concept into their arguments through the use of other terms or labels.
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he offered."'" But some courts, relying on Franklin, now go so far as to
1
restrict the evidence that can be submitted in the penalty phase. 9 One court
recently rejected a claim that the defendant was precluded from "presenting
exculpatory evidence during the penalty phase that would have demonstrated
Relying on Franklin, the Court
that the shooting was not drug related."'
stated "the only evidence that the trial court prohibited appellant from
presenting during the penalty phase was statements that he was not guilty of
the murder for which he had just been convicted."" If these statements indeed
went to the circumstances of the crime (i.e. whether it was drug-related) this
comes too close for comfort to a Lockett violation.
Other courts do not even permit the defendant to testify to his innocence
at the penalty phase, squelching the ability of the jury to hear the assertion they
may be sending an innocent to his death.' Encouragingly, one court has ruled
that the right of allocution and the statutory right to present new evidence
relating to the circumstances of the crime at the penalty phase precluded a trial
judge's "blanket rule that would preclude a defendant from discussing or
3
arguing in allocution facts already in evidence" in the trial phase." Arguing
residual doubt in every case is not a wise approach,' but preserving the

198. 487 U.S. at 171.

199. The United States Supreme Court has permitted states to shape how mitigating and
aggravating circumstances will be considered by sentencing juries. See Walton, 497 U.S. at
652; Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299,309 (1990). The failure to give particularizedjury

instructions about what may be considered in mitigation is therefore less likely to run afoul of
the constitution. But the Court has held fast to the view that the court must allow all relevant
mitigating evidence to be introduced, and that failure to allow such evidence is reversible error.

id. at 308-309.
200. Pennsylvania v. Fletcher, 750 A.2d 261, 277 (Pa. 2000).
201. Id.
202.
203.

McMillan v. Alabama, 594 So.2d 1253, 1272 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991).
Shelton v. Delaware, 744 A.2d 465, 496 (Del. 2000).

204. Defendants and their counsel need to assess whether arguing residual doubt is
warranted in a particular case, and consider a number of practical concerns. See Jennifer
Treadway, 'ResidualDoubt' in CapitalSentencing: No Doubt it is an AppropriateMitigating
Factor,43 CASE W.REs. L. REV. 215,24247 (1992). Recent Capital Jury Project studies show
that jurors are more likely to sentence to death when a defendant does not show some
acknowledgement of the killing and refuses to accept any responsibility. Scott E.Sundby, The
Capital Jury and Absolution: The Intersection of Trial Strategy, Remorse, and the Death
Penalty, 83 CORNELL L.REV. 1557, 1560-66 (1998). "Only in those cases in which the
prosecution asked the jury to deduce from ambiguous circumstantial evidence that the defendant
had acted as the ringleader from among several participants did a denial defense appear not to
skew the jury heavily toward imposing a death sentence." Id. at 1583. "[C]reating such a
lingering doubt (indenial cases] isvery difficult." Id. On the other hand, "a defense asserting
that the defendant had participated in the killing but that his involvement did not rise to the level
of capital murder did not appear to invite a backlash if the defense was plausible based upon the
facts." Id.at 1585. This admission defense approach produced a lingering doubt among jurors
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ability to raise it in the appropriate case is essential.
Barring argument and evidence risks constitutional and other forms of
error. A preclusion of residual doubt creates the need to make unworkable
distinctions and presents the possibility of incongruous results." 5
c. Simply Using the Model Penal Code Approach to Relevant Mitigation,
Without an Exclusion of Death, Would Have Been Better Than the Present
Situation.

The Model Penal Code avoided all of these problems by providing for an
exclusion of death when the evidence does not foreclose all doubt. But even
if one did not accept that portion of the Model Penal Code, the Code still
assured against the current difficulties of defining the proper scope of
mitigation. Lockett unfortunately took up but a piece of the Model Penal
Code's mitigation description, then courts made it exhaustive, and therein may
lie the rub. The Model Penal Code provides that "[in the proceeding,
evidence may be presented as to any matter the Court deems relevant to
sentence, including but not limited to the nature and circumstances of the
crime, the defendant's character, background, history, mental and physical
condition, and any of the aggravating or mitigating circumstances enumerated
in Subsections (3) and (4) of this Section."'
It may well be that while residual doubt fit the appropriate criteria for
relevance, the Franklinplurality did not wish to acknowledge it, and labeled
it a "questionable proposition" for what are best described as "institutional
reasons." 7 These institutional reasons are not justified, as will be discussed
below.

in seven of the twelve life cases studied. Id. Whether lingering doubt is available as an
argument in a case will be dependent on the facts of the case, as it should be.
205. Courts have sometimes been presented with arguments that counsel was ineffective
when he chose to rely on residual doubt rather than good character at the penalty phase. See,
e.g., Chandler v.United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1325-26 (11 th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (finding no
ineffectiveness). If residual doubt is not even viewed as constitutionally relevant in mitigation
and is barred in the jurisdiction where that issue israised, then one must justly question how a
defense lawyer in that jurisdiction could be viewed as reasonably competent in pursuing this
strategy. There isa risk that the lower-court's approaches to residual doubt may become resultoriented; just another way to reject claims from capital defendants. At the least, the lower
courts need to be internally consistent about their treatment of residual doubt.
206.
207.

MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (2) (1980) (emphasis added).
Id.
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d. The Franklin Court's Concern That ConsideringResidual Doubt
Would Burden the Penalty Phase Jury and Penalty Phase Retrials is
Overstated.
i. The Concerns in Franklin
The Court plurality expressed concern that accepting residual doubt
would be placing a constitutional burden on the states of 'relitigating' guilt in
the penalty phase and would undermine the ability to conduct penalty-only
retrials.
The plurality's reasoning is unsatisfactory. First, the plurality "fail[ed]
to differentiate between total relitigation and doubt of guilt as a mitigating
factor," ' and so appears to misjudge the burden placed on the state in both
settings. Second, the plurality suggests that 'relitigating' the other elements
of the crime through consideration of those constitutionally necessary residual
doubts will somehow be less burdensome, and yet gives no support for this
implicit distinction. Third, the plurality failed to consider the frequency with
which evidence arising in the trial phase is reused by the State in a retrial
setting to prove aggravating factors or the absence of mitigating circumstances
arising from the circumstances of the crime. The defendant surely has a right
to rebut the state's evidence by presenting his own, as a matter of due process
Thus,
and to assure that degree of reliability necessary in a capital case.'
event,
any
in
resentencing
at
play
into
come
to
likely
is
evidence
this
of
much
and the asserted additional burden likely evaporates.
Even if sentencing retrials did present such burdens, the plurality should
not resolve this issue by putting the cart before the horse. To achieve a reliable
appropriate punishment at least the first time around, the initial trial and
sentencing body should be allowed and properly invited to consider all
residual doubts as a mitigating factor.
Or, as will be discussed below, the problem of penalty-only retrials can
be resolved by simply requiring the first trial jury find that the evidence
forecloses all doubt before a penalty trial can be conducted. Lingering doubt
will have been resolved in the trial phase, and would seldom arise as a concern
in the penalty phase. Thus, it would not likely be a concern in the event that
a penalty phase had to be retried.

208. People v. Terry, 390 P.2d 381, 388 (Cal. 1964) (ruling such failure to differentiate
court).
was error by the trial
209. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349,349-50 (1977); Simmons v. South Carolina,
512 U.S. 154, 161-62 (1994).
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ii. Comparing this allegedburden to that imposed by considering other
issues (deterrence,cost) that are of less clear relevancefurther undermines
reliance on institutionalconcerns to reject residualdoubt.
Lockett provided that courts maintained "the traditional authority of a
court to exclude, as irrelevant, evidence not bearing on the defendant's
character, prior record, or the circumstances of his offense. ' 210 If it is argued
that residual doubt fits outside this description, or the "reasoned moral
response" description, then the question remains for a lower court as to
whether to admit the evidence nonetheless. Lockett did not require courts to
exclude evidence outside its description, it simply permitted its exclusion.
Relevant evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the existence
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. 2" For reasons
stated above, this evidence should be deemed relevant to the ultimate justness
of a death sentence, and a state could and should find so even without a
constitutional mandate.
But it is true that when outside the bounds of constitutional relevancy, it
is possible to exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by other interests, i.e. on grounds of prejudice, confusion of the
issues, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 1 2 It
would not appear that this is what was at issue in Franklin,for Franklin did not
attempt to present additional evidence, and so the Court plurality should not
be seen as making its decision on that basis. But to the extent the plurality
spoke to burdens of relitigating when a request was made for jury instructions,
some of the concerns addressed in Rule 403 might be part of the plurality's
thinking.
The Franklinplurality termed the issue as one of whether to tell the jury
"to revisit the question of his identity as the murderer. 21 3 Considering
residual doubt in the penalty phase does involve reconsidering the evidence at
the trial phase respecting the elements of the crime, and discerning whether it
meets the certainty one expects for capital sentencing. In some cases,
additional evidence that was viewed as inadmissible in the trial phase but
admissible at the penalty stage may need to be considered.2 14 But the relative
burden of considering residual doubt is slight compared to other matters
argued to be relevant or admissible in mitigation.
210.

211.
212.
213.
214.

Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604, n.12.

FED. R. EviD. 401.
FED. R. EviD. 403.
Franklin, 487 U.S. at 172-73.
See Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. at 97.
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The FranklinCourt did not allude to concerns of avoiding expense or of
inappropriate incursions by the jury into areas of legislative fact-finding about
the death penalty. Yet, these concerns have been raised as to other matters.
Courts often reject evidence regarding the deterrent effect of the death
penalty on this ground. "The wisdom or deterrent effect of those penalties are
for the legislature to determine and are therefore not justiciable issues. Hence
evidence as to these matters is inadmissible. Juries in capital cases cannot
become legislatures ad hoc, and trials on the issue of penalty cannot be
2
converted into legislative hearings." ' Some courts would appear to be
26
willing to allow such evidence to rebut a prosecutor's argument, or to allow
2
rebuttal argument,"' and others will not. "
215. California v. Love, 366 P.2d 33,35 (Cal. 1961). See also Colorado v. Harlan, 2000
WL 306711 (Colo. Sup. Ct. Mar. 27, 2000); Illinois v. Williams, 454 N.E.2d 220, 243 (II.
1983); Illinois v. Yates, 456 N.E.2d 1369, 1387 (Il. 1983); White v. Maryland, 589 A.2d 969,
974 (C.A. Md. 1991) (this does not deal with the defendant nor the crime, therefore there is
"neither cause nor justification for introducing a battle of experts or statistics on this perplexing
question before the trier of fact.. ."); Missouri v. Gilmore, 681 S.W.2d 934, 947 (Mo. 1984)
(funds for defense expert regarding deterrent value of death penalty denied, prosecutor's
reference to deterrent value in close was not grounds to require defense expert as state did not
introduce such evidence); New Jersey v. Rose, 576 A.2d 235, 236 (N.J. 1990) (balancing
deterrence against countervailing considerations remains... primarily a legislative decision);
North Carolina v. Williams, 292 S.E.2d 243,259 (N.C. 1982); Ohio v. Jenkins, 473 N.E.2d 264,
289 (Ohio 1984); Oregon v. Barone, 969 P.2d 1013, 1032 (Ore. 1998) (excluding expert
testimony that addressed only a general political question not before the jury); South Carolina
v. Shafer, 531 S.E.2d 524,533 (S.C. 2000) ("While both the prosecution and defense may argue
their respective opinions regarding the general deterrent effect of the death penalty, neither may
present evidence supporting their views." Footnote 15 says this evidence is irrelevant as the
legislature has approved the practice. Therefore, the trial judge did not err by refusing a defense
request to reopen the record to present evidence after the prosecutor argued in close that the
death penalty deters others from committing murder, and the court need not instruct the jury to
disregard.); Tennessee v. Brimmer, 876 S.W.2d 75, 86-87 (Tenn. 1994); Utah v. Norton, 675
P.2d 577, 588 (Utah 1984); Granviel v. Lynaugh, 881 F.2d 185, 189 (5th Cir. 1989) (finding
expert testimony concerning efficacy of Texas capital statutes was irrelevant to the defendant
or his crime); Williams v. Chrans, 945 F.2d 926, 947 (7th Cir. 1991); Martin v. Wainwright,
770 F.2d 918,936 (11 th Cir. 1985), modified on reh'g., 781 F.2d 185, cert. denied 479 U.S. 909
(1986) ("evidence concerning whether the death penalty has a deterrent effect... is not
designed to help the sentencer focus on the unique characteristics of a particular defendant or
crime. Rather, such evidence is designed to persuade the sentencer that the legislature erred.
..when it enacted a death penalty statute.").

216. California v. Thompson, 753 P.2d 37,71 (Cal. 1988) (stating the matter is proper
for the legislature, not the jury imposing sentence in a particular case; evidence was not relevant
here to rebut argument by the prosecutor which continually focused on the nature of this crime
and the argument that it justified the death penalty, without clearly choosing a theory such as
retribution or deterrence).
217. Fleming v. Georgia, 458 S.E.2d 638, 639 (Ga. 1995) (finding both parties may
argue deterrence under prior precedent, but both are precluded from introducing evidence, and
the defense could not introduce evidence to rebut prosecutor's argument). Justice Fletcher's
dissent focuses on the due process right to rebuttal set forth in Skipper v. South Carolina,476
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Many courts will similarly bar admission of evidence respecting the costs

219
of the death penalty, viewing such evidence as not relevant under Lockett.

Others may allow an instruction on cost.2'o Some courts may foreclose
testimony going-to general potential for rehabilitation, though allowing this
when directed at the particular defendant's potential for rehabilitation."

U.S. 1 (1986) and suggests the better rule is neither party argues deterrence. "While the
admission of expert evidence is required to satisfy due process, it will also prolong the trial and
dramatically increase the cost as both the state and defense employ competing experts.
Additionally, I recognize that legislatures rather than juries are best equipped to consider
sociological evidence on the deterrent value of the death penalty.... we should simply...
avoid the quagmire created by battling sociological experts." Fleming, 458 S.E.2d at 641
(Fleming, J., dissenting). Justice Sears' dissent addresses the practical reality that the
prosecutor's argument will exploit jurors' beliefs about the effectiveness of death penalty as
a deterrent, and under Simmons, the defendant must be afforded the opportunity to present
evidence to rebut the argument used against him. Id. at 643 (Sears, J., dissenting). He suggests
that Gregg, 458 S.E.2d at 183-85, had stated the punishment's value as a deterrent depends on
statistical, empirical studies, the results of which can be evaluated. Id. at 641-42. "Allowing
mere argument by the state with no statistics or other empirical support flies in the face of
Gregg's unequivocal pronouncement that the deterrent effect of the death penalty depends on
such evidence." Id. at 643. See also South Carolina v. George, 476 S.E.2d 903,914 (S.C. 1996)
(holding that both sides may argue their respective opinions, but cannot introduce specific data
to corroborate their views).
218. North Carolina v. Ali, 407 S.E.2d 183, 191 (N.C. 1991) (ruling that neither the
defendant nor the State can introduce evidence or argue the effect, if any, of the death penalty
on the commission of crimes by others, per State v. Kirkley, 302 S.E.2d 144, 155 (N.C. 1983)
(holding prosecutor's argument improper but not so offensive as to require corrective action by
the trial judge sua sponte)).
219. Arizona v. Kayer, 984 P.2d 31, 48 (Ariz. 1999) (finding the trial judge not required
to consider sua sponte the high cost of execution in mitigation as the "death penalty represents
a legislative policy choice by the people's representatives ... and it transcends a financial
cots/benefits analysis." To consider it "would contradict Arizona's public policy decision and
would violate the court's mandate to consider mitigating factors that relate not to cost, but to
a 'defendant's character, propensities, or record and any circumstances of the offense' under
(the statute)."). See also Arizona v. Clabourne, 983 P.2d 748 (Ariz. 1999) (state prevails on
cross-appeal that re-sentencing court erred when-it found "the economic cost to the State of
Arizona arising from the prosecutor's decision to maintain its request for the death penalty in
this case, as compared with the cost of seeking a life sentence, is mitigating."); Colorado v.
Harlan, 8 P.2d 448, 483-500 (Colo. 2000) (ruling that evidence was properly excluded as not
relevant); Tennessee v. Brimmer, 876 S.W.2d75, 86-87 (Tenn. 1994); Utah v. Norton, 675 P.2d
577, 588 (Utah 1984) (finding the issue one for the legislature, not the court).
220. See California v. Thompson, 753 P.2d 37, 71 (Cal. 1988) (holding jury could
properly have been given defendant's requested instruction that costs of imprisonment for life
would not necessarily be greater than the costs of carrying out a death sentence; but the fact that
some jurors may have mentioned the issue in voir dire did not require evidence be presented
where neither evidence produced nor the arguments of counsel made cost an issue in the case).
221. See Spranger v. Indiana, 498 N.E.2d 931,944 (Ind. 1986) (finding that excluding
evidence of susceptibility of other persons to rehabilitation was not error, where specific
testimony as to rehabilitative potential of the particular defendant on trial had been allowed);
North Carolina v. Williams, 292 S.E.2d243,258 (N.C. 1982); Ohio v. Jenkins, 473 N.E.2d 264,
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While there are appropriate arguments favoring the admissibility of this
type of evidence as it solicits a further moral response from the jury and serves
interests of having the jurors be the voice of the community; 2 2 these issues do
present some institutional concerns that may justify exclusion.
Consideration of residual doubt does not present the same institutional
concerns. Residual doubt is ordinarily based on the evidence already in the
case.
Even if additional evidence is proffered for purposes of a residual doubt
determination, it should not be excluded, for several reasons.
First, residual doubt is a fact of great consequence to the determination.
Studies demonstrate residual doubt matters the most in decision-making, that
jurors consistently respond when this is present in the case. Whether the death
penalty deters others, or its relative cost, are not at the moral center of the
juror's decision-making, as is lingering doubt. Deterrence and costs are of less
consequence, and hence, exclusion is more acceptable in the balancing of
probative and prejudicial value of the evidence offered.
Secondly, consideration of deterrence and cost would inevitably require
additional fact-finding that may be beyond the juror's ken. This may include
the presentation of extensive additional testimony and evidence, often expert
evidence. There are no comparable encumbrances in considering lingering
doubt. The jury has heard all, or nearly all, the evidence they need to assess
this issue in the trial phase. They are the body we traditionally employ for just
such fact-finding, and it is well within their ken.
Thirdly, this is an issue wholly particularized to this case and this
defendant, an issue that only this fact-finder can resolve. This is not a general
question of policy that-can be delegated to others, rather it is a particularized
concern that the defendant before this jury might not have committed this
crime. It does not save time to ignore this evidence or factor, indeed,
considering how doubt in capital cases will inevitably be the subject of public
concern for years to come, to not address the matter at the trial level is
manifestly unreasonable. Courts only postpone the expenditure of time and
resources, and damage the public's confidence in the judicial system, and
indeed greatly exacerbate it, by not considering residual doubt as a 'live' issue
in the case. This inquiry is not a waste of time, and any suggestion that it is

289 (Ohio 1984) (finding general rehabilitation testimony would divert jury from its duty to
impose a sentence within the confines of the guidelines fixed by statute and turn its attention
to the wisdom of enacting it in the first place).
222. See Lynn Thompson Reid, Blind Justice: Excluding Relevant Evidence During
Capital Sentencing, 3 J.GENDER, RACE&JUSTICE 343,369 (1999) (arguing such evidence may
be properly admitted for jurors to fulfill their policy-making role).
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would likely offend many citizens. Finally, this does not present a possibility
of needless confusion of the issues-for many jurors, this is the issue.
For these reasons, even if residual doubt is not required to be considered
on the basis of constitutional relevance, it should not be excluded from the
jury's decision-making process.
C. IN SUM, PRESENT LAW FAILS TO ADEQUATELY RESPOND TO THE RISK OF
MISTAKE IN CAPITAL CASES

Most courts have viewed Franklin as dismissing residual doubt from the
capital sentencing process. Whether the concept is related to the jurors at all
seems a function of an individual judge responding to an individual attorney's
request. Even then, all that jury may hear is a defense argument, with no
imprimatur of judicial approval, and with no guidance as to how this might be
considered in decision-making. Arbitrariness reigns, and mistakes proliferate.
The current niggardly approach to giving the jury critical information and
guidance about how it is to decide whether to take a life shocks the conscience.
This is the most criticalfactorfor many jurors,and we are not informing them
that it is wholly appropriateand most importantthat they consider it.
We are long overdue for the Model Penal Code's exclusionary practice.'
IV. THE OPPORTUNITY TO ADD PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS AND RETHINK
BIFURCATION INTHE WAKE OF APPRENDI V. NEW JERSEY224

A. THE APPRENDICASE

The United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Apprendi v. New
Jersey22 holds the promise of bringing about greater reliability and greater
jury involvement in capital sentencing decision-making. In this non-capital
case, the United States Supreme Court struck down a New Jersey hate crime
statute that had allowed the trial judge to enhance a sentence beyond the
statutory maximum on the basis of facts the trial judge found by a
preponderance of the evidence.'
By a 5-4 margin, the Court held that the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments required that any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, other than the
fact of a prior conviction, must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a
223. In the interim, a standardized jury instruction respecting residual doubt should be

adopted by means of a legislative enactment, rule change, or judicial decision. Additional
protections should also be afforded by other jury instructions, and by appellate mechanisms.
224. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
225.
226.

Id.
See id.
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reasonable doubt.2 7 Relying on the decision a year before in Jones v. United
States,m the Court found that the Due Process Clause and the Sixth
Amendment's notice and jury trial guarantees required that such facts must be
charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt?'9 Justices Thomas and Scalia would be willing to apply the
same ruling to prior convictions, as stated in a concurring opinion.' °
The Apprendi Court majority found error in subjecting the defendant to
"a penalty exceeding the maximum he would receive if punished according to
the facts reflected in the jury verdict alone."'" The New Jersey scheme
allowed the defendant to be convicted of a second-degree offense based on
facts proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, and then be sentenced for a
first-degree offense based on other facts proven to a judge by a mere
preponderance of the evidence. 32 To the State's argument that the fact was
not an element, the Court responded that labels are not the answer. 3 The
relevant inquiry is instead "whether the required finding exposes the defendant
"The
to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury's verdict."'
with
associate
to
chooses
legislature
the
culpability
degree of criminal
particular factually distinct conduct has significant implications both for a
defendant's very liberty [a potential doubling of sentence from 10 to 20 years
here], and for the heightened stigma associated with an offense the legislature
has selected as worthy of greater punishment." ' That the State placed the
enhancer within the criminal code's sentencing provisions did not mean that
it is not an essential element of the offense. The Court "endorse[d] the
statement of the rule set forth in the concurring opinions in [the Jones] case:
'[Ilt is unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment
of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal
defendant is exposed. It is equally clear that such facts must be established by
proof beyond a reasonable doubt."'M

227. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. 2348. 2354-55.
228. 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
229. Apprendi, 120 S.Ct. at 2354-55.
230. See id. at 2368-80 (Thomas, J., concurring).
231. Id. at 2359.
232. Id. at 2363 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6(a)(1) (West 1999)).
233.

id. at 2365.

234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 2363 (quoting Jones v. U.S., 526 U.S. 227, 252-53 (1999) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) and referencing Jones, at 253 (Scalia, J., concurring)).
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B. APPRENDI'S POSSIBLE IMPACT ON CAPITAL JUDGE-SENTENCING SCHEMES

The Court's ruling immediately. prompted concerns both within and
outside the Court regarding the continued viability of those capital sentencing
regimes where judges, not juries, determine the aggravating factors that are
necessary for death-eligibility. After all, the Court found "the potential
doubling of one's sentence.. in terms of absolute years behind bars, and ... the
more severe stigma attached, [was a] differential [ ] unquestionably of
constitutional significance." 2" Surely, the fact that death is a penalty different
in kind from any other, and irrevocable in its deadqningly stigmatizing
effect,"3 would require a similar, if not enhanced, attentiveness to the right to
notice and a jury determination of facts beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Court has, however, repeatedly held that jury involvement in capital
sentencing is not constitutionally required-most saliently a decade ago in
Walton v. Arizona.239 Walton involved an Arizona law that required a trial
court to conduct a separate sentencing hearing to determine whether a
defendant convicted of first-degree murder should receive the death penalty
or life imprisonment.' The judge determined the existence or nonexistence
of the statutory aggravating and mitigating factors."I The judge was to
'impose a sentence of death if the court finds one or more of the aggravating
circumstances enumerated in [the statute] and that there are no mitigating
circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.""'' 2 Arizona law
therefore precluded death for one convicted of first-degree murder, unless a
judge found the existence of a statutory aggravating factor and no sufficiently
substantial mitigating circumstances.
The Walton Court, in an opinion written by Justice White, rejected the
argument that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated by such a
scheme, relying on prior precedent: "'Any argument that the Constitution
requires that a jury impose the sentence of death or make the findings
prerequisite to imposition of such a sentence has been soundly rejected by
prior decisions of this Court."'2 3 A minority, but substantial, number of states

237. Id. at 2365. The Court has signaled it may apply Apprendi to other sentencing
questions in non-capital cases. See Jones v. United States, 120 S.Ct. 2739 (June 29, 2000)
(mem.), vacating and remanding United States v. Jones, 194 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 1998),
decision on remand at 2000 WL 1854077 (10th Cir. Dec. 19,2000) (sentence enhancement for
amount ofdrugs was subject tojury finding and proof beyond a reasonable doubt requirements).
238. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305.
239. 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
240. See id. at 643 (quoting ARIz. - V. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(B) (West 1989)).
241. See id at 643 (citing ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN § 13-703(B) (West 1989)).
242. Id. at 644 (quoting ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN § 13-703(E) (West 1989)).
243. Id. at 647 (quoting Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 745 (1990)). The issue
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or permit a jury
do not presently provide .for jury sentencing'
recommendation of a lesser sentence to be overridden by a judge." s In these
states, Apprendi will breathe new life into arguments for jury involvement.
To the Apprendi Court's credit, despite the pointed exchanges and
sparring-to-no-agreement revealed in its opinions, each opinion attended to the
notion that the Court's ruling may have a future impact on the Court's Walton
precedent. The majority declined to find any inconsistency, as the Walton jury
had found all of the elements of an offense carrying as its maximum penalty
the sentence of death.'
Justice Scalia wrote a separate concurrence, stating his view that the Sixth
Amendment right to an impartial jury "has no intelligible content unless it
means that all the facts which must exist in order to subject the defendant to
a legally prescribed punishment must be found by the jury."" 7 Justice
Thomas, in a concurrence joined by Justice Scalia, made clear that the
implications of the Court's ruling on judge-sentencing schemes are uncertain
and that resolution of this question would have to wait for another day."'
had been considered in Spaziano v. Florida,468 U.S. 337 (1984), and in later Florida cases.
See, e.g. Walton, 497 U.S. at 648 ("'[Tlhe Sixth Amendment does not require that the specific
findings authorizing the imposition of the sentence of death be made by the jury."') (quoting
Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638, 640-41, (1989) (per curiam)).
244. ARz. Rev. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (West 1989); COL REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-11-103
(West 1998 &Supp. 2000); IDAHOCODE § 19-2515 (Michie.1997 & Supp. 2000); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 46-18-301 (1999); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2520 (1995).
245. AiA. CODE § 13A-5-47(e) (1994 &Supp. 2000); DEL CODEANN. tit. 11, § 4209(d)
(1995 & Supp. 2000); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(3) (West 1996 & Supp. 2001); IND. CODE
ANN. § 35-50-2-9(e) (West 1998 & Supp. 2000).
246. The Court stated:
For reasons we have explained, the capital cases are not controlling:
Neither the cases cited, nor any other case, permits a judge to determine
the existence of a factor which makes a crime a capital offense. What the
cited cases hold is that, once a jury has found the defendant guilty of all
the elements of an offense which carries as its maximum penalty the
sentence of death, it may be left to the judge to decide whether that
maximum penalty, rather than a lesser one, ought to be imposed .... The
person who is charged with actions that expose him to the death penalty
has an absolute entitlement to jury trial on all the elements of the charge.
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2366 (2000) (quoting Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S.
at 257, n. 2 (Scalia, J., dissenting)) (other citations omitted).
247. Apprendi, 120 S.Ct. at 2367.
248. Justice Thomas stated:
Finally, I need not in this case address the implications of the rule that I
have stated for the Court's decision in Walton v. Arizona... [citations
omitted]. Walton did approve a scheme by which a judge, rather than a
jury, determines an aggravating fact that makes a convict eligible for the
death penalty, and thus eligible for a greater punishment. In this sense,
that fact is an element. But that scheme exists in a unique context, for in
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The dissent of Justice O'Connor, in which the Chief Justice and Justice
Breyer joined, found the majority's opinion directly contrary to Walton and
thus "baffling." 9 The dissent believed that the distinction suggested by the
concurring opinion represented "reasoning without precedent in our
constitutional jurisprudence."' Because the Court "offer[ed] unprincipled
and inexplicable distinctions between its decision and previous cases
addressing the same subject in the capital sentencing context (e.g., Walton),"''
the dissent opined that the Court should not depart from its "settled
jurisprudence."" 2 The dissent suggested that "if the Court does not intend to
overrule Walton, one would be hard pressed to tell from the opinion it issues
today."' 2 3 Then, in an attempt to reconcile the two, the dissent suggested one
could, but only on a level of meaningless formalism it criticized the majority
for adopting.'
the area of capital punishment, unlike any other area, we have imposed
special constraints on alegislature's ability to determine what facts shall

lead to what punishment--we have restricted the legislature's ability to
define crimes. Under our recent capital-puni shmentjurisprudence, neither

Arizona nor any other jurisdiction could provide--as, previously, it freely
could and did--that a person shall be death eligible automatically upon
conviction for certain crimes. We have interposed a barrier between a
jury finding of a capital crime and a court's ability to impose capital
punishment. Whether this distinction between capital crimes and all
others, or some other distinction, is sufficient to put the former outside
the rule that I have stated is a question for another day.
Apprendi at 2380 (Thomas, J., concurring).
249. Id. at 2388.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.at 2389.
253. Id. at 2388.
254. Id. at 2389-90 (O'Connor, J,.dissenting). The dissent reasons:
Upon closer examination, it is possible that the Court's "increase in the
maximum penalty" rule rests on a meaningless formalism that accords,
at best, marginal protection for the constitutional rights that it seeks to
effectuate.... A State could, ... remove from the jury (and subject to a
standard of proof below "beyond a reasonable doubt") the assessment of
those facts that define narrower ranges of punishment, within the overall
statutory range, to which the defendant may be sentenced [citation
omitted], and [tihus, apparently.. cure its sentencing scheme and achieve
virtually the same results. ... [Further, as to Walton in particular, of]
course, as explained above, an Arizona sentencing judge can impose the
maximum penalty of death only if the judge first makes a statutorily
required finding that at least one aggravating factor exists in the
defendant's case. Thus, the Arizona first-degree murder statute
authorizes a maximum penalty of death only in a formal sense. In real
terms, however, the Arizona sentencing scheme removes from the jury
the assessment of a fact that determines whether the defendant can
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Second-generation Apprendi issues will soon arrive at the Court.25' It is

still uncertain as to whether and how death penalty cases will be impacted.
One district court has ruled that the federal scheme (which uses jury findings)
was not in violation because it failed to specify the statutory aggravating
factors in the grand jury indictment. The district court concluded, sua sponte,
a day after Apprendi, that these "aggravating factors are sentencing
considerations, and not an element of a separate crime that distinguishes
capital-murder in aid of racketeering from non-capital murder in aid of
racketeering [, and c]onsequently, no statutory aggravating factor is required
to be presented to a grand jury."'
Other courts may also try to avoid
Apprendi's dictates. Two non-capital defense litigators have suggested that
"Apprendi'simpact on capital cases, especially in judge-sentencing cases, will
be the highest-stakes litigation [and that i]t is upon this issue that the Court's
new coalition of five may fracture." 2 7 If so, the "hard cases make bad law"
adage will once again play out. Death cases will remain a cancer on the law:
an infection that can be cured, but because the cure comes at too high a price,
the law's appropriate development is arrested and the infection remains
(infecting all cases, not just capital cases)."8
C. AN APPRENDI COMPLIANCE-CHECK, AND APPRENDI'S MISTAKE-AVOIDANCE
POTENTIAL

Assuming Apprendi can survive and will apply to capital sentencing

Id.

receive that maximum punishment. The only difference, then, between
the Arizona scheme and the New Jersey scheme we consider here--apart
from the magnitude of punishment at stake--is that New Jersey has not
prescribed the 20-year maximum penalty in the same statute that it
defines the crime to be punished. It is difficult to understand, and the
Court does not explain, why the Constitution would require a state
legislature to follow such a meaningless and formalistic difference in
drafting its criminal statutes.

255. A Ninth Circuit panel recently split 2-1 on the constitutionality of the Idaho judgesentencing scheme, though the error was deemed harmless by the single judge who had found
that Apprendi's reasoning foreclosed continued reliance on Walton. Hoffman v. Arave, 2001
WL 6710 (9th Cir. Jan. 3, 2001). For a sketch of these issues and how defense counsel might
address them, see Jon M. Sands & Steven G. Kalar, An Apprendi Primer: On the Virtues of a
"Doubting Thomas," THE CHAMPION (Oct. 2000), at 18-25, 65-71.
256. United States v. Kee, 2000 WL 863119 (D.N.Y.. June 27, 2000).
257. Sands & Kalar, supra note 256, at 68.
258. The death penalty would once more in yet another context "undermine the accuracy
of our system of adjudication by 'tend(ing] to distort the course of the criminal law."' Samuel
R. Gross, The Risks of Death: Why Erroneous Convictions Are Common in Capital Cases, 44
BuFF. L. REV. 469, 475 (1996) (quoting Herbert B. Ehrmann, The Death Penalty and the
Administration ofJustice, 284 ANNALS OF AM. ACAD. POL & POL Sci. 73, 83 (1952)).
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schemes, some changes may be needed in individual jurisdictions. Each
capital sentencing system needs to undergo an Apprendi-compliance check,
though it may be some time before we know for certain what will be required
by it. In the interim, to avoid later reversals for operating under a flawed
system, jurisdictions may be best served by some preventive maintenance, and
taking a broad view of where Apprendi may take capital litigation.
In some states, this will focus on whether the findings presently being
made by a judge without a jury, or by a jury with no binding power against a
higher penalty, are of the nature covered by the Apprendi rule. If so, and if it
wishes' to retain judge sentencing, the jurisdiction will have to redesign the
trial and penalty phases to achieve the required jury decision-making. A
judge-sentencing jurisdiction may try to argue that all it need do is assure that
the aggravating factors which make one death-eligible are determined by a
jury, and then recontour its bifurcation of the trial and penalty phases by
sliding such needed findings into the trial phase. But that should not be
enough. A death sentence cannot be imposed until mitigating circumstances
in the case are considered-the evaluation of mitigating circumstances is the
other constitutionally necessary component in determining actual deatheligibility. 9 Death cannot be imposed unless (in a weighing state) the
aggravating factors sufficiently outweigh those in mitigation, or if there are no
factors in mitigation, the aggravating factor(s) alone are sufficient to justify a
sentence of death.'6 Death cannot be imposed (in a non-weighing state),
unless death is viewed as appropriate after the mitigating factors have been
considered." So a system of re-bifurcating by simply sliding aggravating
factors into the trial phase and then leaving the jury out of the penalty phase
where mitigation is considered should be inconsistent with the Court's dictate
in Apprendi. If one accepts this view, either Walton is overruled, or Apprendi
is fractured and does not survive. In this period of uncertainty, Apprendi may
prompt a reconsideration of how capital trials are bifurcated and may lead to
some tinkering with bifurcation in an attempt to find a middle ground that
might yet preserve judge-sentencing.
Apprendi's reaffirmation of jury involvement in sentence decisionmaking holds the promise of greater illumination of societal values as reflected
in their decisions, and of further evolution in our sense of permissible

259. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-305 (1976); Lockett v. Ohio,
438 U.S. 586, 604-605 (1978).
260. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3593(e) (the federal death penalty statute) and OHIO REv.
CODE ANN. § 2929.03(D) (the Ohio death penalty statute).,
261. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 873-75 (1983) (describing GA's requirement
for jury to death sentence).
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punishments. To the extent jurors respond with attentiveness and concern to
the risk of mistake, decisions can be more reliable.
Beyond the consideration of whether and how juries are to be part of the
sentencing process, Apprendi directs that the aggravating factors claimed to
create a possibility of death-eligibility will need to be pled in the indictment
and be subject to the proof beyond a reasonable doubt requirement. This will
change the practice in some states: Illinois is one where such notice has not
been given in the indictment. Others, like Ohio, have commonly used
specifications in the indictment for many punishment enhancers, both capital
and non-capital. 2 Prosecutors will need to commit earlier to seeking death,
selecting their reasons and placing them before the grand jury for a probable
cause determination. This in turn should put some greater responsibility on
prosecutors to assess their case with greater care in the pre-indictment process,
or in the post-indictment pre-trial process.
WhetherApprendi's dictate to specify grounds for death in the indictment
will increase or decrease the risk of convicting the innocent is uncertain. It
should decrease the risk. In theory, greater attentiveness to a case should
prompt better screening by police investigators and by prosecutors in their
charging decisions. But Professor Samuel Gross has suggested that one of the
factors that brings about a greater risk of convicting the innocent is the
pressure that investigators feel if the crime is not readily solved: "the police
may be tempted to cut comers, to jump to conclusions, and-if they believe
3
they have the killer-perhaps to manufacture evidence to clinch the case."
With this added mandate to identify facts calling for the death sentence in the
indictment, there may be a greater risk of shortcutting. Police and prosecutors
need to be more attentive to this risk and resist public pressure. Further, there

is perhaps a greater risk that the decision about whether to seek death, having

to be made earlier, will be more susceptible to the inflamed passions in the
community. 2 " These pressures need to be resisted so that the decision of
whether to seek the death penalty can be made more reliably.

262. See, e.g., OHlOREv. CODE ANN. §2941.14 to2941.1410 (West 1996)(requiring that
varying facts allowing greater punishment be pled in the indictment as specifications, which
must be proven at trial, or for some issues, there may be an for a separate proceeding before the

trial judge).
263. Gross, supra note 259, at 478.
264. "Death produces strong reactions... a desire to punish and to protect [compared to
other outrageous crimes]...The danger that the investigators will go too far is magnified to the
extent that the killing is brutal and horrifying, and to the extent that it attracts public attention
-factors which also increase the likelihood that the murder will be treated as a capital case."
Id.

2001]

AVERTING MISTAKEN EXECUTIONS

A related factor in assessing the risk of convicting the innocent is how
willing prosecutors will be to reconsider their decision to seek death in the
period after indictment and before trial. Professor Samuel Gross has suggested
that when the "prosecutor knows from the start that she wants the death
penalty," ... "there is no plea bargaining," and "in the absence of plea
bargaining," the defense counsel may not get a "serious hearing" with the
prosecutor as to his client's innocence, and "the true value of a claim of
innocence becomes harder to interpret" because the prosecutor can expect that
in most cases, "the defense attorney may feel obliged to argue that the
defendant is innocent, whether or not she thinks it's true." ' Professor Gross
urges that "[w]hen inflexible lines are drawn at the start... the defense attorney
is less likely to be able to convince the prosecutor of anything, and especially
not that her client has been wrongly accused."
Prosecutors will need to
remain flexible and be willing to acknowledge that their earlier decision may
be incorrect. Apprendi's other directive that sentencing facts calling for a
higher sentence will need to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt should
encourage prosecutors to be more attentive to the weaknesses in their case.
The impact of Apprendi on the sentencer's reliance on non-statutory
aggravating factors should be addressed in this second-generation litigation.
Facts calling for a higher penalty that sentencers rely upon need to be
identified, so that there is assurance that those facts have been found and that
the requisite proof standard has been met. The prosecutor should be obliged
to itemize all facts in the indictment upon which it intends to ask the sentencer
to seek death. This capturing of the facts will allow the defense greater notice
and opportunity for discovery. Where the prosecutor is able to identify facts
outside of a statute, these will need to be specified. Then the inconsistencies
between what facts are used/not used in one case and what facts are used/not
used in another are likely to become more obvious and, perhaps for that
reason, more troubling.
Prosecutors may well need to respond with consistency or find greater
defense and public concern that the factors calling for death are being
arbitrarily selected. In that respect, Apprendi is likely to prompt a move to a
rule that only statutory-aggravating circumstances are allowed to be
considered in determining sentence, because greater consistency can be
achieved through limiting the sentencer to statutory-adopted classifications.
Apprendi's requirement of specific fact-finding by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt will likely translate into a more frequent use of special

265.
266.

Id. at 491-92.
Id at 492.
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verdicts. While special verdicts have been viewed with some disfavor, if they
are framed correctly and positioned in the jury's deliberative process
properly, 7 their use should enhance the reliability of the sentencer's
deliberative process. The special verdict practice will also provide a means of
more effective appellate review of the sentencer's decision-making process,
and a greater ability to sort out the unjust or inappropriate death-sentence.
D. RETHINKING HOW WE BIFURCATE: THE OHIO EXAMPLE

Apprendi may prompt some new modeling of capital proceedings. If so,
Ohio's model may be one to look to, as it meets Apprendi and other concerns
by bifurcating proceedings in a somewhat different manner than other states.
The Ohio legislative framework adopted in 1981 requires that the aggravating
circumstances or factors be proven beyond a reasonable doubt at the trial phase
of the case. 8 These are pled in the indictment as specifications. " 9 Only those
aggravating factors the offender was found guilty of committing27 and which
are not duplicative of one another27 are weighed against mitigating factors in
the penalty phase.272 In other words, Ohio bifurcates by placing the finding of
the, aggravating circumstances in the trial phase and then these aggravating
circumstances are weighed at the penalty phase, while other states have both
the aggravating and mitigating factors to be weighed and proven at the penalty
phase.273 The Ohio practice is a natural one that assures each aggravating
267. See, e.g., Heald v. Mullaney, 505 F.2d 1241, 1245 (lstCir. 1974) (noting "general
disapproval of special questions and verdicts in federal criminal cases" and that "[tihe states
generally decline to permit special verdicts and questions in criminal proceedings, although
there are exceptions") (citations omitted). In Heald, the defendant argued the use of special
verdicts denied due process. The First Circuit rejected this claim, finding "[neither question
called for an answer leading towards averdict of guilt (and t]he jury remained at all times free
to acquit for the usual reasons." Id. at 1246.
268. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03 (West 1996).
269. OHIoREv. CODE ANN. §2941.14 (West 1996). The aggravating circumstances are
listed in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(A).
270. There are no non-statutory aggravating circumstances permitted in Ohio. Ohio v.
Johnson, 494 N.E.2d 1061, syllabus (Ohio 1986). The aggravated murder itself is not an
aggravating circumstance and is not to be considered. Ohio v. Henderson, 528 N.E.2d 1237,
1240-41 (Ohio 1989). Further, the nature and circumstances of the crime may only enter into
the statutory weighing process on the side of mitigation. Ohio v. Wogenstahl, 662 N.E.2d 311,
para. 2 of the syllabus (Ohio 1996).
271. Ohio v. Jenkins, 473 N.E.2d 264, para. 5 of syllabus (Ohio 1984); Ohio v. Cooey,
544 N.E.2d 895, para. 3 of syllabus (Ohio 1989).
272. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(D) (West 1996).
273. While two other states allow aggravating or special circumstances to be proven at
the trial phase, both these states allow additional factors or circumstances in aggravation to be
considered at the penalty phase. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-40 (1994 & Supp. 2000); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 190.2 (West 1999 & Supp. 2000).

2001]

AVERTING MISTAKEN EXECUTIONS

circumstance used in sentencing is pled in the indictment, proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, and determined by a jury as required in Apprendi.
By placing the determination of aggravating circumstances in the trial
phase, Ohio also normalizes the process due in terms of opportunities to the
defense to deny, rebut, or explain the case in aggravation. The defense seeks
to rebut the entire state's case in the trial phase. Customary discovery rules
and bills of particulars apply to the aggravating factors." 4 Pretrial motion
practice also attends to the entire state's case.
Ohio jury instructions at the trial phase set forth the elements of the crime
of capital murder and inform the jury to address the aggravating circumstances
(each found on a separate verdict form) only if they first unanimously find the
defendant guilty of aggravated murder by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Each aggravating circumstance must then be found beyond a reasonable doubt.
The natural progression of making findings about elements of aggravated
murder and then about each of the aggravating circumstances, each by the
same standard of proof, reduces the likelihood of misapprehension on the part
of the jurors as to the need for proof beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravating
circumstances. This misapprehension has been documented in other
jurisdictions where the aggravating factors are attended to in the penalty
phase.27
If no aggravating circumstance is found beyond a reasonable doubt, there
is no penalty phase and a lesser life sentence is imposed. Ohio therefore culls
out the non-death eligible case in the trial phase, and if not culled, the process
has, at the same time, identified all the relevant aggravating circumstances to
be placed before the sentencer. This process narrows the issues for the penalty
phase.
The Ohio practice avoids unnecessary duplication in witnesses and
presentations swallowing resources because the penalty phase is largely a
mitigation phase. By law, the sentencing jury's consideration of evidence that
can call for a death sentence is strictly limited.276 The penalty phase becomes
274. OIO R. CRIm. P. 7 (E), and 16.
275. See Eisenberg& Wells, supra note 61, at 10(1993) ("[Twenty percent of thejurors
on death juries believe that an aggravating factor can be established by a preponderance of the
evidence or only to a juror's personal satisfaction."). By separating the proof of aggravating
factors from the presentation and deliberations on mitigating factors, the Ohio process may also
reduce the risk of jurors erroneously seeing mitigating factors as matters that had to be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. This is an even more common misapprehension. "Almost half the
jurors thought that mitigating circumstances must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Less
than a third understood that a mitigating circumstance must be proven only to the juror's
satisfaction." Id. at 11.
276. The Ohio Revised Code limits the sentencer's consideration at the penalty phase
on the aggravating circumstances side to "any evidence raised at trial that is relevant to the
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a proceeding for presentation by the defense of the case in mitigation. The
defense calls its mitigation witnesses. The prosecution usually announces that
it is resubmitting its trial phase case277 and only calls witnesses at the penalty
phase if it wishes to rebut inaccuracies in specific assertions made by the
defense witnesses27 or rebut the existence of any mitigating factor first
The defendant may present an unswom
introduced by the defense.'
statement at the penalty phase.'
The penalty phase sentencer (the jury who tried the defendant, or the
panel of three judges who tried the defendant if a jury was waived) can
recommend death only if the prosecution proves beyond a reasonable doubt
that the aggravating circumstances the offender was found guilty of
committing (and which were proven beyond a reasonable doubt) are sufficient
to outweigh the factors in mitigation." A recommendation of death from the
jury must be unanimous; absent such a finding (i.e. if the jury is unable to
28 2
The Ohio Supreme Court has
decide), a life sentence must be imposed.
ruled that jurors should receive a no-acquittal-first type instruction, to the
effect that "you are not required to determine unanimously that the death
283
sentence is inappropriate before you consider the life sentences," and more
aggravating circumstances the offender was found guilty of committing" and the presentation
of testimony and other evidence to that which is "relevant to the nature and circumstances of
the aggravating circumstances the offender was found guilty of committing'." OHIO REV. CODE

ANN.§ 2929.03(D)(1). The trial court should exclude evidence relevant to guilt but irrelevant
to the penalty phase. State v. Getsy, 702 N.E.2d 866, 887 (Ohio 1988). However, because the
trial court must consider the nature and circumstances of the offense, this provision permits
readmission of much or all that occurred during the trial stage. Ohio v. DePew, 528 N.E.2d

542, 552 (Ohio 1988).
277. The judge should evaluate whether any portions of the State's case are irrelevant
at the penalty stage and be particularly attentive to whether the readmission of all state's
exhibits is proper, or whether some portions are irrelevant to the aggravating circumstance(s)
the offender was found guilty of committing. See DePew, 528 N.E.2d 542 (Ohio 1988).
278. DePew, 528 N.E.2d 542, para. 3 of the syllabus (Ohio 1988).
279. Ohio v. Raglin, 699 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ohio 1998). The impact of the capital
murder on the victim's family may be offered in rebuttal when the defendant presented evidence
that he brought joy to the lives of others. Ohio v. McNeill, 700 N.E.2d 596, 605-606 (Ohio
1998). Admission of victim impact evidence is not specifically authorized by statute in Ohio

capital cases, so the question becomes whether such evidence in the trial or penalty phase
depicts the circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime (or more particularly, the
aggravating circumstances). Ohio v. Fautenberry, 650 N.E.2d 878, 882-83 (Ohio 1995) (dicta,
explaining a ruling in Ohio v. Loza, 641 N.E.2d 1082 (1994)).
280.
281.

OHIOREV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(D)(1) (West 1996).
Oiuo REv. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(D)(2) (West 1996).

282. 010 REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(D)(2) (West 1996). If the jurors are unable to
decide unanimously upon one of the life sentences, the judge will make the decision. Ohio v.
Springer, 586 N.E.2d 96, syllabus (Ohio 1992).
283. Ohio v. Brooks, 661 N.E.2d 1030, 1041 (Ohio 1996).
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clearly, should be instructed that "a solitary juror may prevent a death penalty
recommendation by finding that the aggravating circumstances in the case do
not outweigh the mitigating factors."
A jury's recommendation of a life
sentence is binding on the judge.2 5 This process assures that each individual
juror is making the Apprendi findings. Only the unanimous jury can select the
hangman's victims in Ohio.
After the jury has made the requisite findings, the determination of
sentence is a matter for the trial judge and, if death is imposed, the judges of
the Ohio Supreme Court. 2 A jury's unanimous recommendation of death is
given independent review by the judge, i.e. the judge can only impose death
following a death recommendation if the judge finds the aggravating
circumstances the offender was found guilty of committing are sufficient to
outweigh the factors in mitigation beyond a reasonable doubt. Death sentences
are independently reviewed in the Ohio Supreme Court. They are affirmed
only if the Court finds that the evidence supports the aggravating
circumstances, that the aggravating circumstances proven beyond a reasonable
doubt do outweigh the factors in mitigation beyond a reasonable doubt, and
that the sentence of death is appropriate (not excessive or disproportionate to
the penalty imposed in similar cases)."
The appellate review of the
sufficiency of aggravating circumstances is simplified and more natural in
Ohio because the aggravating circumstances have been clearly identified and
subject to proof in the trial phase of the case. Evaluation of whether the
aggravating circumstances outweigh those in mitigation is simplified for the
same reason-most, if not all, evidence on the aggravating side is found in the
trial record, most evidence on the mitigation side is found in the penalty phase
record.288 Apprendi compliance features are thus woven efficiently and
naturally into the Ohio framework.

284.
285.

ld. at 1042.
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(D)(2) (West 1996).

286. Ohio's intermediate appellate judges also make independent decisions about the

appropriateness of the death sentence in cases where the crime occurred between 1981 and
1994. In 1994, Ohio voters amended the Ohio Constitution, allowing the legislature to amend
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2929.05 to make the Ohio Supreme Court the only court of review of
death sentences on direct appeal. Death-sentence cases still proceed to the Court of Appeals
in the event of a denial of state post-conviction relief sought under Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §
2967.21.
287. Oino REv. CODE ANN. § 2929.05(A) (West 1996).
288. Capital defense lawyers in Ohio and elsewhere will weave their mitigation into the
trial phase record as well. "[E]xperts on capital litigation stress the importance of harmonizing
the guilt and penalty phases." Sundby, supranote 60, at 1589. Defense counsel should not think
"of the guilt and penalty phases as independent and distinct productions, [but] rather... as two
acts of a play before the same audience." Id. at 1588.
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Apprendi invites a rethinking of capital trial modeling and how we
bifurcate. This rethinking may, in turn, provide an opportunity to engrain
greater assurances against the risk of mistake into capital litigation systems.
V. CONVICTING, BUT EXCLUDING DEATH, IF TRIAL JURORS RETAIN

LINGERING DOUBTS: ADOPTING A MODIFIED MPC APPROACH

A. THE CHALLENGE
We are making desperately worrisome mistakes, putting persons on death
row who do not belong there, risking their execution. We have a legal system
that does not adequately respond to this risk of error at trial, and that spends
too much time and resources in making up for it later. Reversal rates are
extraordinarily high, as significant errors are not being averted at trial. A
report prepared by James Liebman and a team of lawyers and criminologists
at Columbia University, "A Broken System: Error Rates in Capital Cases,
1973-1995" (June 12, 2000) reveals:
The "overall error rate" for the entire 1973-1995 period, i.e.
the proportion of fully reviewed capital judgments
overturned at one of the three stages (direct appeal, postconviction, and/or federal habeas corpus) due to serious
error, was 68%. ... On retrial, when the errors are cured,
"an astonishing 82% (247 out of 301) of the capital
judgments that were reversed were replaced on retrial with
a sentence less than death, or no sentence at all. In the latter
regard, 7% (22/301) of the reversals for serious error
resulted in a determination on retrial that the defendant was
not guilty of the capital offense."'
Retrials are costly. But we do learn from them the hard lesson that, too often,
we made a mistake in convicting or death-sentencing. 290 Public confidence in
the system is further shaken when it is not the courts that uncover the mistakes
but others, often by perchance. 2' We justly wonder whether there are not
many more mistakes out there that no one has yet to or will ever remedy. No
doubt there are.292 Moratorium measures are resorted to, to prevent mistakes
from becoming irrevocable. Some suggest abolition, a definite cure. Others
289. KAMISAR, LAFAVE & ISRAEL,

to the Ninth Edition, at 80-81.
290. Id.
291.

292.

MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,

Gross, supra note 259, at 497-500.

Id. at 497.

2000 Supplement
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are unwilling to foreclose execution, but are striving for ways to ratchet up the
system and foreclose mistaken executions.
In the absence of abolition, the law needs ratcheting. The law presently
does not direct jurors to be absolutely certain of guilt before sentencing to
death. This silence is threatening. The single counterweight we have seen to
mistake is that "lingering doubt [is] play[ing] a central role in jurors' thinking
about what punishment the defendant deserves."'29 3 Whether presently
constitutionally mandated in all situations or not, residual doubt is in fact
impacting on some decision-making, though not consistently. And, despite the
legal structure that mandates postponing jury discussion and decisions about
penalty, we know jurors are regularly discussing penalty in the trial phase. We
are told most will make up their minds in the trial phase, and most of those
will not change their minds later in the penalty phase. Lingering doubt is
casting a shadow in trial phase deliberations, and some jurors appear willing
to and often do trade off votes, agreeing to convict on questionable evidence
at the trial phase in return for a life sentence in the next phase. So determined
are some jurors to avoid executing one who may be innocent, they will convict
an innocent to save his life.
In essence, despite the Court's best intentions to tell jurors what to think
about, and when to think about it, jurors will not be so constrained. The law
has entrusted them with carrying out a moral imperative, and they are doing
it as they see fit. The law is out of sync with juror's morality, and thus with
our own.
The Capital Jury Project researchers conclude the bifurcation process has
failed as jurors reach premature decisions. Jurors with death-prone beliefs that
should disqualify them reach premature sentencing decisions without
considering, as required to, the evidence beyond the crime; and the trial phase
decision of guilt is being corrupted as well.2'
The evidence here reveals not only the failure to achieve
impartiality in sentencing, but also the failure to protect the
guilt decision from the compounding effects of premature
stands on punishment...The separation of guilt and
punishment decisions through a bifurcated capital trial is
substantially a legal fiction.'
Should we be concerned? If so, about what? When juror behavior is
contrary to the law's expectations, there are a number of possible responses.
293.
294.
295.

Id.
Bowers et al., supra note 60, at 1538-39.
Id. at 1540.
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If jurors are reaching more reliable and appropriate decisions under the
juror's approach, we should change the law to fit the jury practice. Indeed,
most legal reforms have come about by paying attention to what juries do and
adjusting the law to meet the societal value the jurors are reflecting. This is
how the law improves.
If jurors are reaching reliable and appropriate results, we may well let the
law be and place a low priority on directing the jury to follow the existing law.
How low a priority may depend in part on how great the risk that some juries
will deviate from both the expected law and the juror-devised law, and will
reach less reliable decisions, yielding arbitrariness.
If, on the other hand, jurors are reaching less reliable and appropriate
decisions by deviating from the law than the law would achieve if properly
followed, we should intervene to correct juror behavior as promptly as
possible.
What the Capital Jury Project studies reveal is a mixture of these
scenarios. Jurors are reaching more reliable and appropriate decisions about
penalty by considering lingering doubt. But in some instances, this is leading
to less reliable and unwarranted convictions as jurors trade off votes on
conviction for life-sustaining votes at penalty. At the same time, jurors unable
to fairly consider evidence in mitigation are swaying deliberations at the trial
phase toward guilt and toward non-consideration of mitigation by others if the
case proceeds to the penalty phase, contributing to less reliable sentencing
decisions, and perhaps enhancing the risk of an unwarranted conviction.
Clearly, we need to take steps to correct the foreclosed impartiality of deathprone jurors who will not consider, as they are constitutionally required to, the
evidence that calls for a penalty less than death. And we need to attend to the
risk of unwarranted conviction. But as for the rest, the jurors may be pointing
the way to improvements in the law, and demonstrating a commitment to
evolving the law to a stage where fewer mistaken executions will occur. We
should respect, even encourage, that jury behavior, but reject the other.
So the problem is identifying mechanisms that will facilitate some juror
behavior, while also correcting, or at least reducing the damage done by, other
jury behavior.
The confluence of the well-deserved attention to the system's mistakes,
the Capital Jury Project study findings, and the Apprendi decision, provide a
promising backdrop for identifying mechanisms that will reduce our risk of
mistake. They should prompt us to drop-back and look at what we decide, and
when, and how we do it.
As we look creatively for ways to reduce the risk of mistake, "the central
liability of capital punishment," we also need to be aware of practicalities,
efficiency, and expense:
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[W]hat we seek is optimal procedure-and what we are
trying to optimize is the reputation of the system for
dispensing justice.... [W]e are constrained by the
Goldilocks procedural constant, namely, not too much
procedure, not too little procedure, but procedurejust right,
taking into account all relevant considerations.'
Is there a model that can respond to all these considerations?
B. THE MODEL PENAL CODE AS "PROCEDURE JUST RIGHT"

1. Who Should Decide
The Model Penal Code calls for the judge to determine whether the
evidence forecloses all doubt as to guilt at the close of the trial phase of the
case, or at the least, before the penalty phase begins. Jury involvement in this
exclusion determination is a better model,' more consistent with the role the
jury is expected to play, perhaps by Apprendi.2' The question of whether any
doubt remains or lingers is fresh in the minds of the trial phase jury, and the
judge may not always be aware of the doubts jurors have struggled with when
determining guilt. The jurors should be the initial determiners of whether the
evidence -foreclosed all doubt. The judge can then make a de novo,
independent determination, as an additional check on wrongful execution.
2. What JurorsShould Decide
a. Accepting the Inevitable Considerationof Lingering Doubt
Institutionally, we want jurors convicting on proof beyond a reasonable
doubt and refusing to convict when they are not so convinced. We also want
296.

Daniel D. Polsby, Recontextualizing the Context of the DeathPenalty,44 BUFF. L.

REV. 527, 532 (1996) (emphasis added). See also id. at 531 ("Imposing the death penalty

should call for procedures at least as exacting as deciding the winner of the Stanley Cup. If we
would like to be absolutely certain that we do not punish the innocent, we should have more
than one trial. We should insist that guilt be established beyond a reasonable doubt in the best

two out of three. Make that three out of five. ... Arguments of this sort are not to be met with
the exhortations of principle but those of expediency.").
297. See Ronner, supra note 52, at 233 ("One of the basic assumptions behind having
the jury act as decisionmaker is that a group can do better than one." (citations ommitted)).
298. As earlier noted, it is as yet uncertain whether Apprendi will apply to capital

sentencing, and will extend beyond aggravating factors to mitigating ones. The Court may find
a way to distinguish or limit its reach. But jury consideration of lingering doubt will at least

allow those with superior information to render a finding on the most significant mitigating
factor, providing some margin of protection against possible Apprendi error.
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jurors to be a critical bulwark between an innocent accused and the hangman's
noose or the executioner's needle. We can have them do both, reliably, and
yes, expediently, if we regularize the procedure many jurors are now
following. Jurors should be required to decide whether the evidence forecloses
all doubt of guilt. We should accept and embrace'the reality of juror's moral
responses.
Theirs is not a novel response, nor is this a novel concession. The fact
that many sentencers will naturally tend to consider the possibility of mistake
and may up-the-ante accordingly was acknowledged early-on by the United
States Supreme Court. In 1980,. the Court agreed that "the prospects of the
death penalty may affect what [a juror's] honest judgment of the facts will be
or what they may deem to be a reasonable doubt," and that the State of Texas
could not exclude jurors who might be so affected. 2' And, as the California
Supreme Court put it, this affect may be inevitable. "The lingering doubts of
jurors in the guilt phase may well cast their shadows into the penalty phase and
in some measure affect the nature of the punishment. Even were it desirable
to insulate [these] psychological reactions of the jurors as to each trial, no legal
dictum could compel such division .... "
Legal dictum should stop trying to box jurors into ignoring their lingering
doubts. The Model Penal Code embraced the reality that proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is not the same as proof beyond all doubt, and in "the best
thinking" then and now, adopted this distinction as a check on mistakes. It is
time jurisdictions attended to this portion of the Model Penal Code, as they
have regularly done to its other provisions.
b. Previous Legislative Incarnationsof the MPC Approach
No death-sentencing state has yet followed the Model Penal Code (MPC)
formulation in its proposed form, with the judge determining whether the
evidence forecloses all doubt as to guilt at the close of the trial phase of the
case, or at the least, before the penalty phase begins. But, in the past,
Washington and Georgia utilized similar procedures directing attention to the
issue of whether the evidence proves guilt to a certainty or forecloses all doubt
as to guilt. Washington clearly used it as an exclusion-of-death device.
Washington formerly mandated a special question of the guiltdetermining jury when it reconvened as a sentencing jury.3"' When the jury

299. Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 50 (1980).

300. People v. Terry, 390 P.2d 381, 387 (1964).
301. WASH. REV.CODE § 10.94.020(10)(a) (1977, repealed 1981). The 1977 statute was
declared unconstitutional on other grounds in State v. Frampton, 627 P.2d 922 (Wash. 1981).
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found an aggravating circumstance, and was "...unanimously convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt that there are not sufficient mitigating
circumstances to merit leniency..." the jury was required to answer another
question on its penalty phase verdict form. "Did the evidence presented at trial
establish the guilt of the defendant with clear certainty?"' If the jury did not
answer "yes" unanimously, the death sentence could not be imposed. If death
was imposed, this finding, along with others, was reviewed for purposes of
sufficiency in the Washington Supreme Court.303
It is unclear how many death verdicts were precluded in Washington due
to the absence of a finding of guilt to a clear certainty. There is one reported
appellate case reflecting an exclusion, where the defendant appealed on other
issues that drew the Washington Court of Appeals to recite how the exclusion
came about.' David Duhaime was given a life sentence because a penalty
phase juror wrote the judge that he had been pressured by the foreman and
other jurors into agreeing to find premeditation in trial phase deliberations
days before. The judge instructed the jury to proceed with deliberations in the
penalty phase. The jury returned its verdict in regard to aggravating and
mitigating circumstances, finding that the State had proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that aggravating circumstances were present and that there
were not sufficient mitigating circumstances to wanant leniency. The Court
recites: "All jurors responded affirmatively when polled [on that question.].
After further proceedings, the jury then determined that the evidence had not
established premeditated first degree murder with clear certainty.
Accordingly, the death penalty was not imposed but the defendant's sentence
on the premeditated murder in the first degree conviction was life
imprisonment without possibility of release or parole. RCW 9A.32.040(2)."3' 5
As it appeared the juror actually had reasonable doubt, Duhaime argued that
the trial court erred in not ordering a new trial on premeditated murder, but a
majority of the appellate court disagreed on procedural grounds.
The Duhaime case confirms that preclusion did occur under the former
Washington statute. At the same time, it confirms the importance of it as a
check on a wrongful execution. The case demonstrates the inability of some
jurors with doubt about guilt to perceive or use this as a mitigating factor.
Either the juror did not see this as a relevant mitigating factor, or he was
influenced by other jurors not to see it that way. He assented to the verdict
that aggravating circumstances outweighed those in mitigation. In any other
302.
303.
304.
305.

WASH. REv. CODE § 10.94.020(10)(a) (1977, repealed 1981).
WASH. REv. CODE § 10.94.030(3)(a) (1977, repealed 1981).
Washington v. Duhaime, 631 P.2d 964, 968 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981).
Id. at 968.
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state, David Duhaime would have been sentenced to death though one juror
believed the evidence did not prove guilt of capital murder. He was saved
from execution because Washington law mandated proof to "a clear certainty"
of guilt before death could be imposed.
Georgia requested a similar assessment, but not of jurors-instead, of the
trial judge. It does not appear that this worked a preclusion at the penalty
phase; rather its consideration apparently came later. The Georgia Supreme
Court's questionnaire, to be completed by a trial judge at the time of entering
sentence, asked whether the evidence foreclosed all doubt respecting the
defendant's guilt. 6 This "foreclose all doubt" finding from the trial judge was
a part of the statute noted in the landmark decision in Gregg" 7 Georgia's
appellate review procedure was strongly approved by several members of the
Court."' Requiring not only ajudicial finding, but also an appellate review of
it, serves as an added check against mistaken execution. But it is unclear
whether this finding was used as a means of precluding death at either the
sentencing or appellate levels.
c. Reducing Distrustof the System, and Achieving a Rational Parityas to
Exclusions
Illinois and other states should adopt the exclusion identified in the Model
Penal Code and exclude death when the evidence does not foreclose all doubt
as to guilt. This is necessary to avert wrongful executions and is a reasonable,
moral response to our heightened awareness of mistakes. Requiring proof
beyond all or any doubt to execute appears to be precisely the notion that
Governor Ryan is searching for' if the death penalty in Illinois is to be
maintained.
Not only will adoption of this standard help to restore public confidence
in the system, it will help spare jurors from psychological and emotional harm.
Jurors are personally invested in the case, and it is not at all easy to have one's
life in your hands."' The facts in some capital and other cases are so difficult
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-35 (1982).
307. 428 U.S. at 211 (White, J., concurring) (referencing then Ga. Code Sec. 27-2537).
308. Id.at 167 (White, ., concurring).
309. Armstrong &Mills, supra note 1. Governor Ryan's commitment to this was clear:
"...until I can be sure with moral certainty that no innocent man or woman is facing a lethal
injection, no one will meet that fate." Id.
310. Eighty-six percent of capital jurors in one study reported experiencing stress during

306.

the capital trial. Through the Eyes of the Juror: A Manual for Addressing Juror Stress
(Washington D.C., National Ctr. For St. Cts., 1998, available at the NCSC website
www.ncsc.dni.us/research/jurorstr/jurorstr.htm). Jurors may try to distance themselves from the
responsibility as a coping mechanism, lessening the reliability of their decision-making. See
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to bear that juror assistance efforts have begun in some jurisdictions. 3" The

Capital Jury Project studies revealed juror's struggles with the case, and
sometimes with one another. When asked "Is there anything about this case

that sticks in your mind, or that you keep thinking about?" one juror stated, "I
guess, probably just that I never will know if she was really guilty! It was
really hard on me; it was really hard on everyone., 312 This juror was
expressing frustration and uncertainty about whether she had convicted an
innocent person to whom she gave a life sentence. The torment experienced
by jurors who learn they convicted and sentenced to death an innocent person
must be unbearable. 3 We should help jurors find a way to cope with that
Garvey, supra note 60, at 1553, n. 64-66 (citing to South Carolina studies recounted in

Theodore Eisenberg, et.al, Jury Responsibility in Capital Sentencing: An EmpiricalStudy, 44
BUFF. L. REv. 339,354 (1996)) (59%of capital jurors in a South Carolina study "stated that the
life or death decision was mostly or strictly the jury's responsibility") and at 353, tbl.l (41%
of capital jurors stated that responsibility for the life or death decision was partly or mostly the
court's responsibility) and to William J. Bowers, The CapitalJury: Is It Tilted Toward Death?,
79 JUDICATURE 220,223 (1996) (concluding that "Most capital jurors (in CJP studies) disclaim
primary or sole responsibility for the awesome life or death decision they must make."). See
also Joseph L. Hoffman, Where's the Buck- JurorMisperceptionof Sentencing Responsibility
in Death PenaltyCases",70 IND. LJ. 1137,1156-1157 (1995); Theodore Eisenberg, et. al., Jury
Responsibility in CapitalSentencing: An EmpiricalStudy, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 339, 363 (1996)
("A clear majority say that 'very few' death-sentenced defendants will ever be executed, and
about seventy percent of jurors believe that 'less than half' or 'very few' will be executed.");
Sally Costanzo & Mark Costanzo, Life or Death Decisions: An Analysis of Capital Jury
Decision Making Underthe Special IssuesSentencing Framework, 18 LAW & HUMAN BEHAV.
151, 162 (1994) ("... many (jurors) were able to discount their own sense of responsibility for
the sentence.").
311. See generally Throughthe Eyes of the Juror:AManualforAddressingJurorStress,
supra, note 311, J. Chris Nordgren and Matthew Thelen, Helping JurorsManage Stress: A
Multilevel Approach, 82 JUDICATURE 256 (May/June 1999); Robert B. Boatright and Beth
Murphy, Behind ClosedDoors: Assisting Jurorswith their Deliberations,82 JUDICATURE 52
(September/October 1999).
312. Bowers et al., supra note 60, at 1579.
313. Three jurors had urged that had they known what they later learned when
determining whether to convict Gary Graham of capital murder, they would not have done so,
and their torment was evident in television interviews surrounding his Texas execution. See also
Geimer and Amsterdam, supra note 54, at 21-23 (relating the resounding regret of ajuror who
had simply convicted Ernest Dobbert and recommended a life sentence). The question at trial
was whether Dobbert had killed his daughter from a premeditated design. The jury
recommended life, but the judge overrode that as allowed under Florida law. Dobbert was
executed. "The jurors and other trial actors knew this was the crucial issue," including the
prosecutor and defense lawyer. Id. at 21. "All jurors interviewed identified doubt about guilt
of first degree murder as the major factor explaining the life recommendation." One said "I
don't think they [the other jurors] thought he premeditated any of it...I would have held out on
the guilt phase if I had known he would be electrocuted. The word was that he wouldn't be
electrocuted." Id. at 22. This interchange not only points out the need to avert damage to jurors,
but also why jurors (and not simply judges) need to be involved in making this exclusion
determination.
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responsibility, a place to put their doubts." 4 We should respect the jurors'
voices, and give them an outlet for their reasoned moral response. We should
approve and guide their decision, rather than setting them adrift. Jurors are not
telepathic."' They deserve confirmation that what they are doing is right and
direction from the court to consider this. It is unseemly for the law to fail to
confirm what jurors have properly been doing to avert mistakes.
Indeed, a legislature's failure to adopt the Model Penal Code exclusion
would be inexplicable in the many jurisdictions that have already adopted
exclusions based on the defendant's age being below eighteen" ' or his mental
retardation." 7 Lingering doubt outstrips mental retardation, already an
exclusion in 14 jurisdictions, by 12.3% as the factor most making jurors much
less likely to vote for death." 8 Nearly half of jurors so responded to lingering
doubt, while just over a third so responded to mental retardation,
demonstrating that mental retardation had but three-fourths of the influence
lingering doubt held in actual juror moral response decision-making.
d. Defining the scope of the lingering doubt exclusion
The scope of the lingering doubt exclusion is the next pertinent inquiry.
The Model Penal Code speaks to foreclosing "all doubt about guilt," i.e., as to
any element of the crime. Apprendi would appear to direct that the jury make
314. Some jurors will take responsibility and struggle over this decision. If such jurors
rely on the absence of ajury instruction directing them to consider residual doubt or view a trial
judge's refusal to so instruct as so indicative, and then they later learn that they could, and that
others did - how do they feel about the law, about this experience, and about themselves?
315. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 551 (1987) (Brennan, J. dissenting).
316. The following states and jurisdictions exclude the death penalty for those
defendants under the age of 18: CA, CO, CT, IL, KS, MD, MT, NE, NJ, NM, NY, OH, OR, TN,

WA, U.S. See Victor L. Streib, The Juvenile Death Penalty Today: Death Sentences and
Executions for Juvenile Crimes, January 1, 1973 - June 30, 2000, available at

http://www.law.onu.edu/faculty/streib/uvdeath.htm. See also Death Penalty Information
Center, Juveniles and the Death Penalty, available at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.orgjuvchar.html. Five states set the minimum death penalty age
at 17: FL, GA, NH, NC, TX. See Streib, supra.
317. States forbidding execution based on the defendant's mental retardation are: AR,
CO, GA, IN, KS, KY, MD, NM, NE, NY*(except for murder by a prisoner), TN, WA, and U.S.
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618 (Michie 1998 & Supp. 2000); Co. REV. STAT. § 16-9-401 to

403 (1998 & Supp. 2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(j) (1997 & Supp. 2000); IND. CODE §

35-36-9-1 (West 1998 &Supp. 2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4623 West 1995 &Supp. 1999);
KY STAT. § 532.140 (Michie 1999 &Supp. 2000); MD. CODE ANN. art. 27 §412 (1996 & Supp.
2000); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.01 (1995); NM STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2.1 (Michie 1978 &
Supp. 2001); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw. 400.27(12) (McKinney 1994 &Supp. 2001); TENN. CODE
ANN. tit. 39, ch. 13, pt.2, § 39-13-203 (1997 & Supp. 2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
10.95.030 (West 1990 & Supp. 2001); 18 U.S.C. § 3597(c) (1994).
318. Bowers et al., supranote 60, at 1535, tbl. 12.

§
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decisions beyond a reasonable doubt about facts beyond the traditional
elements of the crime alone, i.e. "facts that increase the prescribed range of
penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed."3 9 In capital sentencing,
Apprendi will require proof beyond a reasonable doubt findings as to the
aggravating circumstances. The Model Penal Code had allotted that
aggravating circumstances might be established by the evidence at trial or
could be established at the penalty phase, and provided for another exclusion
of death if "none of the aggravating circumstances enumerated ... was
established by the evidence at the trial or will be established if further
proceedings are initiated." 2 ' From these provisions, it would appear the
Model Penal Code may not have required the evidence to foreclose all doubt
as to aggravating circumstances. But this may simply have been a
consequence of the fact that the drafters believed it likely that proof of the
aggravating circumstances would often come later at the penalty phase, and the
exclusion decision on foreclosing all doubt should not be made before the state
presented its case. Still, there was clearly a willingness to exclude if none of
the circumstances will be established later, so the drafters were willing to
exclude when aggravating circumstances were or would be wanting. If a
jurisdiction has a bifurcation like Ohio's, or will adopt one in the wake of
Apprendi, then the "foreclose all doubt" standard should apply to the
aggravating circumstances as well as to the elements of the crime. We should
not be risking execution of those undeserving of death.
Professor Craig M. Bradley has urged that the death penalty be excluded
"if any juror retained any lingering doubt about the defendant's guilt,"132 but
his is a more modest proposal. Professor Bradley would limit his exclusion to
instances which "...render the defendant completely innocent of the
crime ...such as alibi, or mistaken identity, that, if accepted, would negate any
criminal connection to the death or the crime that caused it."' He concluded
"no heightened standard should generally be applied to such matters as mens
rea at the trial stage or aggravating factors... at the penalty phase," although
"a [defendant's] claim of total non-participation, or total non-awareness that
his participation was criminal, should be subject to the heightened standard." 3
One can understand Professor Bradley's inclination to narrow the concept to
such examples of mistaken identity, for these are indeed the most chilling and
disturbing - we may be executing a person wholly innocent of any
319.

119 S.Ct. at 2362-63 (citations omitted).

320.

MODEL PENAL CODE

323.

Id. (emphasis added).

§ 210.6(I)(a) (1980).

321. Bradley, supra note 13, at 27.
322. Id.
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wrongdoing at all. But Professor Bradley concedes his narrowing principle
presents "difficult case(s)," and "it would not be inappropriate" to apply the
heightened standard in other settings, e.g. where the person was present at the
scene but not aware or participating, or where the defendant was merely
negligent in accidentally causing a death. 3" Professor Bradley's narrowing
construct is inconsistent with the Model Penal Code, and it is not sufficiently
workable or necessary.
There is agreement that this should be a matter for the jury, rather than
the judge.3 2 Expecting the jury to be able to make the rather fine distinctions
among fact-patterns that Professor Bradley is suggesting may well be asking
too much. Indeed, it is akin to the distinction attempted in the Franklin case,
that courts themselves struggle with so unsuccessfully that they appear to have
given up the effort and just concluded residual doubts are never relevant.32
The jury instructions Professor Bradley's proposal entails would be difficult
to frame and administer if dependent on such factual distinctions, posing a
greater potential for error in their implementation or for error being found on
review for not properly framing them.
The Model Penal Code speaks to any doubt of guilt of the capital offense,
and this includes all the elements thereof. That is appropriate. Requiring that
the evidence foreclose all doubt as to guilt (and if proven in the trial phase, the
aggravating circumstances) will give assurance that we have not condemned
a person whose intent or actions do not in the end deserve the death sentence
under the law as defined in the state.
3. When JurorsShould Decide
Both the Washington and Georgia provisions engaged the foreclose-alldoubt question at the close of the penalty phase. This timing will often be both
too costly and too late.
The Capital Jury Project expresses concern about premature decisionmaking and the discussion of penalty in the trial phase, urging that bifurcation
is a legal fiction and that procedural safeguards are being compromised or lost.
That is all true insofar as juror predisposition toward death exists. But to
determine whether we should be concerned about bifurcation being a legal
fiction generally, we need to look more carefully at the rationales for
bifurcation, and whether any are served by postponing consideration of
whether the evidence forecloses all doubt as to guilt.
324. Id. at 27-28.
325.

d at 28.

326. See Section IV, supra.
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To get to "procedure just right," we need to be willing to think outside the
bifurcation box the Court has created. We need to see if that box is confining
us, preventing us from making strides against mistaken executions, and/or is
expending too many resources with little or no societal benefit.
The Model Penal Code and the Court devised a bifurcated system to
avoid irrelevant and prejudicial information flowing to the jurors at the trial
phase and to ensure their adequate access to relevant information and guidance
on how to use it at the sentencing phase. These interests are not compromised
by determining the presence of lingering doubt in or at the close of the trial
phase.
Making this finding at trial does not present a risk that information relevant at
sentencing but prejudicial to the trial determination will be submitted. Nor is
juror inexperience a concern. Jurors have just engaged in an inquiry very close
to the one expected, indeed the difference is simply one of degree of certainty
on the same facts. No disparate or unusual analyses are required, and jurors
can be adequately guided by instruction.
Finally, the jurors will usually already have all the information they need
to decide the question at a point during or at the close of the trial phase.
Sometimes more information may be helpful or necessary for a full and fair
determination of whether the evidence foreclosed all doubt as to guilt and/or
the aggravating circumstances (if these were proven at the trial phase). This
could occur where exculpatory information was not admissible at trial under
the rules of evidence. In those cases, two options arise. An initial
determination could still be made at the trial phase, and then, if need be,
revisited with the evidence submitted in a separate proceeding that would
occur after the trial phase and before the penalty phase. Alternatively, the
decision could be postponed to the separate proceeding where the information
would be submitted. The defense should have the opportunity to elect which
path will resolve the foreclose-all-doubt issue. Defense counsel may fear that
the jury who made a finding at the close of the trial phase that the evidence had
foreclosed all doubt may not be willing to revisit this as openly or thoroughly,
and may prefer one slightly later bite at this averting mistakes apple.
Since the rationales underlying bifurcation are not unsettled by
determining this in or at the close of the trial phase, to find the "procedure just
right" we should look to whether other interests are served by not postponing
to the penalty phase.
The most readily apparent interest is that of cost-savings. Jury studies tell
us that most jurors make up their minds about sentence during the trial phase,
that most do not change their minds in the penalty phase, that lingering doubt
is central to the determination of sentence, and that it is most significant of
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mitigating factors.327 If lingering doubt is present in the case, it is generally
both identifiable and actionable at the close of the trial phase. Postponing its
consideration until the penalty phase imposes heavy resource and emotional
expenditures on the courts, on counsel, on the defendant and on victim's
families.
These expenses and burdens are unnecessary if one can justly conclude
that the result of the penalty phase would seldom, if ever, be different from
that following the trial phase. Given the strength of lingering doubt in jury
decision-making, the outcome following the penalty phase is not likely to be
different than that following the trial phase. Even if it were different on
occasion, we are not jeopardizing society if we allow a somewhat less likely
innocent person to be incarcerated for life.3 More importantly, postponing
into the penalty phase runs the risk that jurors will be swayed to death by
prosecutorial arguments or evidence, and that jurors will be distracted from
making averting mistake their first priority.
The legislative exclusions already crafted for the mentally retarded and
for youthful offenders are usually pre-penalty phase for the same cost-savings
efficiency reasons. By making the foreclose-all-doubt determination prior to
the penalty phase, we save limited capital litigation resources, relieve human
trauma, and begin to restore public confidence in the system's reliability and
efficiency.
The only good reason to forego a prompt determination in the trial phase
or at the close of it is if jurors may make a more accurate decision about
whether the evidence forecloses all doubt later rather than sooner. We can
point to instances where jurors needed time for quieter, less pressured
reflection to make a decision about guilt.3"' Deliberations can be exhausting

327. Bowers et al., supra note 60, at 1544.
328. Further, if a different result, a death sentence were to be imposed in a few cases
following the penalty phase, we would expect that there would be intense resources expended
in the post-sentencing processes in these cases. These are the type that would generate greater
attention in the courts and among the public. See Gross, supra note 259, at 497-98. There is
also a greater likelihood of reversal and then the further expenditures in a retrial if one is
conducted.
329. For instance, in the David Duhaime case, the juror wrote to the trial judge during
penalty deliberations three days after being polled and assenting to the trial phase verdict of
guilt: "I do not want to leave the impression I was coerced into my original verdict decision.
I will only say we did not have the amount of quiet time for personal reflection that we should
have had. I felt pressured by time, by the jury foreman, and by other jurors to make a decision
which I now know was wrong. Subsequent to my decision there was quiet time completely
unpressured by others when I could have and should have changed my decision. It is a matter
of my personal weakness that I did not change my decision at that time." Duhaime, 631 P.2d
at 968.
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and difficult places for jurors to come to full self-awareness.33 More study on
this question may be appropriate. The most resource-efficient and safest
course appears to be a determination in or after the trial phase, with a judge's
willingness to re-visit the matter in the penalty phase if circumstances arise
indicating a need to do so, as they did in the Duhaime case. Again, if defense
counsel wishes to have the question postponed to the penalty phase in order to
provide further information to the jury respecting the question, the defense has
a right of postponement. Perhaps providing the defense with an option to
postpone for other reasons as well is an apt protective device.33'
In the absence of special circumstances, the exclusion of death should
occur at a point when the costs of an unnecessary penalty phase can be
avoided.
By thinking outside the bifurcation box and adopting a pre-penalty phase
determination of foreclose-all-doubt, the slippery slope re-trial problem that
the Franklin plurality relied upon is removed. The plurality urged that
recognizing a right to argue residual doubt to a capital sentencing jury would
logically compel a conclusion that penalty-only retrials would violate Eighth
Amendment rights.332 Shifting the determination from the penalty phase to a
point before the penalty phase relieves this concern altogether. With a trial
jury's finding that the evidence forecloses all doubt as to guilt intact, a retrial
devoted to penalty only will not be expected to reproduce the trial phase
evidence; the determination has been made by the appropriate body. 333

330. See Bowers, Sandys, and Steiner, supra note 60, at 1495-96 (discussing jurors who
did not come to realize until the point of deliberations what their feeling were about views of
the evidence); Sandys, supra note 60, (Crossovers, discussion of juror difficulties).
331. Defense counsel may want earlier juror input to help narrow the issues for its
penalty phase presentation. If an earlier determination is sought, and a finding of evidence
foreclosing all doubt is made, defense counsel are likely put on notice that jurors may not be
willing to listen further to aclaim of innocence, unless significant new information is presented.
Indeed, jurors in denial defense cases may well turn against the defendant who refuses to accept

responsibility, or whose counsel appears to be chastising the jury for its earlier verdict. See

Sundby, supra note 60, at 1574-76, 1580. Death sentences are more common in denial defense
cases. Id. at 1574-75. If defense counsel has pursued a denial defense in the context of a
multiple actor homicide and the state's case has been circumstantial, the likelihood of a life
sentence due to lingering doubt is enhanced. Id. at 1580. Perhaps defense counsel may find
instances when postponing to the penalty phase allows a cautious re-positioning of the defense
case, or that the inquiry works more effectively when the jury has before it a bigger picture that
includes other evidence in mitigation. Jurors may also need time away from prejudicial
influences arising during the trial phase to make a more accurate decision.

332. 487 U.S. at 173-174 n.6.
333. If on the other hand, the presentation at the trial phase included determinations
respecting the presence of aggravating circumstances, as does the Ohio model, it appears to be

necessary to revisit the trial phase case to discern whether aggravating circumstances are

sufficient to outweigh the factors in mitigation. See Margery Malkin Koosed, On Seeking
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Retrials of the penalty phase can proceed without jeopardizing the rights of the
defendant.33 4 In those instances when the determination of foreclose-all-doubt
is postponed, this concern may well prompt the use of a separate proceeding
to avoid the retrial problem.335 The retrial problem is removed when a kneejerk approach to bifurcation is rejected and the principles underlying
bifurcation and our need to avert mistakes are the focus.
4. How JurorsShould Decide
a. Making This Partof the Trial Phase Deliberations
The more challenging question is not what, or when, but how jurors
should be asked to make this finding. Professor Bradley suggests the issue
should be given to the jurors after the finding of guilt, to avoid the problem of
possible compromise verdicts.
If the jury were to receive the residual doubt instruction
along with all the other instructions, defendants would argue
that this might lead jurors to compromise by finding them
guilty, but with lingering doubts precluding death, where the
defendant would otherwise have been acquitted due to those
doubts. Obviously, if the jury is unaware of the possibility
that residual doubts might preclude the application of the
death penalty, that could have no effect on their
determination of guilt.33
Professor Bradley is correct that we need to focus on alleviating any danger of
increasing the risk of unwarranted convictions. Indeed, he made his proposal
Controlling Law and Re-Seeking Death Under Section 2929.06 of the Ohio Revised Code, 46
CLEV.-MARSHALL L. REv. 261, 278-280 (1998).
334. There may be other good reasons not to pursue penalty retrials. Prosecutors may
decline to retry in any event, to avoid undue resource expenditure, and recognizing from a

societal interest perspective that the costs do not provide a significant benefit: the defendant will
die a natural death in prison in any event in all, or nearly all, cases. Id. at 283-287.
Additionally, jurisdictions that foreclose penalty retrials, and simply impose life sentences when
defendants win a reversal of penalty, encourage defendants to forego pursuing their trial phase
claims in later review, saving further resources in the appellate and post-conviction processes.
Id. at 284-285 fn. 111.
335. If the determination does take place in the penalty phase, this would not inevitably
present a need for re-presentation of the trial phase case on retrial. The error complained of that
prompted reversal may not have influenced the jury's foreclose-all-doubt finding. A resentencing court should attend to whether the foreclose-all-doubt finding should be revisited on
a case-by-case basis. If re-presentation is necessary in an occasional case, so be it. That is a
small price to pay for assuring against mistaken executions.
336. Bradley, supra note 13, at 29.
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in 1996 when the bulk of the Capital Jury Project's findings relating to
corruption of the guilt phase were not yet released. We now know that
corruption is taking place and that we need to cure this problem.
It seems that Professor Bradley's concern is alleviated if, as he says, the
jury is unaware that residual doubts might preclude the application of the death
penalty. He seems to assume the jury will be told in trial phase instructions
why they are being asked to make this finding, but that should not be assumed.
Special verdicts requests often come with no explanation, and the more
common these have become and may be included in a capital case, the less
likely the jurors are to speculate upon it. 337 Further, the .scope of juror
education is increasingly left to the states to decide. Even with constitutional
considerations at hand, present United States Supreme Court caselaw may
33
arguably permit a "don't tell" policy, even if the jurors "do ask., 1
The Capital Jury Project findings conclude that some jurors with doubts,
even reasonable ones, trade off their vote in the trial phase to assure against
execution, and this is corrupting the trial phase deliberations. There is
confirmation then that jurors are compromising the trial phase with an eye to
the penalty phase. The question is whether propounding three verdict forms
to the trial phase jury-one not-guilty, one guilty by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, and one guilty by proof beyond all doubt, for instance-will
induce those jurors with reasonable doubts to hold to them, or will induce
them to give them away. This is a question that deserves further study.
There are good reasons to expect that presenting the issue in the trial
phase deliberations will assist jurors with doubts to assess them accurately.
Propounding the three verdict forms would seem to invite a natural
progression in juror thinking and promote a greater appreciation of the
meaning of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. This may, in turn, provide
337. For instance, in Ohio, jurors will commonly receive in capital cases not only the
individual aggravating circumstances verdict forms, but also forms relating to firearms
specifications (Revised Code Sections 2941.141, 2941.144, 2941.145), and in rape cases,
perhaps sexual motivation or sexually violent predator specifications (2941.147,2941.148), and
in drug cases, specification of major drug offender (2941.1410), and in general recidivist
settings, repeat violent offender specifications (2941.149). See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2941.141, 2941.144, 2941.145,2941.147, 2941.148, 2941.149,2941.1410 (West 1996).
338. See California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983); California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538
(1987); Franklin,487 U.S. at 172-83; Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269 (1998); Jones v.
United States, 527 U.S. 373 (1999); Weeks v. Angelone, 120 S.Ct. 727 (2000); Ramdass v.
Angelone, 120 S.Ct. 2113 (2000). Forjust a recent sampling of the vast critique of these cases,

see Stephen P. Garvey, et. al., CorrectingDeadly Confusion: Responding to Jury Inquiries in
Capital Cases, 85 CORNELLL. REV. 627 (2000); James Luginbuhl & Julie Howe, Discretion
in CapitalSentencing Instructions:GuidedorMisguided?,70 IND. L.J. 1161 (1995). The Court

may give further insight into this issue when deciding Shafer v. South Carolina, cert. granted
121 S.Ct. 30 (September 26, 2000) (ruling below at 531 S.E.2d 254 (S.C. 2000)).
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greater reliability to the verdict returned. Jurors can become more capable
sorters and deliberators by recognizing what human experience tells us, that
there is a difference between proof beyond a reasonable doubt and absolute
certainty. Jurors will be better able to distinguish their doubts, and having
done so, better able to compartmentalize and articulate and hold to that
position. A good deal of the concern running through the Capital Jury Project
studies is that the jurors who may hold lingering doubts are pressured to give
them up because these are chastised by other jurors as irrelevant or unworthy
or contrary to morality.339 If jurors are informed there is a distinction to be
made, this should deter those jurors prone to pressure others, and should
empower the jurors who have doubts to be able to think those through with
less influence from others.
On the other hand, if this is not the case and pressures remain, then
waiting until after the trial phase verdicts are returned may provide some
reflection time that is needed to make an accurate decision about foreclosingall-doubt.
But waiting until after the trial phase deliberations does nothing to avoid
corruption of the trial phase verdict already returned. The trading off of votes
may already have occurred. All we are then accomplishing by making the
decision prior to the penalty phase is a savings of the expense of that phase,
and that is only if we can assume that jurors will be told at the later proceeding
why they are doing this, and will act upon the prior arrangement. If this is
done at the trial phase, it should provide strength to those jurors so that they
can avoid negotiating, and they will not be leveraged into convicting a person
they reasonably believe may be innocent.
Too, if we wait until after the trial phase we do nothing to relieve juror
discomfort with disregarding the court's directives to focus only on proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, and we do not attend to juror concerns about the
risk of mistake. We thereby continue to invite arbitrary and inconsistent
decision-making around this issue, which may be difficult to undo later. Jurors
may be understandably frustrated when they learn that their earlier struggles
and disagreements over the role of lingering doubts could have been avoided
if they were just told sooner. Jurors should be invited and expected to make
this decision when these concerns are befalling them, which we know they are
during trial phase deliberations.
For these reasons, deciding at the trial phase seems to be the better option.

339.

Bowers et al., supra note 60, at 1528-1529.
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b. Requiring an Individualized Verdict
The best solution is to seek a procedure that gives the jurors needed
guidance so they can distinguish among their doubts, and that also avoids the
risk of undue influence being brought to bear that sways them to a decision
they do not honestly hold. Such a solution would seem to both empower
jurors to make more reliable individual decisions, and empower them to hold
to them.
The proposal advanced here is that jurors be told of the three possible
verdicts (not guilty, guilty by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and guilty by
proof beyond all doubt), but that the latter verdict is an individual verdict. By
requiring each juror enter his or her individual verdict on an individual form,
we can reduce the likelihood of improper pressures being brought to bear and
can preserve what should be the juror's individual moral response to the
evidence presented. The individual juror's responsibility would then be the
same type that we utilize in the penalty phase respecting mitigating factors.
Requiring unanimous findings as to the presence or absence of mitigating
factors is unconstitutional because it "risks erroneous imposition of the death
sentence."'
As we have seen, lingering doubt is the most compelling of
mitigating factors in jury practice and to our moral sense. To require that
jurors deliberate towards achieving unanimity on this trial phase determination
is illogical when, if the matter was considered in the penalty phase, it could not
be subject to such a constraint under Mills. By focusing on an individual
decision of each juror and dispensing with deliberations towards unanimity,
we reduce the likelihood of improper pressures and give the assurance we need
against the risk of an erroneous imposition of the death sentence.
An individualized verdict practice appears to be available in the federal
death penalty statute to assure the "Right of defendant to justice without
discrimination., 34' The statute requires that jurors be instructed that the jury
is not to recommend a sentence of death unless it has concluded that it would
recommend a sentence of death no matter what the race or other characteristics
of the defendant or the victim may be. The statute mandates "The jury shall
return to the court a certificate signed by each juror" to this effect.34 2 We
should be at least as attentive to the risk of mistake as we are to the risk of
discrimination.

340. Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 375 (1988); see also McKoy v. North Carolina,
494 U.S. 433, 442 (1990).
341. 21 U.S.C. § 848(o) (1994).
342. Id.
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c. The verdict's consequences
If one or more jurors conclude that the evidence does not foreclose all
doubt as to guilt, a life sentence must be imposed. If there are varying life
sentences available upon conviction and additional factual findings to be
made, then Apprendi would suggest the jury reconvene to make the requisite
findings. Otherwise, the judge would enter a life sentence.
If all jurors concluded in the trial phase that the evidence foreclosed all
doubt as to guilt, then the case may proceed to a penalty phase where death can
be considered. The matter must be re-visited with a separate individual verdict
form at the close of the penalty phase if additional evidence was presented by
the defense that was not admissible in the trial phase. The matter may be revisited in the same form for other reasons, in the court's discretion. Residual
doubt is relevant then to the special question and should be considered as a
relevant mitigating circumstance, among others, even if no special question
will be propounded. Jury instructions should be given on residual doubt in
those settings." 3 To avoid a bias in the penalty phase arising from a prior
finding adverse to the defense in the trial phase, the jury instructions given at
the trial phase should clearly enunciate that the juror's individual decision is
"based on the evidence presented to you in this proceeding."
d. A sampling ofpossiblejury instructions
Jury instructions on this matter need to be clear and specific, for the
juror's tendencies will be to rely on proof beyond a reasonable doubt and
unanimity approaches. 3" Possible formulations for jury instruction may
include:

343. On need for specificjury instructions regarding all mitigating factors, see Luginbuhl
& Howe, supra note 339, at 1165-66, tbl. 1.

344. Id. at 1171 ("[ T]he jury has arrived at the penalty phase precisely because they
have employed the criteria of reasonable doubt and unanimity in finding the defendant guilty

of capital murder. Thus, these concepts (in Mills) are firmly embedded in the jurors' minds, and

are not easily dislodged."). While the jurors will still be in the trial phase, and the concepts less
firmly embedded, the concepts will still differ from the others with which they will be dealing.
See also Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 61, at 14 (1993) ("The juror favoring life faces a
struggle against initial opposition that will last throughout the deliberations and continue to
annoy fellow jurors in post-trial interviews. Depriving jurors of full knowledge of life-favoring

legal standards (about parole eligibility) may not directly cause them to vote for death, but
confusion about such standards mutes the impact of burdens of proof designed to favor life.").

Written jury instructions should be provided. Frank & Applegate, Assessing Juror
Understandingof CapitalSentencing Instructions,44 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY No. 3, 412,

423 (1998).
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If you unanimously find that the State has proven beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of
aggravated murder, it is then your individual duty to decide
the following special question:
[choose one of the four following formulations:] ...
Based on the evidence you have received in this proceeding,
are you convinced beyond all doubt of each and every one
of the elements of the crime of aggravated murder?
Or
Based on the evidence you have received in this proceeding,
has the prosecution foreclosed all doubt in your mind that
the defendant [repeat all of the elements of the crime of
aggravated murder]?
Or
After considering all the evidence in this proceeding, has the
prosecution proven to an absolute certainty in your mind
that the defendant [repeat all of the elements of the crime of
aggravated murder]?
Or
After considering all the evidence in this proceeding, do you
have any doubt at all, however slight, that the defendant
[repeat all of the elements of the crime of aggravated
murder]?
If you reach this point, your finding or verdict on this
additional question will be expressed in a separate verdict
form. Each of you will receive your own verdict form.
This additional question is to be answered by each of you,
individually. You do not need to, and you should not,
deliberate as a body on this question. The law does not
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expect a unanimous verdict on this question. Rather, the
law requires that you record your own personal assessment,
whatever that may be. As your own personal assessment is
sought, and that can be different from that of other jurors on
this question, there is no need to deliberate upon this as you
have with respect to other matters in this case. A separate
form will be provided to each of you for the purpose of
recording your own personal response to this question.
If you find the defendant not guilty of aggravated murder,
you will not consider or respond to this separate question.
No doubt those with expertise in drafting jury instructions will find some
appropriate means of improving the draft provided above. The instructions
and accompanying verdict forms need careful attention to achieve the goal of
averting mistaken executions.
A proposal to adopt this modified-MPC approach is presently pending in
the Ohio House of Representatives, in H.B. 300. This bill would amend Ohio
Revised Code 2929.03(B) to require the trial jury (or the panel of three judges
who are the triers of fact if the jury is waived) to determine, in its verdict at the
trial phase, not only whether it finds the defendant guilty of the charge of
aggravated murder with specification(s) beyond a reasonable doubt, but also
whether it finds the charge proven beyond any doubt. Proof beyond any doubt
is defined in the bill as "proof of such character that the jurors do not have any
'
doubt, no matter how slight, that the charge is true."345
If the jury or panel of
three judges finds proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but does not so find the
charge proven beyond (any) doubt, then no penalty phase will be conducted;
the sentencing judge must simply choose among the life sentences when
sentencing upon the offense(s) of conviction. The conviction remains intact,
of course, due to the proof beyond a reasonable doubt verdict underlying it.
In this respect, the proposal treats any doubt about guilt as it would the
defendant's age below eighteen in Ohio - death is excluded as a penalty.
e. CompanionMeasuresfor Even GreaterProtection
To further assure against mistake, the jurors' finding that the evidence
forecloses all doubt should not yield a penalty phase unless the trial judge
comes to the same conclusion after an independent de novo consideration of
34 6
the matter.
345.
346.

H.R. 300, 123rd Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1999).
These findings would also be subject to later independent review by the appellate
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Making the foreclose-all-doubt determination in the trial phase indirectly
responds to the other concern identified in the Capital Jury Project studies: that
some jurors are so predisposed to death once the crime is proven beyond a
reasonable doubt that they will not consider evidence in mitigation in the
penalty phase. If one or more jurors have a lingering doubt in the trial phase,
the case will not proceed to the penalty phase. The foreclosed impartiality of
death predisposed jurors will not have an opportunity to affect penalty phase
decisions. The life sentence will be insulated from their impermissible bias.
If instead the determination is deferred into the penalty phase, or repeated
there, it will be essential to engage a second voir dire before the penalty phase
to requalify jurors, as the researchers suggested.347 Only those jurors free of
influences that would foreclose their willingness to consider evidence in
mitigation, and who were willing to assess whether the evidence foreclosed all
doubt as to guilt, would qualify for service in the penalty phase jury.
Alternatively, lingering doubt may be exempted from discussion in the
requalifying process.348 In order to assure adequate numbers of jurors are
available in the event of disqualification of some, judges should empanel a
larger number of alternate jurors who can serve as replacement jurors.349
CONCLUSION
The Capital Jury Project researchers suggested there is "no easy or
obvious remedy" to the problems they identified. That is true. But if we are
willing to think creatively about the process of capital litigation at the same
time we look to the better thinking in the Model Penal Code that formed the
basis of the present system, we may just arrive at a manageable measure that
could help avert mistaken executions. A modified Model Penal Code
approach, requiring that jurors individually confirm in the trial phase that the
evidence forecloses all doubt as to guilt, may just be "procedure just right" for
some of what ails us.

court. See Geimer & Amsterdam, supra note 54, at 22 ("Of course, no appellate court can
effectively address the practice of trading away reasonable doubt about guilt in return for
sentencing recommendations: jurors violate their oaths by doing so. However, recognizing the
legitimacy of lingering doubt as a mitigating factor and providing a way for juries to indicate
its presence would furnish a vehicle for appellate consideration of a matter this study found to
be very important in many capital cases.").
347. Bowers, Sandys, and Steiner, supra note 60, at 1546.
348. Id.
349. These alternates should have observed the entire trial, as did the regular jurors.
Further, the trial court may require alternates to observe trial phase deliberations from afar by
means of closed-circuit television.

